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Abstract 
 
“The Face of Things: The Posthumanist Imagination in Eighteenth-Century Britain” 
examines how eighteenth-century British subjects negotiated their identities in response to the 
increased contact with nonhuman agents—plants, animals, diseases, and automata—facilitated 
by global networks of commerce and science. Throughout the project, I argue that such 
transactions that reckon the agency and vitality of “things”—the broadly construed nonhuman—
led British writers to question anthropocentric and Eurocentric ideas and practices, by collapsing 
key conceptual distinctions between the human and the nonhuman, the British and their colonial 
others. Building on the new-materialist understanding that “things” exhibit an agency 
independent of human intent, this project reveals British subjectivity in the period as anxious and 
unstable, contradicting the image of enlightenment writers as asserting a confident, rational 
mastery over their environs. Each chapter of the dissertation epitomizes different kinds of 
enlightened attempts and failures to contain the nonhuman: Chapter 2 charts Britons’ strenuous 
efforts to domesticate the elephant through a broad range of cultural artifacts, including poems, 
anatomy reports, it-narratives, and automata. Focusing on the Journal of the Plague Year and 
The Storm, Chapter 3 examines Defoe’s attempts to impose order on the force of disasters 
through his construction of an idealized but ultimately compromised “information manager.” 
Attending to how Swift’s eponymous protagonist is turned alternately into a golem and a toy 
doll, Chapter 4 reads Gulliver’s Travels as a fearful meditation on the potential 
interchangeability of humans and machines. Chapter 5 reveals how Barbauld’s poems imagine 
the aesthetic appreciation of animals as a catalyst for ethical action, theorizing an empirical 
foundation for inter-special, transnational community. “The Face of Things” engages with recent 
turns toward posthumanism and environmental ethics in literary studies by highlighting both the 
autonomy of marginalized objects and animals and the interconnectedness of the human and 
nonhuman. The ultimate stakes of the project are therefore both political and ethical. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION: BRITISH SUBJECTHOODS, THINGS, AND POSTHUMANISM  
IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 
 
Yet all things everywhere are not held in packed tight  
In a mass of body. There is void in things.  
… By void I mean intangible empty space. 
If there were none, in no way could things move.  
For matter, whose function is to oppose and obstruct, 
Would at all times be present in all things,  
So nothing could move forward, because nothing 
Could ever make a start by yielding to it.  
Lucretius, De Rerum Naturae (c. 50 BCE)1 
 
For the essence of words and images is formed of bodily motions alone, which involve in no 
way whatever the conception of thought.  
Baruch de Spinoza, (1677)2 
Matter is always already an ongoing historicity.  
Karen Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity” (2003)3 
 
 
Taking ‘Things’ Seriously  
 
Rather than adhering to the formal conventions governing the introductory chapter as a 
genre, I want to begin with a brief detour through two literary vignettes from contemporary 
novels that elucidate the central concerns and methodology of my dissertation: Martin Page’s La 
libellule de ses huit ans (2003) and Ian McEwan’s Solar (2010). Page’s La libellule de ses huit 
ans, a mediocre social satire of the modern art world in France, has one undeniably redeeming 
virtue: it puts forth as its protagonist Fio Régale—a social outcast invested in doing justice to a 
world that appears to have passed the point of correction in her eyes, both by stealing overpriced 
artworks and by punishing pieces of furniture and everyday machinery populating her domestic 
space. More importantly, Régale’s twofold ways of serving justice indicates the degree to which 
                                                
1 Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe, Trans. Sir Ronald Melville (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 
13. 
2 Baruch de Spinoza, The Philosophy of Spinoza, ed. Joseph Ratner (Tudor Publishing Company, 2007), 
195.  
3 Karen Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to 
Matter” Signs 28.3 (2003): 801-31, 821.  
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she takes the agency of objects seriously. On the one hand, she interferes with the modern art 
trade, where art objects are elevated to the status of fetishes in a way that enables artworks to 
exert overpowering authority over curators, auctioneers, and collectors—the wide-ranging 
human subjects obsessed with determining the value and price of artworks. Probably the telling 
irony implicated in this process of artistic and commercial assessments, of which the protagonist 
is critical, is the way pricing overrides the actual value of artworks. Régale’s criminal 
intervention in high culture can thus be understood as an attempt to curb the already well-
established circulation of fetishes. As another part of her performative justice, Régale shoots a 
refrigerator that refuses to close properly, and physically punishes a chair upon which she 
stumbles. In her mind, the agential power of machinery and furniture works as a synonym for the 
wrong that runs deep in the world. She also displays in a ludicrous way the somatic and bodily 
relationship owners have with their everyday objects, pieces of furniture or electronic devices 
that are supposed to be static and accommodating. In Régale’s small universe, the refrigerator is 
perceived as intentionally resisting its owner’s desire to close it, and the chair as having a will to 
flip her over. These seemingly random bouts of aggression acted upon inanimate mundane 
objects suggest a magnitude of absurdity attending to any kinds of efforts to treat nonhuman 
objects as entities with their own volition and agency; at the same time, these acts function as a 
significant reminder that agency always entails accountability.4  
                                                
4 Nothing might better illustrate the vexed relationship between the agency of nonhuman species and 
accountability than animals on trial in early modern England. See Kathryn Shevelow, For the Love of 
Animals: The Rise of the Animal Protection Movement (New York: Henry Holt, 2008), esp. Ch. 5. 
Shevelow maintains that the “[p]rosecution and execution, as well as the religious penalty of 
anathematization … of animals” has been prevalent particularly from the fourteenth century to the 
Renaissance (91). The eighteenth century, by contrast, saw the dwindling number of juridical actions 
against animals. But what is pertinent to my dissertation is Shevelow’s point that such pervasive 
recognitions of animals as legitimate legal subjects accountable for their actions in the early modern era 
were prompted by the close proximity between human and animal in living space: “These prosecutions 
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McEwan’s Solar presents a satirical portrait of what interdisciplinary academics attempt 
to accomplish when they are faced with pressing issues like global climate change. McEwan’s 
fictional narrative, which centers on the disheveled life of Michael Beard (a weathered, Nobel-
laureate physicist), underscores one of the key concepts in posthumanist theory and 
environmental humanities—the principle of interconnectivity—and it conveys a cautionary tale 
about interdisciplinary methods. The edge of McEwan’s satire is aimed at humanities scholars 
trying to develop an interpretive frame grounded in combining scientific knowledge with 
humanist fervor, the kind of interdisciplinary method that appears too tenuous and naïve for the 
physicist. At the start of the novel, Beard is invited to a talk where he witnesses numerous 
scholars strive to reach a general consensus across disciplines as to how to stop or, at least, slow 
down climate change. During the conference Beard’s mind, half attentive and half distracted, 
hovers over individual talks charged with a profound sense of urgency and his failing private 
life: the imminent demise of both Beard’s fifth marriage and his career is interwoven with the 
prospect of the end of the earth. Beard skeptically views the environmental crisis as nothing 
more than “one in a list of issues, of looming sorrows, that comprised the background to the 
news.”5 The comical (at times twisted) parallel McEwan draws between the equally urgent 
concerns of the protagonist’s private life and the desperate fate of the earth underlines the 
interconnectivity between humans and the environment. In both the domestic and the global 
contexts of McEwan’s novel, human inaction aggravates problematic existing conditions: 
Beard’s decision not to remedy his fast-collapsing marriage is juxtaposed effectively against a 
more general human indifference toward taking practical action to slow down the global 
warming whose symptoms are detectable everywhere. In his idiosyncratic way, McEwan 
                                                                                                                                                       
took place in the context of other human-animal connections, … and the widespread belief that animal 
behavior reflected or predicted something of consequence for human society” (91-92).  
5 Ian McEwan, Solar (New York: Doubleday, 2010), 15. 
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questions the very possibility that human subjects can correct past wrongdoings in either the 
personal or the public realm. 
Like Page’s novelistic account of mundane objects that demonstrate a certain degree of 
agency over the humans who would control them, my dissertation is largely concerned with 
“evocative objects” that display their autonomy, vibrancy, and agency in a wide range of 
eighteenth-century literary texts.6 This dissertation investigates how British subjectivity is 
shaped in response to the fast-shifting material, physical world of the long eighteenth century. It 
attempts to propose an alternative reading of British subjectivity, which runs counter to both the 
anthropocentric and the Eurocentric cultural norms at work during the period.7 To that end, this 
project takes issue with a set of ideas and practices that privilege human and/or European 
experience and knowledge-making in eighteenth century Britain and its colonial sites—locations 
which underwent major shifts in terms of the sheer number of commodities, zoological and 
botanical specimens, and even human bodies that circulated across national, epistemological, and 
ontological borders. With a particular focus on disparate eighteenth-century bodies as a locus 
onto which existing power systems get projected—in short, as entangled things—I contend that 
the social relations minted by the growth of imperial and commercial networks in eighteenth-
century Britain fostered a heightened awareness of subjectivity.  
                                                
6 I borrow the phrase “evocative objects” from the title of Sherry Turkle’s edited collection, Evocative 
Objects: Things We Think With (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), whose contributors analyze 
everyday objects—including a cello, keyboards, ballet sleepers, and a rolling pin—to acknowledge their 
status as “companion[s] in life experience.” These individual objects produce an affect of nostalgia, and a 
“sense of erotic possibility.” Turkle, Evocative Objects, 6. These collected essays, along with Susan 
Stewart’s On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1993) and Elaine Freedgood’s The Ideas in Things: Fugitive Meaning in the 
Victorian Novel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), are indicative of the material turn in 
current literary scholarship. For a similarly autobiographical examination of the interrelationship between 
an object and a human subject, see also Miguel Tamen, Friends of Interpretable Objects (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).  
7 It should be noted that the cultural norm in the context of this project touches on the gender norm as 
well. 
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The Posthuman in Long Eighteenth-Century Britain 
This dissertation explores a complicated and multifarious array of British subjecthoods: 
Gulliver’s porous, anxiety-ridden identity as a machine in unfamiliar cultures; Defoe’s narrative 
figures, who embody Enlightenment ideals by displaying a rational, taxonomic, classificatory 
drive to secure certainty in response to their fast-shifting physical environments; and Barbauld’s 
ethical subject, who espouses our moral obligation to care for vital, nonhuman objects that 
convey their individual ‘thingness.’ Despite my attempt to categorize the distinctive 
characteristics of each subject, the different components of subjective identity represented by 
these figures are entangled and manifested in British identity throughout the long eighteenth 
century. The writers analyzed in this project—Daniel Defoe, Jonathan Swift, and Anna Laetitia 
Barbauld—envision British subjectivity not as a completed product, but as a continuously 
negotiated construct in response to their bodily encounters with the unfamiliar and vital objects 
that inundated Britain during this period. Each chapter examines an instance of the making of 
subjectivity at work in the encounter zones between British imperial subjects and the various 
objects that challenge and overwhelm them. Pivoting on such encounters and their ramifications, 
I argue that eighteenth-century British subjectivity is seldom the embodiment of unabashedly 
confident and rational selfhood—as has often been claimed—but is constantly in tension with 
things that display agential power and narratorial autonomy. 
In order to understand what is at stake—ethically and ontologically as well as 
epistemologically—in the making of disparate subjectivity in the long eighteenth century, I draw 
on productive intersections between the posthumanist turn in critical theory and the material turn 
that has grown strikingly visible and substantive in eighteenth-century literary studies. 
McEwan’s Solar offers a useful qualifier concerning my deployment of interdisciplinary 
  6 
methods, at the same time that it resonates with my primary concerns regarding interconnectivity 
and the feasibility of environmental justice, within and beyond the parameters of traditional 
literary analysis. Though I am not as skeptical as McEwan’s protagonist about the payoff of 
using interdisciplinary approaches to address pressing issues like global environmental justice, I 
am acutely wary of the pitfalls of applying scientific terminology to analytical work in the 
humanities—of extending scientific terms as metaphors for more general uses in humanistic 
discourses. For instance, I am cautious of the use of quantum physics as a springboard for 
humanities scholars to engage in interdisciplinary research, a practice which might give us the 
misguided idea that the core of quantum physics can serve as a foundation for solving problems 
grounded in humanistic frameworks of study. Obviously, new materialists and posthumanists are 
indebted to the paradigmatic changes entailed by quantum physics, and interdisciplinary 
approaches to the issues like environmental justice, ecological crisis can prove effective and 
fruitful in setting up an agenda. And yet, from the beginning of this dissertation I want to pay 
particular attention to the caution Beard provides in Solar: my interdisciplinary approach to the 
recently recognized agency of things/objects in eighteenth-century narratives and the making of 
British subjectivity is a quite modest method to delve into what various encounter zones between 
human subjects and nonhuman life-forms entails in terms of our understanding of eighteenth-
century British cultural, political, and gender identity. At the same time, towards the end of these 
chapters—where my work is informed by such recent object-oriented thinkers as Lorraine 
Daston, Cary Wolfe, Levi R. Bryant, Samantha Frost, and Anna Tsing—I will attest to what is at 
stake in eighteenth-century ecological discourses regarding human encounters with nonhuman 
species, based on the evidence discernible in contemporary poems about the natural world. The 
ethical stakes of this nonhuman turn will be discussed in a later section of this chapter.   
  7 
Therefore, before I lay out the specific contours of the four chapters of this dissertation, I 
want to present a broad picture as to what the posthuman is and why it matters for our 
understanding of the long eighteenth century. The posthuman is everywhere. As a sticky 
theoretical concept or as a discrete identity that embraces broad-ranging nonhuman subjects, the 
posthuman, over the last few decades, has taken center stage in myriad debates across 
disciplines, and even across often-territorial periodic distinctions. The plasticity of the term 
‘posthuman’ has enabled scholars to examine from a new methodological perspective the 
allegedly nonhuman, such as animals, plants, machinery, along with racialized and gendered 
bodies, and the entangled relationship between human subjects and the material environment. 
Among the disparate camps affiliated with posthumanism, Donna Haraway’s study of 
nonhumans effectively envisages the epistemological, ethical, and political stakes of this 
particular branch of studies, not to mention its broad trajectory. Despite Haraway’s downright 
refusal to identify herself as a posthumanist—“I am not a posthumanist; I am who I become with 
companion species, who and which makes a mess out of categories in the making of kin and 
kind”—the emphasis on “species interdependence” throughout her works has unarguably set the 
tone for posthuman studies.8 Haraway defines the material presence of nonhuman species and 
our imbrications with them as “significant otherness,” which underlines “emergence, process, 
historicity, difference, specificity, co-habitation, co-constitution, and contingency.”9 Particularly, 
her claim that “[w]e are, constitutively, companion species” by constituting each other “in the 
                                                
8 Donna Haraway, When Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 19. A similar 
refusal of affiliation with posthumanism can be found in Haraway’s most recent article, “Anthropocene, 
Capitalocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene: Making Kin,” Environmental Humanities 6 (2015): 159-65, 
161. 
9 Haraway, The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness (Chicago: 
Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003), 7. 
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flesh” beautifully epitomizes not only the material, but also the affective dimension of an 
interspecies community.10  
What then is the posthuman? Particularly in the context of late eighteenth-century 
literature, what are the stakes of foregrounding the posthuman? To answer the first of these 
questions, I turn to the concept of the posthuman as it has undergone multiple redefinitions since 
the late twentieth century. N. Katherine Hayles defines the posthuman as “an amalgam, a 
collection of heterogeneous components, a material-informational entity whose boundaries 
undergo continuous construction and reconstruction.”11 She also postulates that the core of the 
posthuman lies with “an agency, desire, or will belonging to the self … clearly distinguished 
from the ‘wills of others.’”12 Such autonomy of nonhuman species is the defining characteristic 
of the posthuman, the feature translated as either “thingliness” or “vitality” in the different 
varieties of new materialism.13 While Hayles is invested in formulating the posthuman 
particularly in terms of mechanical entities, Cary Wolfe’s notion of the posthuman is geared 
toward nonhuman animals, the study of which has since branched into multiple interdisciplinary 
studies, including environmental ethics and ecofeminism. Building on the studies of Levinas, 
Derrida, and Agamben, Wolfe recognizes anew animals as sentient and feeling subjects capable 
of speaking in their own terms. In doing so, he agrees with Hayles’s idea that the posthuman is 
characterized by multiple points of origin and variegated directions. Similarly, Brian Massumi 
explores animal play as equally significant to human speech in order to deprivilege the 
                                                
10 Haraway, When Species Meet, 16. 
11 N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and 
Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 3.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Jane Bennett defines “vitality” as “the capacity of things … not only to impede or block the will and 
designs of humans but also to act as quasi agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of 
their own. See Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 
viii. Catherine Packham nicely posits the vitality of nature in the context of the Romantic period. See 
Eighteenth-Century Vitalism: Bodies, Cultures, Politics (New York: Palgrave, 2012), esp. 2-3. 
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longstanding supremacy of human language: “Its aim [the goal of Massumi’s book] is to 
construct the concept of an animal politics and carry it to the limit of what it can do, with 
sympathy and creativity, starting in play and ending in play.”14 Karen Barad, in her seminal 
study of posthumanism, asserts that “[m]atter is always already an ongoing historicity” in order 
to articulate a much broader range of implications for the posthuman, highlighting the idea that it 
is a form of subjectivity operating independent of human history, will, or projection.15 Her notion 
of “posthumanist performativity” makes it possible to acknowledge nonhuman agency, through 
cutting loose the nonhuman from the representational grid of power, because “performativity is 
linked not only to the formation of the subject but also to the production of the matter of 
bodies.”16    
In conversation with these practitioners of either posthumanism or the nonhuman turn, 
this project has several aims. Primarily, my engagement with posthumanist theory enables me to 
read far too familiar literary eighteenth texts from a new angle. I draw renewed attention to the 
nonhuman life forms embedded in eighteenth-century literary and nonliterary representations; in 
so doing, I demonstrate how these nonhuman objects—including a pachyderm, an epidemic 
disease, a natural disaster, a small insect, and other animals—manifest their own irreducible 
vitality, which in turn affects human understanding of the relationship between the self and its 
environment. By paying attention to the corporeality of these novel objects, or their material 
representations in the period, I also contend that the body is a site where existing power relations 
are inscribed but simultaneously defied. The kinds of power I analyze—as manifestations of 
material force that works upon the bodies of nonhuman life forms—can be numerous, but within 
                                                
14 Brian Massumi, What Animals Teach us about Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 3.   
15 Karen Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to 
Matter,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 28 (2003): 801-31, 821. 
16 Ibid., 808.  
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the trajectory of my dissertation, I will focus on the Eurocentric, anthropomorphic, and colonial 
power in play in the long eighteenth century. Finally, the overlap between posthumanist theory 
and the material turn within eighteenth-century literary scholarship enables me to flesh out the 
ethical concerns authors articulate in the face of the ever-changing material world in eighteenth-
century Britain. I contend that one of the most distinctive aspects of these eighteenth-century 
texts—and one that establishes their continuity with the present—has to do with their serious 
concerns about nonhuman life-forms and their ensuing emphasis on human responsibility for the 
vitality of things.   
 
WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT ‘THINGS’:  
POSTHUMANIST THEORY, NEW MATERIALISMS, AND ETHICAL GROUNDS  
If the historical backdrop of eighteenth-century material culture occupies a significant 
place in my discussion of the making of British subjectivity, the nonhuman turn in critical 
methodology, with its attention to nonhuman life forms, sheds a new light upon the eighteenth-
century literary treatment of nonhuman entities and the human subjects who actually encounter 
them, as the following chapters will illustrate.17 Over the last three decades, we have seen the 
body come under rigorous critical scrutiny across disciplines. The body has become a frequently 
referenced and primary subject of interdisciplinary studies, as evidenced by recent work in 
phenomenology, post-Marxist materialism, affect theory, and disability studies—the last two of 
which are fundamentally lodged in the phenomenological underpinning of the body.18 Indeed, 
                                                
17 The nonhuman turn can be defined as a critical response to the long reign of deconstruction, which was 
fundamentally built on the linguistic turn. By its nature, this newer critical move has implications for 
several disciplines and subdisciplines, from anthropology to phenomenology, affect studies to disability 
studies. In many cases the nonhuman turn functions as a synonym for posthumanism based on the fact 
that both methodologies depart from the assumptions of representationalism, and both dismantle the 
notion of a great chain of being, thereby denouncing anthropocentrism.  
18 Sarah Ahmed and Jackie Stacey, eds. Thinking Through the Skin (London: Routledge, 2001); Jane 
Bennett, “The Force of Things: Steps toward an Ecology of Matter,” Political Theory 32.3 (2004): 347-
  11 
the body has long drawn intense and sustained attention from literary critics, historians (social, 
cultural, and technological), and cultural theorists, and particularly in the wake of Michel 
Foucault’s influential analyses in The Order of Things and The History of Sexuality. 
Poststructuralism and feminism have also respectively attempted to account for the human body 
as something that is inscribed by but simultaneously goes beyond the imposition of existing 
sociocultural entanglements.19 What is at issue in this renewed attention to the body and to the 
possibility of an emancipatory move from the confines of the body and its corporeal inscriptions, 
however, can be found on three fronts, each of which merits our attention, particularly in relation 
to the various eighteenth-century representations of bodies which we will have occasion to 
consider in this study. First, in the new methodological frameworks with which this dissertation 
engages, the materiality of the body acquires its own historicity, as Karen Barad duly points out 
throughout her works.20 Second, the trajectory of the body put into analysis is extended to 
nonhuman agents, including animals, scientific units like atoms, and mundane objects. Third, the 
body begins to be construed as contingent, flexible, and porous. 
To examine the multiple aspects of bodies—mechanical, zoological and botanical, and 
thing-like human—represented in eighteenth-century texts, I draw on posthumanism as an 
                                                                                                                                                       
72. In this article, Bennett employs the term “body materialism,” not only to articulate a particular strand 
of post-Marxist materialism, but also to underline what she calls the “thing-power” immanent in a vast 
constellation of nonhuman entities.   
19 Elizabeth Grosz, Architecture from the Outside: Essays on Virtual and Real Space (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2001), esp. Chs. 1 and 2; Grosz, Becoming Undone: Darwinian Reflection on Life, Politics, 
and Art (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011); Steven Shapin and Christopher Lawrence, 
“Introduction: The Body of Knowledge,” Science Incarnate: Historical Embodiments of Natural 
Knowledge, ed. Christopher Lawrence and Steven Shapin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 
1-20. 
20 Karen Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to 
Matter” Signs 28.3 (2003): 801-31, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the 
Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007). 
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umbrella term.21 Admittedly a broad and fraught formulation, posthumanist theory works in this 
study as a way to redefine entangled human conditions in the context of the eighteenth century, 
particularly in relation to natural law, and to commercial and colonial networks. I have found 
Posthumanism to be an apt tool for examining and contesting conventional dichotomies between 
the mechanical and the organic, the animal and the human, objects and subjects, exteriors and 
interiors, the environment and the human. It is originated from the acknowledgement that being 
human is not so much a constant, fixed condition as has often been imagined. As such, we should 
first begin with the definition and semantic boundaries of posthumanism at work in this 
dissertation. As Cary Wolfe writes, the term, in striking contrast to the clear-cut definition of 
humanism, is fraught with manifold points of origin, and variegated directions.22 What is 
posthumanism? How does it actually manifest itself in eighteenth-century literary, cultural texts? 
What new light does it shed upon our understanding of the texts and the imagined subjectivity 
during the period? My use of posthumanism focuses on the nonhuman or liminal subject’s 
potential to destabilize the constitution and boundary of the human and nonhuman by 
emphasizing the agential power of nonhuman entities. To elaborate further, I should situate 
myself in relation to scholars who have been labeled as posthumanists and/or new materialists.  
                                                
21 Despite Richard Grusin’s theoretical distinction between posthumanism and the nonhuman turn, based 
on the argument that the former is more concerned with the teleology of the concept of human and its 
evolution to posthuman, I categorize scholars like Bruno Latour, Brian Massumi, Donna Haraway, and 
Jane Bennett as practitioners of posthumanism. This is because the posthumanist turn also delves into the 
fundamental Latourian question as to whether we have ever been human. Even Grusin himself 
acknowledges that some of the “best work on the posthuman seeks to avoid such teleology” (ix). For 
more of Grusin’s pointed but unfruitful attempt to distinguish the terms, see his “Introduction” to The 
Nonhuman Turn (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015), esp. viii-x. I am also aware of the 
profound fatigue and exhaustion that can be produced by critical terms that are followed by the prefix 
post, as well as the deep-seated skepticism often borne against moves toward theory more generally. Even 
so, posthumanism as a method is pronouncedly versatile, not only as a means for contesting existing 
conceptual binaries but also for attesting to the possibility of emancipatory and ethical moves away from 
existing social, cultural, and epistemological inscriptions.   
22 Cary Wolfe, What is Posthumanism? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010). 
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One of the most compelling accounts of (and justifications for) posthumanist 
methodology can be found in the works of Rosi Braidotti and Karen Barad.23 Braidotti elucidates 
in a nuanced way that posthumanism can be equated with a deliberate “de-centering of ‘Men,’” 
an epistemological and ontological stance that robs the anthropocentric subject of its privileged 
status as a primary spectator and adjudicator.24 Even though such de-centering involves a certain 
degree of anxiety and uncertainty, it is an effective method for effacing the binary opposition 
between what is socially constructed and what is originally given. Braidotti neatly illustrates the 
merits of the posthumanist approach:  
In my view, the common denominator for the posthuman condition [is] an assumption 
about the vital, self-organizing and yet non-naturalistic structure of living matter itself. 
This nature-culture continuum is the shared starting point for my take on posthuman 
theory. Whether this post-naturalistic assumption subsequently results in playful 
experimentations with boundaries of perfectibility of the body, in moral panic about the 
disruption of centuries-old beliefs about human ‘nature’ or in exploitative and profit-
minded pursuit of genetic and neural capital, remains however to be seen.25 
A similar attempt to transgress conventional ontological and epistemological boundaries is 
discernible in Karen Barad’s beautiful articulation of “posthumanist performativity,” which calls 
into question the fiction of representationalism, which Barad describes as a logical fallacy 
stemming from an undue reliance on Cartesian dualism.26 Barad argues that the assumption that 
there exist “two distinct and independent kinds of entities—representations and entities to be 
                                                
23 Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2013); Karen Barad, “Posthumanist 
Performativity”; Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, esp. Chs. 2 and 4. 
24 Braidotti, The Posthuman, 2. 
25 Braidotti, The Posthuman, 2. 
26 Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity,” 802.  
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represented” is a supreme fiction to justify existing categorical biads.27 In an effort to defy 
methodologies privileging and centering on the linguistic turn, in which representationalism is 
lodged, Barad offers “physical optics” as an alternative to what she calls “geographical optics.”28 
For Barad, physical optics functions as a synonym for what she terms “diffractive 
methodology.”29 In a way akin to how eighteenth-century natural philosophers or experimental 
scientists were inspired by and emulated the frame of Epicurean and Lucretian materialisms, 
Barad is informed by the paradigm of quantum physics, which enables us to recognize the 
granular composition of things beneath their glossy surface. This reversal of the established 
subject-object relation is articulated from the beginning of Barad’s essay: “In this article, I offer 
an elaboration of performativity—a materialist, naturalist, and posthumanist elaboration—that 
allows matter its due as an active participant in the world’s becoming, in its ongoing ‘intra-
activity.’ It is vitally important that we understand how matter matters.”30 Even further, Barad 
illustrates posthumanism’s interdisciplinary origins through her deployment of the concept of 
“agential realism”: 
Agential realism is an account of technoscientific and other practices that take feminist, 
antiracist, poststructuralist, queer, Marxist, science studies, and scientific insights 
seriously, building specifically on important insights from Niels Bohr, Judith Butler, 
Michel Foucault, Donna Haraway, Vicki Kirby, Joseph Rouse, and others.31  
Although sweeping in its breadth, Barad’s definitional essay enables us to see in what particular 
disciplines posthumanist methodology (in the form of agential realism) is rooted. It is a call for a 
                                                
27 Ibid., 804.  
28 Ibid., 802.  
29 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 135. 
30 Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity,” 803.  
31 Ibid., 810.  
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departure from social constructivism. It is a call for foregrounding the materiality and agency of 
things over classical notions of human subjectivity.  
Those who are committed to envisioning the material world under the flag of the new 
materialisms—Diana Coole, Samantha Frost, and Jane Bennett, to name a few—have a similar 
understanding of the method’s weighty ontological, political, and ethical implications.32 The new 
materialisms, according to Coole and Frost, are designed to recognize the material dimension of 
the world we have taken for granted. The new materialisms depart from their famous materialist 
predecessors, including Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud, by reevaluating the “the most fundamental 
questions about the nature of matter and the place of embodied humans within a material 
world”33 More importantly, the exigency of the particular form of new materialisms rests on the 
fact that they are a timely response to fast-shifting scientific and technological advances in the 
twentieth- and twenty-first centuries, which have entailed ethical issues concerning human 
relations to the ecosystem. Thus, they ask for a comprehensive reappraisal of preceding 
materialisms in order to reposition human subjects from their normative status to that of an 
allegedly ethical, more responsible one equipped with “sensitivity [to] contemporary shifts in the 
bio- and eco-spheres, as well as to changes in global economic structures and technologies.”34 
Strict and precise evaluation of daily human interaction with the corporeal world is another 
responsibility. Crucial to this approach is a renewed understanding that nonhuman entities 
demonstrate equally significant agency independent of humans. What is fundamentally new and 
central in this branch of materialism is found in the following claim:  
                                                
32 In addition to Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, eds. The New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and 
Politics,  (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010) and Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology 
of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), recent publications on the object culture should be 
acknowledged. See Levi R. Bryant, The Democracy of Objects (Ann Arbor, MI: Open Humanities Press, 
2011); Sherry Tuckle, ed. Evocative Objects; and Miguel Tamen, Friends of Interpretable Objects. 
33 Coole and Frost, The New Materialisms, 3. 
34 Ibid., 3. 
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According to the new materialisms, if everything material is inasmuch as it is composed 
of physicochemical processes, nothing is reducible to such processes, at least as 
conventionally understood. For materiality is always something more than “mere” matter: 
an excess, force, vitality, relationality, or difference that renders matter active, self-
creative, productive, unpredictable. In sum, new materialists are rediscovering a 
materiality that materializes, evincing immanent modes of self-transformation that 
compels us to think of causation in far more complex terms; to recognize that phenomena 
are caught in a multitude of interlocking systems and forces and to consider anew the 
location and nature of capacities for agency.35 
Posthumanists and new materialists start from a shared recognition that matter is vital and that it 
transgresses anthropocentric underpinnings. At the same time, they commonly acknowledge that 
the denunciation of Cartesian dualism is the precondition for collapsing human-animal, human-
machine, and human-nature binaries through their respective pursuits and rearticulations of the 
material world. To tackle Cartesian dualism—which draws an arbitrary, unstable line between 
the interior and exterior, the metaphysical and physical—it is inevitable to return to Lucretius 
and Epicurus. These ancient materialists suggest that such dualities are bridgeable.36 The 
rediscovery of atoms has made it possible for human subjects to give objects what is due to them.  
The acknowledgement that posthuman entities have their own historicity and agency is 
resonant in the works of several eighteenth-century literary scholars whose analyses influence 
the methods explored in this study. Laura Brown, for instance, attempts to reread familiar 
novelistic accounts of the eighteenth century from a posthumanist angle: her examination of 
                                                
35 Ibid., 9. 
36 In regard to the chasm between the material and metaphysical, although Lucretius suggests the 
possibility of bridging it, a radical, half-jocular materialist like Julien Offray de la Mettrie proposes we 
stick to the only realm our sensorial experience can register. See Man a Machine and Man a Plant, trans. 
Richard A. Watson and Maya Rabalka (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994). 
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primate narratives produced from the late seventeenth to the early nineteenth century marks a 
posthumanist turn in eighteenth-century literary studies.37 Focusing primarily on representations 
of imaginary animals and increasingly intimate human-animal proximity, Brown argues that the 
period experiences a kind ontological shock, and she explores the way existing anthropocentric 
frameworks of understanding are contested. We cannot discuss the eighteenth-century 
posthumanist imagination without citing Bill Brown’s seminal formulation of the “thingness” of 
nonhuman entities. Brown’s “Thing Theory” in Things marks a watershed moment in our 
understanding of the allegedly fixed, static objects that are imbedded in narratives. Brown’s first 
and foremost contribution to matter-oriented literary analysis lies with his careful distinction 
between things and objects, a concept pervasive in ensuing scholarly works: for Brown, things, 
in striking contrast to objects, are entities which can defy anthropocentric projections and can 
thus work on their own, independent of human needs and intentions. Brown pays due attention to 
how encounters with things are actually “occasions of contingency—the chance interruption—
that disclose a physicality of things.”38 With a particular focus on the consequences of such 
encounters with things, he argues that “[t]hings lie beyond the grid of intelligibility the way mere 
things lie outside of museal exhibition, outside of the order of objects.”39 In so doing, Brown 
suggests that the thingness intrinsic to things disrupts established understandings of subject-
object relations based on human-centered, social-constructivist premises; more importantly, 
thingness registers a moment of human failure to take control of the material environment. In 
either case, thingness produces uncertainty and anxiety in human subjects.  
                                                
37 See Laura Brown, Homeless Dogs and Melancholy Apes: Humans and Other Animals in the Modern 
Literary Imagination (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010). Brown’s last chapter in The Fables of 
Modernity: Literature and Culture in the English Eighteenth Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2003) also touches on the impact of nonhuman animals upon eighteenth-century British 
perceptions of self and other.  
38 Bill Brown, “Thing Theory,” Things (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 4. 
39 Ibid., 5.  
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More specifically relevant to eighteenth-century studies, the essays collected by Mark 
Blackwell in The Secret Life of Things pay critical attention to a long overlooked literary genre in 
the period, texts that can be categorized either as it-narratives or object-narratives, by 
emphasizing the arcane operation and narrative power of things.40 Jonathan Kramnick also 
focuses on the agential power of things and their impact on human identity within the 
interpretive framework of causal relations in eighteenth-century fiction.41 Jonathan Lamb’s 
publication of new materialist readings of eighteenth-century literary texts has provoked renewed 
interest in it-narratives as well. Lamb’s articles collected in The Things Things Say resonate with 
the aforementioned scholars’ concerns with the agency of the nonhuman—what he terms its 
“thingness”—within early modern literary texts.42 Although broad in its subject matter, the gist 
of Lamb’s argument can be located in his opening claim that “things have their say in the 
eighteenth century.”43 Recognizing the voice, agency, and vitality of things is the starting point 
of these literary scholarly works. In relation to the rise of experimental philosophy and new 
science in the early modern period, literary critics like Helen Deutsch and Marry Terrall have 
drawn our attention to the configurations of life and vitality in the period, attempting to “locate 
the history of materialism within a larger history of ideas, as well as in a range of cultural, 
literary, and scientific practices.”44 
                                                
40 Mark Blackwell, The Secret Life of Things: Animals, Objects, and It-Narratives in Eighteenth-Century 
England (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2007). 
41 Jonathan Kramnick, Actions and Objects from Hobbes to Richardson (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2010).  
42 Jonathan Lamb, The Things Things Say (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), . 
43 Lamb, The Things Things Say, 33 and 115. 
44 Helen Deutsch and Mary Terrall. Vital Matters: Eighteenth-century Views of Conception, Life, and 
Death (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012). In the introduction to their collection, Deutsch and 
Terrall make clear that the primary subject of their interdisciplinary discussion touches on “life, living 
bodies, and organic matter,” which overlaps with late eighteenth-century, or Romantic literary attention to 
living matter. For more specific analyses of life matters and their vitality in the period, see Catherine 
Packham, Eighteenth-Century Vitalism: Bodies, Culture, Politics (New York: Palgrave, 2012); Sharon 
Ruston, Creating Romanticism: Case Studies in the Literature, Science and Medicine of the 1790s (New 
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ENCOUNTERING THE MATTER OF ‘SCALE’  
Though my individual chapters will account for what is at stake in the use of 
posthumanism as a primary method of reading eighteenth-century literary texts and culture, I 
want to discuss here the way the posthumanist approach, broadly construed, opens up the 
possibility of discussing major ethical concerns that have been exigent since (at least) the 
eighteenth century. Elizabeth Grosz underscores the significance of establishing a new kind of a 
humanities where “the human is no longer the norm, rule, or object, but instead life itself, in its 
open multiplicity, comes to provide the object of analysis and poses its questions about man’s—
and woman’s—specificity as a species, as a social collective, as a political order or economic 
structure.”45 Here Grosz echoes other posthumanists discussed earlier in that she equally 
underlines that the task of decentering human subjecthood within humanist discourses is the 
precondition for new humanist (or posthumanist) discourses; at the same time, she indicates a 
degree of skepticism toward attempting to deliberately dethrone the human subject from its 
former privileged centrality. The posthumanist imagination and the nonhuman turn inevitably 
raise the question as to whether such decentering actually helps to reinforce a human-centered 
perspective, even when we are talking about nonhuman life forms, life matters, or things. Can 
the human be decentered, as has been suggested, at least on a discursive level? If so, what 
happens then? What is at stake when we draw on object oriented ontology?46  
                                                                                                                                                       
York: Palgrave, 2013); Janelle A. Schwartz, Worm Work: Recasting Romanticism (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota, 2012); Denise Gigante, Life: Organic Form and Romanticism (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2009).    
45 Grosz, Becoming Undone, 16. 
46 Object Oriented Ontology (OOO) is a form of revised ontology built on the premise that the human 
subject is displaced from its central, privileged position in the metaphysical world. For more on the 
details and stakes of OOO, see Timothy Morton, Ecology without Nature: Rethinking Environmental 
Aesthetics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007) and Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, 
Causality (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 2013), 19, 43; and Ian Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, or 
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The collapse of the great chain of being enables us to recognize that humans and 
nonhumans are interconnected, sharing and thus jointly responsible for the lot of our common 
ecological systems. Persistent emphases on interconnectivity underline this particular recognition 
that not a single nonhuman, or subhuman subject can be dismissed as the other. Samantha Frost, 
in a similar vein, contends that “[w]ith the human displaced as a central figure, the environment 
is conceived as intricate and extensively interconnected ecologies in which individual and 
collective social, economic, and political activities provoke creature and habitat adaptations that 
in turn require transformations in activity and habit from social and political actors.”47 Once the 
normative anthropocentric hierarchy is removed, the grid of power relations is altered, rescaled, 
and reapplied. When this takes place, human subjects can witness the very “historicity” (Barad) 
or “reality” (Frost) of an object, namely the recognition of what Lamb terms its “thingness,” or 
what Morton calls the “astonishing autonomy” of nonhuman entities, which is irreducible to 
either abstraction. The very granular, discrete, and raw corporeality of objects presents itself 
within the new ecology and then claims itself as a “matter of coexistence.”48 What responsibility 
is entailed in our recognition of matter’s coexistence? In the particular context of the twenty-first 
century, such a recognition reinforces our sense of urgency to remedy the impact of humans 
upon the environment as “a force of nature in the geological sense.”49 Undeniably this kind of 
moral stance is prompted by the premise that the scale of human impact upon the environment is 
much more enormous and detrimental than human subjects have generally imagined. This 
presumption has in effect provided an impetus for the green movement as well. But what does all 
                                                                                                                                                       
What It’s Like to Be a Thing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), where Bogost defines 
OOO as a philosophical position that “puts things at the center of being”(6). 
47 Samantha Frost, “Challenging the Human X Environment Framework,” The Oxford Handbook of 
Environmental Political Theory, ed. Teena Gabrielson, et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 
178-92, 184. 
48 Timothy Morton, Realist Magic, 45. 
49 Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Climate of History: Four Theses,” Critical Inquiry 35 (2009): 197-222, 207.  
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of this have to do with eighteenth-century perceptions of human subjectivity, nature, and ethical 
action?  
To answer this question, I propose a brief reading of Tobias Smollett’s The History and 
Adventures of an Atom (1769), mainly because this convoluted political satire in the guise of an 
oriental tale demonstrates the intimate cohabitation of human subjects with matter.50 Atom, as 
anticipated by its genre, begins with the mock-heroic speech of an atom to its human narrator, 
Nathaniel Peacock. Calling Peacock three times and identifying himself as “part of thyself [the 
narrator]” (5), the atom goes on to say:  
What thou hearest is within thee—is part of thyself. I am one of those atoms, or 
constituent particles of matter, which can neither be annihilated, divided, nor impaired: 
the different arrangements of us atoms compose all the variety of objects and essences 
which nature exhibits, or art can obtain. Of the same shape, substance, and quality, are 
the component particles, that harden in rock, and flow in water; that blacken in the negro, 
and brighten in the diamond; that exhale from a rose, and stream from a dunghill. (5-6)  
In a manner similar to the apparition of Hamlet’s father, Atom’s presence evokes a certain 
degree of awe and fear. Uncannily it also commands the human narrator to “[t]ake up the pen, … 
and write what I [the atom] shall unfold” (6). Then in the matter of a second, the atom provides 
at length his itinerary from Japan to the Cape of Good Hope, to London inside Peacock’s body. 
The detailed itinerary of atom matters to us, for it not only registers the mobility of a British 
sailor in the eighteenth century, but it also recognizes the circular movement of atoms from rice 
to a human body, and vice versa. Of course, the Swiftian excremental pun is not absent here. The 
global, cyclical eclogue of the atom evinces two things. First, eighteenth-century Britons 
                                                
50 Tobias Smollett’s The History and Adventures of an Atom, ed. O. M. Brack, Jr. (Athens, GA: 
University of Georgia Press, 1989). Hereafter the text will be cited as Atom.  
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demonstrate a renewed interest in the atom as is indexed in the contemporary revival of 
Epicurean and Lucretian materialism. Even Swift notes that “the Universe was formed by a 
fortuitous concourse of Atoms.”51 The close proximity between this scientific unit—what the 
OED defines as “a hypothetical, … minute and indivisible, … ultimate particle of matter”—and 
a fictional character suggests a new way of perceiving the material world in eighteenth-century 
Britain.52 More importantly, that the smallest particle of matter speaks and literally cohabits with 
the human narrator suggests a change in the scale of human perception detectable in the period, 
particularly as it-narratives gained ascendancy in the literary marketplace. This signals a shift in 
the scale, in the size of the kinds of objects deemed worthy of literary, scientific, and ethical 
attention.   
Smollett’s Atom also reveals how such small particles are entangled in the intersection 
between global commerce and the century’s increasing popular understanding of science and 
technology—thus it is a proper index for the nonhuman bodies I will discuss in the following 
chapters. If we return to the question of ethics and responsibility I posed earlier, this increased 
understanding of small particles, along with the attention paid to other talking animals and 
objects in contemporary it-narratives, helps to expand the gambit of human concerns during the 
period. Atom, a landmark object narrative of the eighteenth century, therefore registers both the 
ethical and the cognitive recognition of how things are implicated in the colonial network, which 
in turn demands a careful understanding of their agency and their entangled condition. Hence, 
the speaking atom opens up the possibility of thinking with nonhuman life matters even within 
the eighteenth century context, as has been analyzed by Lorraine Daston and Gregg Mitman: 
                                                
51 Jonathan Swift, “A Tritical Essay Upon the Faculties of the Mind,” Parodies, Hoaxes, Mock Treatises: 
Polite Conversation, Directions to Servants and Other Works, ed. Valerie Rumbold (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 17-34, 22. 
52 See “atom,” OED. 
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“Thinking with animals can take the form of an intense yearning to transcend the confines of self 
and species, to understand from the inside or even to become an animal.”53 As Barad suggests, 
the way to think with animals is predicated on human efforts to remove the animal body from the 
representational network, and to focus on its performance. Daston and Mitman contend that 
animals are not so much “just one symbol system out of many” or “one of the innumerable 
possibilities to externalize and dramatize what humans think” as they are “privileged” and 
“performative.”54  
Informed by posthumanist thinkers, I attempt to pay cautious attention to the way 
nonhuman life matters speak, act out, and perform within and outside eighteenth-century 
underpinnings of nature and matter. In so doing, I chart the way human subjectivity is contested 
and reconstructed in close relation to its shifting material conditions. At the risk of anachronism, 
I contend that the kind of subjectivity manifested in select literary texts and other contemporary 
primary materials from the eighteenth century rather acknowledges its porous, unstable, 
contingent, hybrid condition as an ineluctable part of its constitution. Ultimately, increased 
encounters with the material world beyond the confines of national, epistemological, and 
ontological borders challenge eighteenth-century Britons to rearticulate their identity and their 
relationship to the material world surrounding them.  
 
OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS  
This dissertation begins with a theoretical introduction (Chapter 1) to the posthuman, 
followed by the four substantive chapters, each focusing on different contact zones with a 
nonhuman agent, and each highlighting a different aspect of affects elicited by such encounters. 
                                                
53 Lorraine Daston and Gregg Mitman, Thinking with Animals: New Perspectives on Anthropomorphism 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 7. 
54Ibid., 12. 
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Chapter 2 begins with my examination of multifarious representations of the elephant body in a 
range of different cultural —an anatomical report, an animal narrative, automata, and 
broadsides—circulating in long eighteenth-century Britain. This chapter functions as a test case 
for understanding a series of encounters between nonhumans and humans in an effort to examine 
their impacts on the anthropocentric, Eurocentric norms of Britishness and selfhood which 
undergird Enlightenment ideals during the period. By focusing on these particular 
representations of the elephant, I demonstrate how the British public’s initially imaginary 
conceptions of this exotic species and their classificatory scientific systems were challenged by 
the animal’s material presence. The materiality of the elephant represented in these diverse texts 
functions as a proper site for discussing corporeal interchanges and newly emergent human-
animal and human-chattel/slave relationships in the period, for these interconnections present not 
only the modern subject’s intention to incorporate new knowledge into existing epistemological 
fields, but also the slippage of subject-object relations more generally. 
  Chapter 3 captures a period of crisis as depicted in Daniel Defoe’s disaster writings, The 
Storm (1703) and A Journal of the Plague Year (1722). This comparative analysis of Defoe’s 
well known calamity writings examines the ways in which objectivity is discursively constructed 
in the face of unruly natural forces. Defoe envisages the information manager as a form of 
enlightened subjectivity capable of narratively containing unruly material things that demonstrate 
agential power. These two early eighteenth-century texts chart a gradual erosion in Defoe’s 
belief that empirical methods can apprehend the vitality of disasters, revealing how his 
epistemological stance changes from one of relatively strong confidence to one characterized by 
skepticism. While Defoe’s reliance on new scientific instruments and rhetorical strategies 
evinces his investment in creating an aura of objectivity, Defoe’s idealized information manager 
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simultaneously attends to the potentially unreliable embodied dimensions of knowledge-making 
in ways that foreground both the subversive thingness of nonhuman entities and the empirical 
observer’s own thing-like position in the face of incomprehensible disasters.     
Chapter 4 fleshes out Swift’s posthumanist imagination as it is manifested in Gulliver’s 
Travels (1726). Swift’s radical anatomy of Gulliver’s body represents him as conceptually 
deconstructed, inventoried, appraised, and reassembled in different ways throughout his four 
voyages. As the narrative is filtered through Gulliver’s contingent positions, we can glimpse 
Swift’s eighteenth-century brand of posthumanism by examining how the intersection of 
technological, cultural, and intellectual endeavor culminates in multiple constructions of Gulliver 
as a kind of man-machine. Swift’s text deepens our understanding of eighteenth-century 
perceptions of both the human and the animal body, and it reveals much about his culture’s 
anxieties in the face of technological advancement. In light of Julien Offray de La Mettrie’s Man 
a Machine (1748), I attempt to examine Gulliver’s man-machine, man-animal body. My 
examination of Gulliver’s body is informed by recent scholarship on the advancement of 
mechanics, engineering, and technology in eighteenth-century Britain.55 In addition to showing 
                                                
55 Throughout this chapter, the automaton functions as a metonym for other similar types of machinery 
including cyborgs, intricately designed machines, and prosthetic devices. For critical work exploring 
eighteenth-century automata culture and the history of technology, see Otto Mayr, Authority, Liberty, and 
Automatic Machinery in Early Modern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); 
Adelheid Voskhul, Androids in the Enlightenment: Mechanics, Artisans, and Cultures of the Self 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2013); Minsoo Kang, Sublime Dreams of Living 
Machines: The Automaton in the European Imagination (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2011), Chs. 3-5; Julie Park, The Self and It: Novel Objects in Eighteenth-Century England (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010); Jessica Riskin, “The Defecating Duck, or, the Ambiguous Origins of 
Artificial Life,” Things. ed. Bill Brown (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 99-133, 
“Eighteenth-Century Wetware,” Representations 83 (2003): 97-125; Simon Schaffer, “Enlightened 
Automata,” The Sciences in Enlightened Europe. eds. William Clark, Jan Golinski, and Simon Schaffer 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 126-65; Julie Park, The Self and It, esp. Ch. ; 
Kevin LaGrandeur, Androids and Intelligent Networks in Early Modern Literature and Culture: Artificial 
Slaves (New York and London: Routledge, 2013). Susan Stewart’s work does not exactly fall into the 
category of technology studies, but her insights on the doll and the doll-house and her analysis of 
Gulliver’s position in On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection 
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how Swift denaturalizes or defamiliarizes the human body, I link Swift’s posthumanism to 
contemporary discourses related to inventorying, automata, and cybernetics. At the same time, 
this chapter is also enriched by a close dialogue with scholars interested in the agency of 
things.56 In conversation with critics who explore the posthumanist, mechanical discourses of the 
period, I argue that Swift displays profound anxieties concerning the fine line drawn between the 
human and nonhuman (or/and Posthuman), which is neatly underlined by his description of the 
human as a “topsy-turvy” creature.  
My closing chapter analyzes Anna Laetitia Barbauld’s nature poems as her way of 
articulating ethical subjecthood in the face of the vitality of things. Her recognition of the 
vibrancy and beauty of natural objects—including a caterpillar, a mouse, and a dog—should be 
viewed as both a cognitive and an aesthetic event. By examining her speaker’s sensory 
registering of the vitality of these things and the way each moment of encounter creates a 
community of care, albeit momentarily, I argue that Barbauld’s sustained attention to the 
nonhuman objects that populate the natural world manifests an ethical imperative. Central to 
Barbauld’s concern with nonhuman objects is her focus on the beauty of living matter, as 
represented in “The Caterpillar” in particular. My analysis of Barbauld’s poems is informed by 
eighteenth-century formulations of beauty postulated by Francis Hutcheson and Joseph Addison, 
as well as Elaine Scarry’s seminal work on the relationship between beauty and ethical action.   
  
                                                                                                                                                       
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1993) illuminate Gulliver’s machine-like position. Be sure to mention 
some collected essays in Early Modern Things, ed. Paula Findlen (New York and London: Routledge, 
2013). 
56 Jonathan Lamb, The Things Things Say (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011; Mark Blackwell, 
ed. The Secret Life of Things: Animals, Objects, and It-Narratives in Eighteenth-Century England 
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Chapter 2 
ENCOUNTERING THE ELEPHANT: 
ANIMAL AGENCY AND BRITISH SUBJECTIVITY IN THE LONG EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
 
Who doubts that elephants are found  
For science and for sense renown’d?  
 —John Gay, “The Elephant and the Bookseller” (1727)57 
 
If a lion could talk, we wouldn’t be able to understand it. 
—Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953)58 
 
Eighteenth-century Britons saw objects on the move. Material things unheard of, 
unknown, and perhaps unknowable flooded into the British Isles at a bewildering speed and in 
massive quantities. Indian calicoes, Chinese silks and porcelain, monkeys, and parrots, for 
instance, inundated British cultural and economic daily life throughout the long eighteenth 
century. The pace and volume of these supposedly static objects gave many British observers the 
sense that things themselves had taken on agency in relation to their human counterparts.59 One 
reason for this commonly held perception was that many of these objects in transit obscured the 
human actors and socio-economic relations that had made such encounters possible in the first 
place. Just as we are often oblivious to the child labor behind the glossy packages of coffee beans 
conveniently at our disposal, the circulation of objects in eighteenth-century Britain underscored 
the materiality of consumers’ encounters with commodities while making invisible their 
imbrication (and possible complicity) with existing networks of colonialism and international 
trade. When social relations are effaced, the objects we encounter from all parts of the globe 
appear to have their own agency. More specifically, the mediated forms of eighteenth-century 
nonhuman objects convey a sense of their own autonomy by challenging existing orders of 
                                                
57 John Gay, John Gay: Poetry and Prose. Vol. 2. ed. Vinton A. Dearing (Oxford: Clarendon, 1974), 314. 
58 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and 
Joachim Schulte (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), 235.  
59 Throughout this chapter, the terms “thing” and “object” will be used interchangeably unless otherwise 
noted, as in the case of the terms ‘thingness’ or ‘thingliness,’ which bespeak the autonomy of nonhuman 
entities. 
  28 
categorical distinction and epistemology. Tellingly, the sporadic but persistently meaningful 
presence of the elephant in eighteenth-century Britain serves as a particularly productive test 
case for understanding the dynamic agency of the nonhuman.  
Focusing on the elephant enables us to study a number of consequential transcultural 
encounters that call into question normative, anthropomorphic, and Eurocentric distinctions 
between the human and the nonhuman. Looking at eighteenth-century material and textual 
representations of the elephant, this chapter attends to the ways in which encounters with this 
enormous animal—nonhuman matter that raises questions of scale in human perception—
engendered ontological and epistemological shock. In so doing, I demonstrate how British 
subjectivity is shaped through the recognition of the vitality inherent in the elephant as a force 
that exceeds human attempts to contain it. Exploring the function of the elephant in British 
epistemology, I claim that the increasing presence of the elephant redefined British subjectivity 
by provoking its mediation through the figure of the colonial nonhuman. My primary task is to 
chart different aspects of British subjectivity in relation to encounters with nonhuman, non-
European bodies. Yet I am by no means gesturing at a grand, coherent historiography of British 
subjectivity. The elephant body works rather as an ideal site to discuss knowledge-production at 
the center of the British empire in the sense that it touches on the relationships between art, 
science, and commerce on a global scale. At the same time, I want to locate a moment of rupture 
in anthropocentric understandings of nature and self; put another way, this chapter attempts to 
identify cultural sites where correlationism, the long-held conviction that nonhuman subjects are 
configured “in relation to (human) minds or language,” is contested.60 In dialogue with recent 
critical work that has turned toward the nonhuman and the animal, I contend that the elephant 
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body is a thing, an object that demonstrates what Jane Bennett terms “thing-power.” The 
thingness of the elephant body suggests that nonhuman entities have their own will irreducible 
both to human will and to anthropocentric categorization. I emphasize the thingness of the 
elephant, not like Descartes, who dismissed animals as kinds of machines, but to foreground the 
extent to which these particular nonhumans are not always compliant to human needs.61  
Why choose out the elephant from among so many other nonhuman species? Historically, 
the elephant’s sheer bulkiness and its status as an exotic, wonder-evoking object have defied 
efforts to contain it as a pet, making it difficult for human subjects to be easily sympathetic 
toward it. Unlike parrots, cats, dogs, and monkeys—all of which became wildly popular in 
eighteenth-century households—elephants hardly fit into the category of pets, which are 
generally thought of as creatures that are supposed to be small, cute, portable, and potentially 
humanoid. In relation to such criteria, elephants have often failed to evoke any degree of 
sentimental reaction in the publics that have consumed representations of them. The elephant’s 
tangibility and its increasing proximity to eighteenth-century British readers demanded, however, 
that the public correct their romanticized or phantasmagoric views of the species. By singling out 
the elephant among the various animals that brought ontological shock to eighteenth-century 
Britain, I contend that textual attempts to contain this particular species register the culture’s 
concerted efforts to forge a range of modern “enlightened” subject-positions: the credible 
eyewitness, the objective observer, the reliable traveler-empiricist, the taxonomist, and the 
conforming spectator.  
                                                
61 See Bill Brown, “Thing Theory,” in Things, ed. Bill Brown (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2004), where he elucidates the convoluted relationship between subject and object, noting that we face 
“the thingness of objects when they stop working for us,” implying that objects become things once they 
take on agency against or independent of human will (4). On the thingness of objects, see Jane Bennett, 
Vibrant Matter, where she elaborates the ‘vitality’ of things.  
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Reading eighteenth-century discourses on the elephant through the lenses of thing theory, 
new materialism, and posthumanist theory, I argue that the elephant is a thing enmeshed in 
different scales across species and across borders. This method enables us to dissociate elephant 
bodies from existing representational networks and anthropocentric systems of meaning. While 
tracking its impact of the making of enlightened British subjectivity, I also ask whether the 
elephant has a say about its own experience in its own terms. In doing so, I complicate current 
discussions of the classificatory systems that have long been construed as the brainchild of the 
Enlightenment. Exploring the cultural tension between the British subject and the elephant, I 
historicize the development of enlightened subject-positions, from the vociferous virtuoso to the 
anatomist who silently craves social recognition, to zoo-goers and audiences of luxurious 
spectacles. In the process, I am able to elucidate the relationship between knowledge-production 
and the material culture of the eighteenth century, building on recent work in animal studies. 
Travelling across the long eighteenth century with the elephant as it is represented in disparate 
texts and forms, I connect the development of British empire to the dissemination of scientific 
knowledge, mechanical engineering, artworks, and exotic animals.  
 
The Elephant at the Juncture of Knowledge-Making and Empire (1660-1760) 
SAMUEL BUTLER’S THE ELEPHANT IN THE MOON  
 It is not uncommon to come across literary satires ridiculing virtuosi in the long 
eighteenth century, a period before the rigid disciplinary line was drawn between gentlemanly 
polite science and science as a systematic discipline.62 The rise of experimental philosophy in the 
late seventeenth century inspired a huge number of amateur male scientists, some of whom were 
                                                
62 Gimcrack in Thomas Shadwell's The Virtuoso (1676), and Valeria in Susanna Centlivre's The Basset-
Table (1706) are exemplary representations of virtuosi that invite mockery and half-hearted sympathy.  
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affiliated (or aspired to be affiliated) with the Royal Society.63 The Elephant in the Moon, a 
satirical poem by Samuel Butler (1613-1680), exemplifies contemporary responses to what 
Simon Schaffer and Steven Shapin term the “modest witness,” mainly because the speaker in the 
poem mocks both the gravity the virtuoso assumes and his misuse of scientific instruments.64 
This relatively unknown work by Butler serves as an apt point of departure for discussing the 
status of the elephant in early modern British understandings of both the natural world and the 
colonial subject. The poem, which directly addresses the cultural status of the Royal Society, 
suggests that seemingly neutral sites of knowledge production turn out to be intricately tied up 
with the colonial project of enterprises like the East India Company.65 Butler’s poem depicts 
Royal Society members’ momentary fuss over the daunting task of visiting the moon and 
planting a British flag there in a way that helps to contextualize Patrick Blair’s Osteographia 
Elephantina (1713) and to clarify the nature of the knowledge Blair aims to produce within and 
outside his text. No one in Butler’s poem seems willing either to give up or to seize the rare 
opportunity to set foot on the moon. Butler’s Royal Society members, comprised almost 
exclusively of virtuosi, offer wild guesses about the nature of the moon’s inhabitants. One 
                                                
63 For more on the formation of the scientist since the early modern period, see Steven Shapin, “‘A 
Scholar and a Gentleman’: The Problematic Identity of the Scientific Practitioner in Early Modern 
England,” History of Science, 29 (1991): 279-327. 
64 Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental 
Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 59. 
65 The two supposedly independent engines of British modernity—the Royal Society and the East India 
Company—were linked through their shared interest in expanding Britain, each aiding the other’s project. 
Thomas Sprat’s History of the Royal Society (1667), which came only a few years after the launching of 
the Royal Society, presages its symbiotic relationship with chartered enterprises like the East India 
Company. His description of the Society as “Royal Corporation” indicates some significant overlaps 
between the Royal Society and Royal chartered companies (52). See Sprat, History of the Royal Society, 
eds. Jackson I. Cope and Harold Whitmore Jones (St. Louis, MO: Washington University Press, 1958). 
Miles Ogborn also points to the Royal Society’s kinship with the East India Company by pointing to 
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Court of Committees. See Indian Ink: Script and Print in the Making of the English East India Company 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), xvi.    
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particular virtuoso, after looking through the telescope, claims to have seen an elephant running 
amok on the moon’s surface, and offers this “rational” explanation for what he has witnessed:  
That Elephants are in the Moon, 
Tho’ we had now discover’d none, 
Is easily made manifest, 
Since, from the greatest to the least, 
All other stars and constellations  
Have cattle of all sorts of nations,  
And heaven, like a Tartar’s hoard,  
With great and numerous droves is stor’d: 
And if the moon produce by nature, 
A people of so vast a stature,  
‘Tis consequent she shou’d bring forth  
Far greater beast, too, than the earth, ….66 
This fanciful reference to the elephant is confirmed by another Society member’s claim to have 
also observed the elephant, thus sealing their communal bond as scientists. This seemingly 
random reference to the elephant is rich with implications on many fronts. First, Butler indicates 
the way in which a scientific fact is established.67 However tongue-in-cheek the virtuoso’s 
personal observations might sound, they can be construed to be true, as long as there is an 
                                                
66 Butler, Samuel. “The Elephant in the Moon,” The Elephant in the Moon and Miscellaneous Thoughts 
(Coventry: N. Merridew, c. 1800), 8.   
67 On fact-making mechanisms in the period, see Mary Poovey’s A History of the Modern Fact: Problems 
of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Steven 
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empowered group of people endorsing those observations.68 Secondly, since what the virtuosi 
firmly believe to be an elephant turns out to be a mouse on the surface of the telescope, Butler’s 
poem can also be read as mocking the lack of rigor among these self-anointed scholars. Lastly, 
this antic portrait of seventeenth-century experimental philosophers hints at the imaginary 
popular understanding of the elephant in British culture. An animal that is difficult to identify 
becomes associated with an elephant in the moon, and its enormous body makes it seem 
naturally located on the moon amid mythic battles. The virtuosi’s discussion indicates that the 
elephant still remains at the crossroads of the imaginary and the empirical. Butler’s 
representation of the elephant seems informed by the early modern conceptualization of the 
species as evidenced in the following visual representations.   
Conrad Gessner’s “Elephant” (1551) and Wenceslaus Hollar’s “A large elephant with a 
monkey on its back and various flowers and insects” (1674) bear a close affinity with each other 
despite a gap of more than a century, in the sense that neither of these elephants corresponds to 
actually existing elephants except in the contour of their bodies, suggesting both that Gessner 
and Hollar are still grounded in the imaginary and that early modern Europeans had little 
opportunity to directly observe living elephants. Gessner’s woodcut presents an elephant with a 
disproportionately large head and an incredibly large and shell-like ear.69 The entire facial 
structure of the elephant imitates that of a boar, and its four straight legs and webbed feet 
intimate that Gessner had no firsthand experience with elephants. In a similar vein, Hollar’s 
                                                
68 Shapin’s account of the social adjudication of facts/truth holds true in the Royal Society members’ 
heightened discussion over the existence of the elephant. Shapin suggests that “solutions to the problem 
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The Book of Barely Imagined Beings: A Twenty-First Century Bestiary (Chicago: University of Chicago 
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etching offers another inaccurate rendering of an elephant. Compared to Gessner’s woodcut, 
Hollar’s animal appears more natural due to the slightly improved proportion between the 
elephant’s head and the rest of its body, and the more detailed description of its feet. However, 
the shape of its ears—which look similar to the drooping petals of the flower next to the 
elephant—along with its feet like bear paws, its bluntly described joints, and the exaggerated but 
inaccurate shape of its trunk altogether demonstrate that this etching is not based on empirical 
observation of the elephant. It should be noted, however, that the elephant’s alignment with a 
monkey, a grasshopper, and other flowers within one frame can be interpreted as an index of the 
gradual refinement of natural history. At the same time, this framework suggests the difficulty 
inherent to classifying different species as a set in a convincingly coherent order. Diana Donald, 
drawing on John Locke’s sense of bewilderment at the sight of even seemingly trivial plants or 
animals, notes that late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century “naturalists were humbled by their 
own bafflement in trying to order and make sense of the extraordinarily varied and intricate 
forms of animal life and behaviour.”70 The fauna (elephant and monkey) juxtaposed with 
botanical specimens embody the epistemological difficulty in articulating the staggeringly 
complex relations between newly discovered elements of the natural world.  
Butler’s lampoon both represents and foreshadows the relations between the colonial 
project and the import of exotic animals, unwittingly suggesting the logic of colonialism lurking 
beneath the elephant body in the poem. From the outset of the poem, Butler’s speaker points to a 
close affinity between lunar exploration and the colonial project. This seemingly ambitious and 
preposterous project is similar to that of the East India Company, in the sense that the moon is 
presented as a possible colony, in which the British would eventually establish “new 
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plantations.”71 Admittedly, this is a satire against the Royal Society with respect to the object and 
mechanisms of their ostensibly serious empiricism.72 And yet “The Elephant in the Moon” 
engages a range of issues outside of the formation of the Royal Society. The elephant as a 
centerpiece of this poem suggests the way Butler’s late seventeenth-century English 
contemporaries perceive the elephant. The Royal Society members gathered on the site—
presumably representative of the general public in terms of the degree of their curiosity and their 
understanding of the supposedly exotic animal—focus primarily on its gigantic body and its 
impenetrable nature. As opposed to Pliny’s and Topsell’s accounts of the elephant, which point 
to the intelligence located below its thick skin, the virtuosi’s remarks on the elephant register 
their sense of wonder at the elephant’s body per se. This may be a result of the classical 
reference to the use of elephants in battle. And yet the blissful ignorance of the virtuosi 
concerning the elephant body demonstrates the extent to which contemporary perception of 
pachyderms reflected both the public’s curiosity and their epic failure to grasp the “barely 
imagined being”—to borrow Henderson’s witty twist on Borges’s twentieth-century bestiary 
encyclopedia. Indeed, Butler’s satire provides helpful context for understanding the cultural 
significance not only of Blair’s empirical report on the body of the elephant, Osteographia 
Elephantina (1713), but also of a satirical it-narrative published much later in the century, A 
Letter from the Elephant to the People of England (1764).  
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as Robert Hooke and Isaac Newton were invested in exhibiting scientific spectacles as a way to draw 
focused attention from the monarch as well as from lay people in an effort to secure funding for their 
ongoing experiments. What is notable in Jardine’s account is their individual need to deploy scientific 
instruments—air-pumps, microscopes, and telescopes—as a focal point of this public display. For further 
contextualization, see Jardine’s Ingenious Pursuits: Building the Scientific Revolution (New York: 
Anchor, 1999), 50-65. 
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THIS PASSION FOR NATURE  
According to Christopher Plumb, three elephants were imported into Britain during the 
Restoration and early eighteenth century: one in 1675, another in 1683, and a third in 1720.73 
Although it is not clear whether Butler himself witnessed the elephant brought to Britain in 1675, 
the arrival of these elephants coincides with and further fuels a more scientific approach to the 
pachyderm. Patrick Blair (1680-1728) had been immersed in surgery and botanical observations 
before he finally stumbled upon a chance to anatomize a female Indian elephant, which drowned 
near Dundee in 1706.74 His anatomy report, Osteographia Elephantina: or, A Full and Exact 
Description of all the Bones of an Elephant (1713), is essentially a medical attempt to come to 
terms with this unusually bulky species. It exemplifies how the early eighteenth-century British 
understanding of animals is tied to the empiricist desire of the previous century, as is found in 
Robert Hooke’s Micrographia (1667), where Hooke makes two passing references to the 
elephant as an antithesis to his primary subject matter—the most miniscule insects, rendered 
visible only via the microscope. Blair’s detailed structural dissection of this rare zoological 
specimen bears affinities with Hooke’s own investment in breaking things down into more 
manageable and understandable units at the price of reducing that which is under the lens to a 
passive object of human observation. Concomitant with these scientific projects is the making of 
a British subjectivity: an objective witness aiming to distinguish itself from the virtuoso’s more 
superficial, speculative interest in things. Thus, this early eighteenth-century report on the dead 
elephant can be interpreted as part of an Enlightenment project that persistently labels things of 
vitality, thereby turning them into static objects, independent of their own history.  The report’s 
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visual addendum showing the individual body parts of the elephant is emblematic of scientists’ 
technical training with regard to examining and thus properly looking at animals.75 
In order to articulate the nature of the knowledge Blair aims to produce by anatomizing 
the elephant, it is important to understand the kind of recognition that Blair seeks from the Royal 
Society. Does Blair aim to participate in so-called gentlemanly science, which by definition 
primarily involves polite conversation? Are the methods and conclusions of Blair’s anatomy 
compatible with what Anita Guerrini terms “polite science”?76 If so, then what exactly do Royal 
Society members aim to achieve through this kind of inquiry? How do they differ from their 
predecessors, such as the early modern pedant? What particular role does the elephant serve in 
relation to the making of gentlemanly knowledge in Blair’s text? Primarily, Royal Society 
members distinguish themselves from pedants by demonstrating themselves to be “sociable, 
pliant, and polite.”77 As a group, they are invested in forging a new identity, one which is 
fundamentally grounded in experimental philosophy as a method, and in the aristocracy as a 
class.   
From the start of the report, Blair solicits the attention of a particular audience—and 
acknowledgement by the Royal Society—by dedicating his work to John Arbuthnot (1667-1735), 
the well-known physician and satirist. From its inception, the Royal Society aimed to conjoin 
new science (intertwined with experimental philosophy) and gentility, and Blair’s anatomy 
manifests precisely this dual pursuit. As Shapin points out, the Society’s predilection for new 
science is not easily compatible with the gentlemanly preoccupation with polite conversation. 
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Hence, Blair’s text evinces not only the tension between the Royal Society’s two disparate goals, 
but also the historical conflict between the ancients and the moderns. Interestingly, in his 
dedicatory letter Blair clarifies the genealogy of the empirical knowledge he both consults and 
vies with, starting with references to Tavernier, and then continuing on to Aristotle, Moulin, and 
Leewenhock. He explains how his own anatomical text concurs with and contradicts these 
previous authors on the physiology of the elephant. In an effort to be part of the community of 
scientists who confirm and disseminate scientific discourses, Blair juxtaposes the actual body of 
the elephant with these classical texts. 
In opposition to Butler’s farcical account of the Royal Society and its virtuosic forms of 
knowledge, Blair wants to produce objective knowledge gleaned from the elephant’s actual body: 
his text idealizes a modern way of learning focused on the unmediated experience of the natural 
world, and it suggests a new way of looking at animals, wrenching them from the realm of the 
mythical and the imaginary to understand them as part of the material world. Blair’s approach is 
modern partly because he deals with actual corporeality of the animal, and partly because he 
does not organize his report around the utility of the elephant to humanity, a value commonly 
found in contemporary taxonomies and hierarchical systems.78 In the history of science, Blair’s 
work suggests a way of putting the seemingly arcane, wondrous body of the elephant into 
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rational order, by examining its skin, organs, and bone structure. Furthermore, his way of 
organizing this information is grounded in multiple underlying traditions. This whole project of 
skinning and dissecting the entire elephant body follows traditions of medical training prevalent 
since the sixteenth century.79 The overall organization of the anatomy report and his later 
addition of pictures of each body part suggest that Blair is quite conversant with this kind of 
medical training.80 If the sixteenth century was flooded with publications on human anatomy, the 
eighteenth century sees more systematic attention to animal anatomy. The visual aids in the last 
section of Blair’s report suggest an objective way of looking at the animal, thus training a certain 
readership in the visual practices of empirical science. Lastly, Blair’s insistent consciousness of 
his Royal Society audience indicates that even his own supposedly objective, scientific research 
resonates with a patriotic drive. 
Considering that the Royal Society in London was launched as a corporate body seeking 
out permanency against the backdrop of the political ramifications of the civil war, it seems 
inevitable that Blair’s anatomy project—through which he aims to be accepted both by the public 
and by the Society’s quite selective membership—is rooted in similar ideologies. Michael 
Hunter rightly points out that there are both affective and political factors in the Royal Society’s 
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pursuit of impartial science, highlighting that the Royal Society in a way responds to their 
culture’s need for a “healing, consensual philosophy.”81 It is equally clear that this research 
institution is deeply embedded in state politics. As is reflected in Boyle’s links with the East 
India Company, the Royal Society’s new science definitely serves to reinforce the expansion of 
Britain. This connection is evident in Thomas Sprat’s seminal publication, The History of the 
Royal Society (1667), where Sprat illuminates the role of patriotic drives in contemporary 
scientific pursuits. Sprat explains how Society members’ primary concern lies in the “care of an 
Universal Intelligence,” and he goes on to contend that London is the  ideal site for producing 
such universal, objective knowledge, referring to it as “the head of a mighty Empire, the greatest 
that ever commanded the Ocean: It is compos’d of Gentleman, as well as Traders: It has a large 
intercourse with all the Earth; It is, … their House of Fame, a City, where all the noises and 
business in the World do meet”82 Although Blair does not explicitly mention either the origin or 
the itinerary of the elephant, his report unwittingly articulates how the elephant embodies 
colonial subjection, and his attempt to understand its exotic body structure—in objective or 
systematic terms—is intricately tied up with the expansion of Britain. Blair’s anatomy report 
reveals how the making of facts and the establishment of objectivity rely upon the embodied 
knowledge of the silent colonial subject.   
The main body of Blair’s anatomy report is addressed to Hans Sloane (1660-1753)—one 
of the two major figures in conflict within the Royal Society.83 Although modest in its rhetoric, 
Blair’s project seems quite ambitious in that he aims to produce an exemplary anatomical work 
that requires unpleasantly gory and stinky dissection. From the outset of the report it becomes 
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evident that Blair has been grappling with the very physicality of the elephant, subject to decay 
under the treacherous weather. And yet he makes clear that his project is to “satisfy the World in 
such Things as were of Moment in this rare and curious Animal” and to “observe . . . Particulars” 
(2). In other words, Blair is invested in translating the mysterious elephant into an object 
accessible to everyone’s factual understanding. It is worth noting that Blair actually offers a brief 
account of the elephant’s history: the elephant travels all over Europe as an exhibit before it 
comes to England, ultimately facing its death in a tragically ironic way. According to Blair, the 
elephant drowned in a ditch English people had created to alleviate the elephant’s fatigue. It is 
not exactly clear if Blair is aware of the elephant’s origin; he simply states that the elephant is on 
tour, ostensibly for public entertainment. Once the carcass is handed over to Blair, he notes that 
circumstances are not ideal for his dissection: the day is reportedly “too hot,” and Blair is 
surrounded by a big crowd (4). Hence he has to embark on anatomizing the whole body 
instantly. Although Blair would prefer to examine the intestines the next day, he realizes that the 
heat has already dried them up.  
The detailed descriptions he offers at the beginning of the report enable modern readers 
to conjure up the material conditions of anatomy in the early eighteenth century: on a warm April 
Sunday, a surgeon surrounded by a curious and vociferous audience waits anxiously for his turn 
to examine an elephant’s body from its surface to the depth of its muscles and intestines with the 
help of a butcher. After discussing the elephant’s general characteristics in a way that endorses 
long-held perceptions of the species, Blair moves on to examine every detail of its body in 
dialogue with Moulin’s previous anatomy of an elephant. In his examination of “Cuticula and 
Cutis,” Blair contrasts his elephant to Moulin’s (which was preserved relatively intact), noting 
the following specific material conditions:  
  42 
I had not an opportunity of making tryal upon any of it green; for on the Monday, while I 
was oblig’d to go out and take care of the Bones, the Workmen were busied in salting and 
preparing it, and afterwards I had not time: So that what Accounts I can give you are 
taken from it, as it now stands dry. But that I may give you all the satisfaction I can, I 
shall transcribe what of Dr. Moulin’s Account I find agreeable to that I see in this 
Subject, and add my own Observations. (18) 
This short note on the physical conditions of his vivisection—in addition to the way he engages 
in conversation with his predecessor through the tangible and visible evidence of the elephant at 
hand—encapsulates Blair’s methodology through his simultaneous corroboration and refutation 
of previous scholars. In contrast to vicarious observations of the specimen, Blair’s report is 
unusually humorous because he intermittently complains that he has been battling with the 
elephant’s speedily rotting body.84 Expediency and exactness matter in times like this, and Blair 
can generate only a report on the elephant’s bone structure due to the unfavorable conditions. 
Blair does count the number of bones in each section of the elephant, however, and his exact 
accounting of these bones is emblematic of the way in which a more systematic form of 
knowledge was produced in the early eighteenth century.85 Still more striking is the fact that 
Blair provides a visual representation of every single bone he successfully pulls out and 
reassembles. (See Figures 1 and 2.) The tables showcasing the whole body of the elephant before 
and after the dissection indicate that Blair’s task of examining, fleshing out, labeling, and thus 
containing the supposedly arcane body of the elephant has been to a significant extent 
successfully executed as planned at the outset, despite circumstances.  
                                                
84 See Osteographia Elephantina, 32.  
85 Ibid., 90-91. 
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Blair’s tables mark the historical moment when the elephant can no longer be placed in 
the realm of imagination or mystery. Now its physical mystery has been disclosed and 
disseminated to the group of scientists in the Royal Society. The representation of the elephant’s 
bone structure—which Blair painstakingly describes and rearranges both textually and visually—
suggests a watershed epistemological moment when the once exotic nonhuman body is reduced 
to manageable parts and safely contained in the form of a lab report. At this point it is worth 
revisiting the fact that Blair never shows any interest in the actual origin of the elephant. He 
appears content to seize on the fortuitous chance that an elephant has happened to pass by his 
town in England as a part of its rigorous European tour, yet this striking neglect of the creature’s 
origin seems significant: the vehicle that has made it possible to bring an elephant to Britain was 
surely part of a carefully laid-out trade network, which would be fully set in motion in the 
following decades. In part through its obliviousness to the broader network of global commerce, 
British subjectivity is being gradually forged as an impartial observer of things. And the elephant 
body, as evidenced in Blair’s Osteographia Elephantina, falls into the category of a colonial 
subject, stripped of its mystery and laminated in the repository of so-called objective or 
systematic Enlightenment knowledge.  
 
The Elephant and the Expanding British Empire (1764) 
 
In contrast to Blair’s elephant placed flat on the anatomy table, the elephant in A Letter 
from the Elephant to the People of England (1764, Letter hereafter) is presented as a loquacious 
body with a glorious past and diverse travel experiences. The Letter is unusual in many respects. 
It foregrounds a nonhuman narrator who spends much of the text bragging about himself. Its 
subject matter is divided essentially into two sections, one which foregrounds the elephant’s past 
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feats and the knowledge he has acquired through his travels, while the other attempts to provoke 
specific actions from his target audience. The Letter is an ideal site for examining not only the 
agency of nonhuman subjects, but also the function of speaking animals within mid- and late-
eighteenth-century it-narratives. Of what particular social, cultural, economic changes are these 
animal speakers symptomatic? How do they differ from the fabular representation of animals? 
Does the conspicuous presence of animal narrators indicate—as many easily assume—increasing 
eighteenth-century interest in animals or non-human subjects? To address these questions, I 
place the Letter in relation to other contemporary animal it-narratives and fables as a way of 
figuring out whether these narratives can function as a vehicle for social, political, or economic 
satire.86 To what degree does an animal narrator complicate these texts’ potentially satirical 
purposes? My primary purpose in this section is to view the elephant narrator in the Letter as a 
colonial savant, a colonial specimen, and a fundamentally ironic spokesman for British empire—
a subject who has fallen into the bewildering dissemination of things and knowledge that was 
fueled by British commercial and political expansion during the second half of the eighteenth 
century. In order to contextualize this particular text, however, I begin with a brief literary 
history of the it-narrative. After exploring the formal conventions of texts narrated by animals, I 
will demonstrate how the Letter uses an elephant narrator both to critique current English 
treatment of the Scots, and to offer a wide range of commentary on Britain as an emergent 
empire. 
The Letter is intriguingly complex, in part because of its generic and historic ambiguities. 
No narrative comes out of a vacuum, and this text borrows from multiple formal conventions of 
                                                
86 Francis Coventry’s The History of Pompey the Little; Or the Life and Adventures of A Lap-Dog (1751) 
is perhaps the most often cited it-narrative employing an animal narrator, primarily because it marks the 
boom of animal narratives inundating the literary marketplace since the mid eighteenth century. See 
Heather Keenleyside, ed. British It-Narratives, 1750-1830, Vol. 2 (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2012) 
for selections of representative it-narratives produced in the period.  
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the period, sharing generic characteristics with fables, it-narratives, and travel narratives. Yet the 
text eludes attempts easy generic definition within existing conventions. The Letter shares the lot 
of other it-narratives from mid-century in that it touches on the circulation of a nonhuman 
subject and “presents a particular vision of the social system.”87 It-narratives almost always open 
with a succinct but clear account of the origin of their nonhuman narrator, as exemplified in 
Tobias Smollett’s The History and the Adventures of Atom (1769).88 In some cases, the particular 
convention offers a vicarious experience of alterity by centering pivoting around the mobility, 
experience of nonhuman actors as found in Francis Coventry’s The History of Pompey the Little 
(1751). The Letter, however, presents an elephant narrator who does not bother to offer any 
autobiographical details of his early life. Given the historical fact that the elephant is imported 
from India, this omission suggests that the anonymous author of this satirical piece may have 
aimed to efface the context of Britain’s imperial project. Interestingly enough, the elephant 
narrator starts off in a flamboyant manner, and even his name—Maximus et Potentissimus 
Elephantus—sets the tone of this narrative and anticipates the primary characteristics of its 
protagonist. The elephant narrator starts from the claim that his celebrated body and presence 
have been ceremoniously welcomed in several places around the world—everywhere but 
England, which we will discuss later in this section. Along with his name, the narrator highlights 
                                                
87 See Liz Bellamy, “It-Narrators and Circulation: Defining a Subgenre” in The Secret Life of Things: 
Animals, Objects, and It-Narratives in Eighteenth-Century England, edited by Mark Blackwell 
(Lewisburg: Bucknell UP), 117. Bellamy also fleshes out some general characteristics of it-narratives that 
have gained ascendancy since the mid-eighteenth century. According to Bellamy, animal narratives are 
one among a group of prose fictions loosely associated with it-narratives, and while “there were no 
animal narratives in the first half of the eighteenth century, these made up 27 percent of the total in the 
second half, rising to 45 percent between 1801 and 1850, and declining to 37 percent from 1851 to 1900” 
(130).    
88 Laura Brown also notes that “the canine protagonist emerged in the eighteenth century as the 
specifically modern agent of a distinctive formal itinerancy”; see Brown, Homeless Dogs and Melancholy 
Apes: Humans and Other Animals in the Modern Literary Imagination (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2010), 117. I 
interpret the speaking elephant narrator as an agent of global colonial transactions.  
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the fact that he is of “Genius, Taste . . . and Learning” (2), signaling that he is sophisticated 
enough to comment intelligently on the politics, science, or culture of any country he has visited. 
As part of his self-fashioning as a citizen of the world—an experienced and sagacious traveler—
he reports that he has been endowed with honors he believes to be his due. As an idealized 
colonial savant, the talking elephant models how British subjects should behave in the face of 
their expanding empire; to a certain degree, this text therefore functions as a conduct manual for 
British readers.  
The Letter also functions as a convoluted political satire resonant with multiple ironies 
derived from the unconventional self-fashioning of the nonhuman, non-European narrator. 
Montesquieu’s Persian Letters (1721) had set the pattern for using an oriental figure in to 
foreground commercial and intellectual exchanges relevant to the French imperial project and, 
more importantly, to provide nuanced social commentary on the center of a European empire in 
the making. But employing a nonhuman narrator whose body is imbedded in British trade to 
India, I claim, is a bolder and more effective choice to critique and to defamiliarize what had 
been taken for granted in mid-eighteenth-century Britain. The elephant narrator serves multiple 
functions: he is the index of an encounter zone made possible by increasing global trade, and he 
also serves as a colonial savant whose primary task is to report detailed information—usually 
natural history, geography, or language—about the colonized country to the colonists. Although 
satirical in tone and structure, this narrative is designed to police and to refine English 
audiences—not necessarily British, as is implied by the specific target named in the text’s title—
by suggesting more sophisticated colonial ruling techniques the English should implement. 
Speaking in the wake of the Seven Years War (1756-1763), which expanded Britain’s colonial 
territories, the elephant narrator might be an ideal mouthpiece for discussing England’s 
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encounters with diverse colonial others, and for offering conduct advice to a country in charge of 
an increasing number of subjects around the world.   
During his stay in Paris, the elephant resides in a French palace thanks to the King’s 
proper assessment of his nonhuman guest’s intelligence and knowledge. Elephantus is further 
accepted as an honorary member of the (French) Royal Academy of Sciences:  
[I]n Consideration of My prudent Conduct, [the French monarch] was pleased to honour 
Me with a very valuable Present; and his grateful Subjects, sensible of My discreet 
Behaviour upon this Occasion, gave Me repeated Proofs of their Friendship and Esteem 
for Me. — I was soon created a Knight of the Order of St. Louis, and a Member of the 
Royal Academy of Sciences. I diligently visited the Academy for the Improvement and 
Refinement of the French Language, and speedily became an incomparable Proficient. 
(3) 
This social recognition is significant particularly because a supposedly exotic and foreign animal 
actually participates in the society of elite European men. Contrary to the historical fact that 
animals from colonial territories were imported to the metropole and treated as objects of new 
European knowledge, Elephantus stands as a producer of science proper within the Royal 
Academy of Sciences. He makes remarkable progress, quickly acquiring a new language and 
knowledge of European fine arts. Elephantus boasts about this intellectual versatility, which 
assures him equal treatment among the elite and polite society of the metropole.  
Similarly, in his typically boastful way, the elephant stresses that he is “universally 
respected” in Rome as well (3), welcomed even by the highest echelons of the church hierarchy. 
In the center of religious authority, Elephantus tours the modern architecture of the city—the 
crowning achievement of Western modernity—including theaters, palaces, convents, temples, 
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colleges, hospitals, aqueducts, obelisks, catacombs, and sepulchers. He expresses his 
appreciation for the advancement of the city in which he is traveling, and in return for the 
Romans’ enthusiastic hospitality, the elephant offers them his valuable “collar” (4). Although it 
is only briefly described, this moment of gift giving is rich with implications. In Cynthia 
Klekar’s account of the gift economy, she duly points out that “the underlying motivations for 
gift exchange and the social networks that the exchange mediate can be described as calculated 
social practices,” primarily because the gift is tied up with the principle of self-interest.89 The gift 
serves to forge “nonmaterial values” between two parties—values like “alliance, diplomacy, 
friendship, kinship, sacrifice, and marriage”—but it also disguises the element of calculation or 
economic negotiation that such exchanges set in motion.90 Elephantus’s gift of his collar to the 
Romans thus epitomizes the moment of cultural exchange that on a surface level can be 
interpreted as a benign practice of friendship, but that simultaneously reinforces the elephant’s 
position in the sense that he believes he actually honors the city by giving them his dear 
possession, which is later preserved in an Obelisk in the Castle of St. Angelo.  
Elephantus’s two-year stay in Persia engages more explicitly with dimensions of nascent 
imperialism, especially through the narrator’s direct military involvement. Indeed, the elephant 
narrator demonstrates his military prowess in a way that bears resemblance to Gulliver’s 
participation in the battle initiated by the Lilliputians in Gulliver’s Travels: 
… [F]or Persia I worked wonders.—Having given many signal Proofs of My Courage, as 
well as of My Experience in the Art of War, the great and renowned Kouli Khan, the then 
reigning Sophi, was pleased to appoint Me Generalissimo over all his Forces, 
                                                
89 See Cynthia Klekar, “Obligation, Coercion, and Economy: The Deed of Trust in Congreve’s The Way 
of the World” in The Culture of the Gift in Eighteenth-Century England, ed. Cynthia Klekar (New York: 
Palgrave, 2009), 128. 
90 Klekar, “Obligation, Coercion, and Economy,” 129.  
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commissioning Me to protect and direct his People, and to defend, upon every Occasion, 
his Royal Person, Dignity, and Honour.—Now it happening that My Royal Master had 
received many unpardonable Insults from the Mogul, respecting My Lord’s Inheritance of 
a small Spot of the Earth, lying West of the great River Oxus, to stifle the Wretch’s 
Arrogance and Haughtiness, I furiously hurried forth, with a small Detachment of my 
Slaves, into the Heart of his Country, where I triumphed in Rapine and Destruction, 
conquering all that was to be seen, heard, felt, or smelt!—I slew forty Generals; hung 
seventy Priests; drowned three hundred Buffalos; swallowed three Nabobs; and kick’d 
down the Walls of Babylon. (5) 
Elephantus’s participation in the war on the side of Persia alludes to the Persian invasion of 
Mughal India (1738-39) led by Nadir Shah: in an attempt to restore his authority and military 
prowess, Nadir Shah invaded Mughal India, who actually defended themselves by drawing on 
2,000 elephants. Resorting to elephants in civil or international battles is a commonplace military 
strategy, but the fact that the elephant taking on the anthropomorphic body and voice in this text 
engages in the war suggests something else. Central to this account of Elephantus is the fact that 
he considers himself a miracle worker. He has no trouble presenting himself just as another 
human subject. Elephantus’s substantive support of the Persian army suggests that his sympathy 
goes to the victor of history: ultimately, his military engagement and his identification with the 
victors of history paves the way to Elephantus’s attempts to quell any potential dissension within 
the English nation.  
After performing these brilliant military feats, Elephantus’s own curiosity leads him to 
England. His reference to “rambling curiosities” as the major trigger to this particular visit 
echoes commonplace rhetoric used in contemporary travelogues, such as Robinson Crusoe (5). 
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Supposedly, curiosities function as a neutral trigger for further knowledge and travels, but 
curiosity can also serve as the engine for financial or political interests at work in the colonial 
project. The elephant narrator expects that his visit to England will be identical to his visits to 
other nations where he has been invariably welcomed and treated as an eminent guest. In striking 
contrast to his expectations, however, Elephantus finds everything in England disappointing: “I 
was received with less Gentility, less Politeness, less Civility, less Hospitality, and even with less 
Humanity, than I should have met with in an untaught, savage Country” (6). What upsets 
Elephantus is that he is provided with “an ugly, dirty, dark, dismal Hovel,” “stinking water,” and 
a straw bed. Given that what he receives is the customary human treatment of an animal, 
England functions as the first country in his text that treats the elephant as an elephant. For the 
first time, the anthropomorphized animal character faces the possibility of being seen as 
nonhuman, marking the sharp discrepancy between Elephantus’s perception of himself and 
English perceptions of animals. If the elephant represents a colonial subject who visits the 
colonizing country, like the four Indian chiefs who visited London in 1712 (as recorded in The 
Spectator), then the initially inhuman treatment he receives—based on the appearance of his 
body—indicates the nature of English responses to non-English subjects.  
Soon redress is made, and Elephantus’s understanding of the English people is 
immediately transformed. On receiving better treatment, he flip-flops his position and describes 
the English as 
“prudent, obliging, and pleasingly agreeable,” in opposition to other nations who believe the 
English to be “opprobrious” (6). Without giving evidence of this general consensus that English 
people are considered disgraceful, the elephant continues his favorable opinion of them, though 
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he reserves the right (and assumes himself qualified) to criticize English society and to impart his 
unsolicited advice: 
In short, I am well acquainted with the Situation of your Affairs. The Political System is 
my Looking-glass, and the Republic of Letters my Elbow-chair. I am a Philosopher; I am 
a Geographer; and an Orthographer; and an Astronomer; and an Astrologer. I am likewise 
a Physician, as well as a Musician. I understand Architecture, Law, Botany, Pharmacy, 
Anatomy, and so forth. I am also compleatly versed in Mathematics, Metaphysics, 
Hydrostatics, Pneumatics, Niddinoddinatics, and so on. Physiognomy is the bright Mirror 
of my Penetration. (7)  
After cataloguing the long list of his professions—abilities usually taken to be the exclusive 
province of European scholars and merchants—the elephant urges the English to promote him as 
“a Minister of State,” endowed with full control of the nation (8). To resolve existing factions 
and dissent in England, Elephantus demands the English relegate all their rights to him—an 
autocratic idea resonant with colonialist rationalizations. His demand that the English people 
elect him as their sovereign is punctured by a sense of exigency stemming from his stresses on 
the word “immediately” in his speech (9). He repeatedly refers to England’s “domestic Cavils,” 
and although Elephantus does not articulate what particular historical event serves as the 
backdrop of this letter, it seems clear toward the end of the narrative that it has much to do with 
the Act of Union (1707) and with English discrimination against the Scottish in the course of the 
two states becoming one.91 It is highly significant the elephant narrator brings up the issue of 
                                                
91 Christopher Plumb briefly notes that this is a satirical commentary on “despotism, autocracy and the 
maltreatment of Scots” (531). Only toward the end of the narrative does it become clear that it is the 
general English treatment of Scots that is in the elephant’s mind. And yet Plumb does not link the Letter 
to the bewildering speed of British expansion after the Seven Years War. 
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England’s expansion as a nation-state through the integration of Scotland, Ireland, and remote 
colonies overseas.  
The narratorial functions of the elephant are linked to the marked changes occurring in and 
outside Britain as an expanding nation-state. Satirical texts often foreground a foreign traveler at 
the heart of a metropole, observers who eventually offer a critique of the country they are 
visiting. In light of similar tropes employed in Persian Letters and The History and Adventures 
of Atom, this speaking elephant serves double functions. On the one hand, Elephantus (like other 
foreign narrators) touches on sticky political issues surrounding the nascent British empire, 
whose identity rests on commercial and military encroachment upon other states. On the other, 
his self-fashioning as a magnanimous and refined sovereign suggests his embodiment of a facet 
of British empire predicated on technological and scientific advancement, refined aesthetical 
taste, and the production of awe and (military) terror. When Elephantus describes himself as 
“Freedom’s firm advocate, Liberty’s gracious Lord, the Courageous, the Faithful, the Beloved, 
the Wise and Instructive Ruler of Mankind, [and] the oracular Insignia of a Multiplicity of future 
Joys,” it is evident that his rhetoric echoes the self-conception of British empire as a benevolent 
protector of political stability and freedom (9). The elephant elaborates that he has been “the 
mighty-mighty Wonder of this Wonder-working Age, the Pride of Valour, the Joy of Industry, 
the Terror of your Enemies, and the Envy of the whole World” (9). These characteristics are 
emblematic of British national virtues as an empire toward the late eighteenth century, as will be 
materialized in the last section of this chapter. The political implications of the elephant’s 
speeches become clear when he touches on “domestic Cavils” (9). After the Seven Years War, 
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the elephant asserts that domestic political turmoil will sabotage the reputation as well as the 
prosperity of England, and therefore must be prevented:92  
The late general Uproar concerning the great Cause of Liberty, occasioned by the 
successful Artifice and unlimited Effrontery of a graceless Member of the community, 
more effectually injured this Nation than any other Evil that has happened within this 
Century past. At the conclusion of an ever-memorable and most glorious War, when it 
essentially became your Duty to endeavor to remove its consequent Irregularities and 
Disorders, and to re-establish the Comforts and Blessings of Peace, a ridiculous Cabal, 
upon a ridiculous Subject, ridiculously threw every Thing into Confusion, and rendered 
you the Ridicule of the whole World. 
In Elephantus’s lexicon, excessive calls for liberty are associated with a kind of dissent not far 
removed from factionalism or even treason. Hence he advocates the creation of a united political 
entity presumably under the Union Jack. Despite his origin as a colonial subject, Elephantus’s 
argument here suggests he represents the vested rights of the English, not even the British. His 
specific suggestions to the English people indicate the nature of the imminent empire-in-
progress. In order to successfully establish this ideal of empire, the elephant suggests a draconian 
rule that squashes any bud of political subversion. The text’s closure, in which Elephantus insists 
the Earl of Jack-Boot’s station be restored as a way to ensure the permanence of English 
governance, shows that the elephant works as a spokesperson for English commercial and 
political interests.  
And yet a central question still remains surrounding the overarching purpose of this 
satire. Satires often function as literary contrivances to tackle objects that are difficult to pull 
                                                
92 Still it strikes me strange that the elephant narrator addresses only “the people of England” when he 
actually addresses issues in ever-expanding Britain, which might indicate that the author points toward 
the implicit (or explicit) Anglocentrism of the commonwealth. 
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down in reality. If the Letter is emblematic of an animal satire, what is its intended target: 
English mistreatment of the Scottish, the rebellious group undermining the path to a greater 
Britain, or perhaps the colonial figure who engages ambitiously in the production of knowledge 
at the expense of other colonial subjects? The anonymous author, by means of an elephant 
narrator, relates at length Britain’s key characteristics as an expanding empire, promoting itself 
on the basis of its scientific and mechanical advancement, its artistic sophistication, and its 
military power. That’s the insignia of Britain displayed to outsiders; inside the country, however, 
it grappled with political factions and the germs of subversion, nicely described by the elephant 
narrator. By putting weighty commentaries on British political affairs in the mouth of the 
elephant traveler, the author might be suggesting that British citizens should abandon subversive 
factionalism because it is not amenable to the consolidation of the nation as a terror-inspiring 
empire. Thus the elephant’s emphasis on tolerance can be viewed as a refined way of governing 
non-English bodies inside Britain.  
In constructing this nuanced satire, the author makes the most of the epistemological 
status of the elephant, drawing on a particular species that had long intrigued European 
onlookers through its sheer size, the hardly imaginable geographical distance it had to cover to 
get to Britain, and its association with Asiatic cultures. The representational itinerary of this 
particular species from Butler to the Letter historicizes the deployment of the elephant 
throughout the early modern period and the eighteenth century, presaging the moment when 
every English person could easily go and see the body of the elephant, thus reducing colonial 
subjects to the status of an everyday spectacle. In portraying the elephant—both a foreign body 
and a colonial, nonhuman subject—as a sagacious but ambitious and military figure, the author 
of the Letter highlights what goes unsaid about the imperial project both in and outside Britain. 
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By letting the elephant speak, this satirical piece successfully articulates the treatment of colonial 
subjects and the web of empire that actually makes it possible to introduce the elephant body into 
England in the first place.  
 
Becoming-Animals, Becoming-Things: The Things Elephant Automata Say 
Toward the end of the eighteenth century, what used to be novel lost its novelty. What 
was once deemed to be exotic became commonplace, competing with duplicates of its own kind. 
This is the case with the status of the elephant in late eighteenth-century British perception. The 
natural body of the elephant, stripped of its mysterious aura, began to be deployed as a 
decorative motif in British commodities, or as the centerpieces of early British zoos. Focusing on 
the “mutability of things,” Nicolas Thomas rightly argues that “objects are not what they were 
made to be but what they become,” and consequently, objects enmeshed in commercial 
exchanges tend to go through changes in terms of their value and their reception depending on 
the material conditions of trade.93 My archive of the elephant—James Cox’s elephant clocks with 
automata, Hubert Martinet’s musical automaton, and two late eighteenth-century broadsides 
showcasing the elephant as a way to attract audiences to Exeter-Change (Figures 3 and 4)—
registers such mutability because these objects’ primary functions shifted over time and space. In 
this section I argue that these visual and material representations of the elephant signal, on the 
one hand, the containment within British epistemology of the potentially unsettling force of these 
exotic imports, brought in from the countless corners of the expanding empire. On the other 
hand, these objects evince a tension emerging out of British commercial engagements with Asian 
countries, revealing two peculiar conditions of British expansion that bring about imperial 
                                                
93 Nicholas Thomas, Entangled Objects: Exchange, Material Culture, and Colonialism in the Pacific 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 4.  
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ironies. First, the more intimately developed these trade networks became, the more indifferent 
Britons seemed to the very global contexts that actually propelled these imports. Second, and 
perhaps more strikingly, despite the imperial and commercial ambitions of British merchants and 
chartered company operators in India and China, some British exports returned to the home 
country without producing their intended sensations in foreign markets, often not even a sputter 
of interest. These returned cargoes of goods supposed to embody the advancement of British 
mechanical arts and manufactures signify no economic gains for British merchants and thus an 
asymmetrical trade relationship.94 Asymmetry became an issue only when the European empires 
who initiated these transactions failed to make expected gains. The exhibition of Cox’s and 
Martinet’s musical automata epitomizes both the asymmetries and the gift culture inherent in 
global trade.  
I pair the automata of Cox and Martinet with “Tipu’s Tiger” archived in Victoria and Art 
Museum, in order to examine the gradual acclimatization of exotic things within the British isles, 
and how increasing encounters with such things shaped British subjectivity toward the end of the 
eighteenth century. While I chart British commercial engagements with Asian countries with a 
particular focus on the logistics of elephant automata, I demonstrate how British empire more 
generally rests on the nexus of commerce and scientific knowledge. My claim is that the 
circulation of automata in and outside Britain contributes to disseminating both the local 
knowledge of what British empire construed as peripheries and relatively advanced knowledge 
                                                
94 For the growing imbalance in East-West trade, see Roger Smith, “The Sing-Song Trade Exporting 
Clocks to China in the Eighteenth Century,” Antiquarian Horology and the Proceedings of the 
Antiquarian Horological Society 30 (2008): 629-58. Smith demonstrates how such an imbalance arose 
from the fact that the European obsession with Asian goods (textiles, porcelain, and tea) could not be 
offset by a reciprocal demand for British goods. Notably frustrated, British merchants confronted two 
problems. First, since purchases of Asian goods/chinoiserie were made in silver, this imbalance entailed a 
huge silver drain. Second, British merchants who operated on the prospect of profits through international 
trade were completely disenchanted. Amid the bleak vision of global trade, Smith notes, luxurious 
mechanical toys popular in Asia compensated for the deficit (629-30). 
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on mechanical engineering. Animal-shaped automata reveal how the undertakings of the 
emerging British empire rest largely on the advancement of scientific and mechanical 
knowledge, in a way that precedes the period of rigorous specialization in the field of science. I 
attempt a metonymic reading of Cox’s and Martinet’s automata to indicate that these luxurious 
mechanical toys were inextricably tied to the production of commercial and scientific 
knowledge.95 This process, in turn, engenders a divide within imperial subjectivity in the sense 
that those who engage in overseas trade acquire a moderate amount of knowledge of new things 
while the majority of domestic British subjects who appreciated the spectacle of imported things 
were essentially turned into passive consumer-spectators. Ultimately, I contend that these Asiatic 
animal-shaped automata embody a political agenda that engages with the asymmetrical power 
relations between Britain and various Asian nations. Precisely put, in this section I ventriloquize 
the things automata say in order to illuminate both the status of things and the making of later 
eighteenth-century British subjectivity within a matrix of commercial, mechanical, and political 
contexts.  
 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE AUTOMATON HYPE AND ITS PROPONENTS 
To understand the social meanings of these particular late eighteenth-century animal-
shaped automata, we should first examine the broader context of early-modern discussions of 
                                                
95 I am indebted to Elaine Freedgood’s metonymic reading of Victorian things in The Ideas in Things: 
Figurative Meaning in the Victorian Novel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). Here 
Freedgood salvages things from their immediate association with commodities or props in Victorian 
novels, through paying renewed attention to the origin and vitality of things implanted in the narratives. 
Likewise, my reading of elephant automata is an effort to hear what these things say about imperial and 
commercial networks other than as an objects of exchange. Also, I expand on the impact of things by 
suggesting that things actually help to construct human subjectivity in the long eighteenth century.   
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automata.96 Descartes (1596-1650) and Boyle (1627-1691) can be singled out among their 
contemporaries for their heavily reliance on the figure of the automaton as a way to explain 
natural phenomena. As is widely known, Descartes likens nonhuman species to machines, 
drawing on language steeped in the mechanical philosophy of his age. Likewise, Boyle compares 
nature to a “great and admirable automaton,” describing nature’s more arcane undertakings as 
“the subordinate engines comprised in it.”97 Boyle’s analogy rests not only on the commonplace 
mechanical understanding of the universe, but also on the desire to establish order and certainty. 
Leibniz (1646-1716) uses similar metaphors in his own philosophy, noting that “each organic 
body of a living being is a kind of divine machine or natural automaton which infinitely 
surpasses all artificial automata.”98 This passage from Leibniz’s Monadology (1714) echoes 
Descartes in that it imagines the organic body as superior to human-made devices. In 
seventeenth-century philosophical discourse, automata work as an effective trope for making 
sense of the world, especially in the face of newfound knowledge and political turmoil.  
The eighteenth century—the period Kang describes as experiencing an “automaton 
craze”—was rife with frequent exhibitions of automata.99 Both French and British mechanics 
significantly contributed to the making and distribution of automata throughout Europe during 
the period. Jacques de Vaucanson (1709-1782) deserves particular attention given his lasting 
                                                
96 For a comprehensive technological history of automata, see Silvio A. Bendini, “The Role of Automata 
in the History of Technology,” Technology and Culture 5 (1964): 24-42; for the general condition of pre-
modern automata making, see Anthony Grafton’s case study of Giovanni Fontana, the sixteenth-century 
Italian mechanic in “The Devil as Automaton: Giovanni Fontana and the Meanings of a Fifteenth-Century 
Machine,” in Genesis Redux: Essays in the History and Philosophy of Artificial Life, ed. Jessica Riskin 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 46-62.  
97 Quoted in Kang, Sublime Machines, 113. 
98 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, G. W. Leibniz's Monadology : An Edition for Students, ed. Nicholas 
Rescher, (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press), 25.  
99 Kang, Sublime Machines, 9. 
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impact on the manufacturing industry in England.100 In 1742, Vaucanson exhibited a set of three 
automata, among which the duck-shaped automaton generated a great degree of excitement. 
Diderot’s account of the exhibit registers a sense of wonder, with a particular focus on the 
structure of the duck automaton:  
Anatomists will find nothing to criticize about the construction of the wings. All the 
bones have been copied. All those protuberances called apophyses are faithfully followed 
as are the different joints, hollows, and curves. The three bones that form the wings are 
quite distinct. The first is the humerus and rotates in all directions with a bone that serves 
as the shoulder blade. The second is the cubitus of the wing and moves with the humerus 
by means of a joint that anatomists call the hinge-joint. The third is the radius that turns 
in the hollow of the humerus and is attached at its terminations to the small bones of the 
wing tip, just as is the case with the real animal. In order to show that the motions of 
these wings are in no way like those that one sees in the great masterpieces, such as the 
cocks of the clocks of Lyon and Strasbourg, the mechanism of the artificial duck is 
visible, the intention of the inventor being to demonstrate rather than merely to show the 
machine.101 
Vaucanson’s contemporaries (like Diderot) were struck by his intricate duplication of the organic 
system of a living duck in the form of an automaton. The mechanical duck is reported to “flap its 
wings, drink water, swallow grain, and even excrete little pellets from its rear.”102 Just as Blair 
was preoccupied with reorganizing the bone structure of the elephant in Osteographia 
                                                
100 For an account of Vaucanson’s technical ingenuity, see Bendini, 36; Kang, 108-111, 121, 129, 139-
145.  
101 The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d'Alembert Collaborative Translation Project, trans. Nelly S. Hoyt and 
Thomas Cassirer (Ann Arbor: MPublishing, University of Michigan Library, 2003). Web. 25 Aug. 2013. 
<http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.did2222.0000.140>. Trans. of "Automate," Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire 
raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, vol. 1. Paris, 1751. 
102 Kang, Sublime Machines, 104. 
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Elephantina (17), Diderot’s detailed descriptions indicate a similar degree of intellectual passion 
for figuring out the intricate design of things. The elaborate working of the joints and the 
digestive system copied in the duck-shaped automaton were thus a source of wonder and marvel 
at mid-century.103 
Vaucanson’s automata came to London in 1742, thereby impacting the making of 
mechanical toys as well as the public consumption of such mechanical spectacles in Britain.104 
But Vaucanson’s legacy was not limited to the manufacture of extravagant toys. Taking 
advantage of Frederick II’s offer to serve in “the position of royal inspector of silk manufactures 
in 1741” Vaucanson reveals that his automata manufacture and exhibitions are tied up with his 
desire for economic gain and social recognition.105 Five years later, Vaucanson became a 
member of the Académie Royale des Sciences, emblematizing the link between mechanical 
industries and the established scientific academy. Though his work is associated primarily with 
mechanical ingenuity, Vaucanson’s automata and his ensuing success as a self-made gentleman 
scientist—a position to which Blair had aspired in earlier eighteenth-century England—
foreground the connection between mechanical spectacles and the personal desire for social 
elevation in the period. As we shall see, James Cox’s mechanical toy industry quite faithfully 
follows Vaucanson’s legacy.  
Indeed, automata manufacture embodies the Zeitgeist of the eighteenth century, often 
called the age of projects, and Vaucanson was not without predecessors of his own.106 In a period 
when rigid professionalization had yet to be realized in these disciplines, there was a fine line 
                                                
103 To see how the notion of experienced wonder shifts over time, see Lorraine Daston and Katharine 
Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150-1750 (New York: Zone Books, 1998). Chapters 2 and 9 are 
especially relevant to my discussion of the elephant. 
104 Kang, Sublime Machines, 104.  
105 Ibid., 106. 
106 Novak, The Age of Projects.  
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between ostensibly serious scientist-engineers and those who exhibited merely to profit from 
public shows.  Performing scientific spectacles for the public increased a manufacturer’s chances 
not only to establish his credibility, but also to draw attention from prospective investors.  The 
exhibitions that Johann Bessler, a.k.a. Orffyreus (1680-1745) produced at mid-century best 
illustrate the nature of the period’s public shows and its receptions of automata. For instance, An 
Account of the Automaton, Constructed by Orffyreus (1770) is comprised of correspondence 
between key scientific figures—‘sGravesande and Newton, Baron Fischer and Desaguiliers—as 
well as other testimonials on the Orffyreus machine which highlight its outstanding 
characteristics. These letters show the intellectual network that had been established within the 
circle of scientists across Europe, and they also reveal that the hype surrounding the Orffyreus 
wheel arises from its association with perpetual motion. Although an end product of human 
craftsmanship, the automaton engenders wonder and curiosity because it is construed to move 
permanently based on an uncannily self-motivated power.107 Given that the automaton’s 
hydraulic and pneumatic mechanisms were rendered invisible to the lay public, it is no wonder 
that paying audiences took the myth of perpetual motion at face value. Orffyreus designed his 
public shows as an opportunity to intrigue potential investors, and the promise of high returns on 
investments in his wheel prompted Londoners to establish a joint stock company for that 
purpose. Even after seeing the epic failure of the South Sea Company, these stockjobbers 
anticipated the initial gross investment of £1,000,000 would guarantee substantial returns. 
Despite the wheel’s heightened market value, this stockjobbing eventually failed, but the craze 
surrounding Orffyreus’s wheel shows that the period was rife with feverish illusions concerning 
scientific advancement and the financial market. More importantly, the collapse of speculative 
                                                
107 Simon Schaffer delineates the ups and downs of Orffyreus’s venture in “The Show That Never Ends: 
Perpetual Motion in the Early Eighteenth Century,” The British Journal for the History of Science 28.2 
(1995): 157-189.  
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markets and the ensuing disillusionment about the rampant circulation of things suggest that the 
automata industry was subject to the broader logic of the political economy.  
JAMES COX AND THE EXPANDING BRITISH EMPIRE  
Among eighteenth-century automata craftsmen, James Cox is one of the best documented 
goldsmiths and entrepreneurs who determined the fabric of international trade in the mid- and 
late eighteenth century.108 His countless engagements with China and India have drawn attention 
from art historians, curators, and historians of science, mainly because Cox’s project provides a 
rich mine for understanding the material conditions of trade between East Asia and Britain in the 
period.109 Cox’s intricate and luxurious timepieces were renowned not only for their aesthetically 
appealing design, but also for his ambitious attempt to integrate “changing barometric pressure” 
in his mechanical devices in an effort to generate perpetual motion.110 My interest in Cox’s 
automata stems primarily from the fact that he embodies the culmination of longstanding efforts 
in eighteenth-century British mechanical design. Moreover, the fact that Cox was closely 
involved with the vagaries of Sino-European trade, which became more fraught due to the 
                                                
108 Catherine Pagani singles out three major automata craftsmen in the eighteenth century. James Cox, 
Jacquet Droz and Leschot of La Chaux-de-Fonds (Switzerland) comprised the holy trinity of automata 
manufacture in the mid and late eighteenth century. It should be noted that Droz et Leschot, a corporation 
run by the two Swiss partners, experienced greater success than Cox in China by producing less 
expensive but equally magnificent clocks appealing to European tastes. They made enormous profit by 
increasing their range of clientele, which included the Chinese elite, officials, and nouveaux riches. 
Pagani thus suggests that Cox’s narrower marketing, which targeted only the Quianlong courts, resulted 
in the demise of his enterprise. For more details about these European automata producers, see Pagani, 
Eastern Magnificence and European Ingenuity: Clocks of Late Imperial China (Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 2001), especially Ch. 3.  
109 Clare le Corbeiller, “James Cox and His Curious Toys,” The Metropolitan Museum of Art 18 (1966): 
318-324; Marcia Pointon, “Dealer in Magic: James Cox’s Jewelry Museum and the Economics of 
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undertakings of East India Company and an increasing number of private traders, sheds new 
light upon the very mutability and vitality of elephant-shaped automata.111 The itineraries of 
these automata evince the extent to which British empire is located on “the nexus of machine and 
industry,” to borrow Larry Stewart’s apt phrase.112 To highlight the nature of commercial 
entanglement between Britain and East Asia, I center on Cox’s elephant automaton alongside 
Martinet’s equivalent and “Tipu’s Tiger.” In so doing, I argue these particular representations of 
Asiatic animals signal a tension borne out of asymmetrical international trade relations between 
east and west.  
Cox and his industry must have stood proudly under the flag of British mechanical 
advancement, though he himself went through the ups and downs of the high-end mechanical toy 
industry, which was susceptible to fluctuations in Sino-British relations. From the moment Cox 
first entered into trade with China in 1762, he enjoyed an almost invincible position as a world-
renowned craftsman and businessman. His products—boasting “their intricate detail, fine 
movements, rich materials, and abundance of colored stones and painted enamels”—fascinated 
the Chinese consumers Cox targeted, including members of the Quianlong empire.113 Cox’s 
superbly created ‘sing-song’ mechanical toys, clocks, and watches served both as gifts that 
facilitated international trade and as commodities that incurred profits.114 And yet, his semi-
monopoly in China did not last long. Once the East India Company gave approbation to private 
traders, a flood of British manufactures inundated both China and India. As a consequence, 
heated competition among British merchants undermined Cox’s standing in East Asia. To make 
                                                
111 Ironically, the wane of Cox’s operation in China was accelerated by the East India Company, whose 
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112 Larry Stewart, “A Meaning for Machines: Modernity, Utility, and the Eighteenth-Century British 
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things worse, his shipment of luxury goods to China was banned in 1772.115 Faced with the 
possibility of bankruptcy (which actually occurred in 1778), Cox had no other option but to 
dispose of the proud collections housed in his famous private museum in Spring Gardens near 
Charing Cross—a disposal nicely encapsulated in A Descriptive Inventory of the Several 
Exquisite and Magnificent Pieces of Mechanism and Jewellery (1774).  
This document, which anticipates the form of the auction report as it developed in the 
following century, is made up of two parts. In its preface, the anonymous author relates at some 
length Cox’s contribution to the wealth of the British nation, while the second lengthier section 
catalogs individually numbered items, drawing on effusive language to make each product 
desirable in the eyes of prospective buyers. If we attend to the probable motto of the Cox 
enterprise—the sentence, “Growing ARTS adorn Empire”—we can see that Cox’s efforts at 
producing mechanical goods were to be construed as arts that actually beautify the empire, 
including both Britain and its colonies overseas. The hard labor Cox put into the making of 
mechanical toys gets elevated to the status of creating art, and the dissemination of British 
mechanical toys becomes synonymous with an art project that embellishes the ever expanding 
empire. The ensuing Latin phrase, “Labor et Ingenium,” indicates both what was crystalized in 
these automata, and what activities provided the firm foundations on which the expanding 
empire stood: human labor and the ingenuity on which Cox had drawn constitute the perfect 
empire. Hence this auction report is not just a primary document that informs us about the 
specific automata of which Cox was trying to dispose. Rather, the Descriptive Inventory can be 
viewed as an archive in which the major components of empire are listed and described in detail. 
To that end, the author elaborates how the Cox industry functioned as a vital source of 
employment in Britain and Switzerland.   
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In addition to the political and economic implications of the report, one of the 
peculiarities of the Descriptive Inventory can be found in its references to automata: what 
brought these automata, which had been primarily designed as exports, back to London to be 
housed in their creator’s private museum? As the Act for Enabling Cox to Dispose of His 
Museum indicates, Cox’s manufactures were initially designed to be exported to Asia via the 
East India Company’s commercial engagements with India and China. Yet, for some obscure 
reason, some of the exports were shipped back to Britain and exhibited to the British public. 
These returned ‘sing-songs’ best demonstrate the fate of many international cargoes in the 
period. Simon Schaffer, tracing the course of European goods exchanged in the so-called “sing-
song” trade—trade dealing in exquisite mechanical manufactures—notes that European artifacts 
often underwent a metamorphosis in which otherwise neutral goods acquired a secondary 
function as an emblem of exchanges across cultures.116 As precisely such a go-between, British 
mechanical toys were obligated to facilitate potentially seedy transactions across irreducible 
cultural differences. 
Indeed, it became a common practice to offer exquisite mechanical toys as gifts or 
tributes to emperors and high-ranking officials in the countries with which Britain aimed to 
trade. To elucidate the function of automata at the intersection of opposing Asian-British 
commercial interests, we must first discuss the role of civility in these exchanges. In his study of 
British engagements with the Far East, Robert Markley underlines the wide use of the word 
‘civility’ by trading partners “to override linguistic, religious, and cultural differences, [and] to 
convince themselves that a mutual understanding of economic, social, and military interests 
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exists between European merchants and Chinese and Manchu authorities.”117 On the one hand, in 
light of Markley’s definition of civility, we can construe automata clocks and watches as both a 
catalyst and an embodiment of such civility—a collective phantasmagoria that reduces the 
irreducible differences (even in taste) to a manageable size and scale. On the other hand, 
automata manufactured in Britain inspired a profound sense of wonder in Asia, making 
consumers perceive such things as marvels.118 And yet, as the actual number of such goods in the 
market increased over time, these products gradually failed to fascinate their target audience in 
Asia. Unfortunately for European traders, some unpredictable emperors never bothered to open 
their gifts, and the degree of a culture’s interest in such commodities inevitably depended on the 
vagaries of their initial receivers. Hence, as an attempt to maintain Asian consumers’ interest, 
goldsmiths like Cox began to draw on Asiatic animals. To better appeal to their audiences, 
European manufacturers integrated such Asian elements as the figures of Asian emperors, as 
well as elephants and tigers. Hence Cox’s and Martinet’s elephant automata embody Europeans’ 
anxious desire to continue selling their mechanical toys. At stake for British tradesmen was far 
less the perpetual motion of the product, than the perpetual stream of exports to target countries. 
As Schaffer notes, the British goods were supposed to appeal to local officials by being 
“distinctively British yet universally meaningful,” and they were supposed to be “seductively 
and theatrically impressive while displaying the principles of civil rationality and utilitarian 
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118 If a sense of wonder akin to the sublime experience is occasioned by the discovery of pronounced 
differences in scale, size, or in color, experiencing wonder is in effect antithetical to the imagined 
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commerce.”119 Appropriating Asian animal bodies was an inevitable choice for mechanical 
craftsmen like Cox and Martinet.  
 
THE THINGS ELEPHANT AUTOMATA SAY  
The deployment of Asian animals in automata epitomizes British efforts to maximize 
profits, but this particular form of cargo—either those automata ready for being shipped or those 
being returned rejected or unsold—also impacted British audiences and consumers in terms of 
their understanding of exotic commodities and the expanding empire. The elephant automata 
created by Cox and Martinet provide excellent case studies for examining eighteenth-century 
British perceptions of things, particularly non-British objects. Though it is obviously not a 
representation of an elephant, “Tipu’s Tiger” (1793) is aligned with these two automata in my 
analysis mainly because its depiction of a life-size man-devouring tiger resonates with 
contemporary critiques of British imperialism; my juxtaposition of these artworks thus provides 
an opportunity to listen what eighteenth-century things say in relation to British expansion in the 
period.120 My interpretation of these automata serves several purposes. First, it shows that the 
circulation of mechanical devices contributes to the creation and dissemination of British 
knowledge regarding the body of the colonial other. At the same time, the incorporation of 
Asiatic animals into the body of these automata materializes British desires to create the illusion 
of their own abundance and of their profit in Asian markets. Further, my metonymic reading of 
elephant automata traces the containment of once-exotic things within familiar British paradigms 
                                                
119 Schaffer, “Instruments as Cargo,” 220.  
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slightly remote from my subject matter in terms of the period, Elaine Freedgood’s metonymic reading of 
nineteenth-century objects informs my analysis of elephant automata.  
  68 
of perception and consumption. Central to the perceptual shifts in this period is the way in which 
the act of seeing and understanding things becomes interchangeable with consuming them. In the 
course of British attempts to consume and ingest intricate commodities bearing resemblance to 
Asian animals, even an automaton like “Tipu’s Tiger”—which appears to question British 
expansion—gets reduced to a source of entertainment. Lastly, my reading suggests that these 
objects say something about the material conditions of manufacturing and imperial expansion 
that exceeds their intended purposes and functions.   
Among the many surviving machines created by Cox and his disciples, his life-size swan 
automaton best exemplifies the pinnacle of his craftsmanship in terms of aesthetic execution; 
indeed, many historians of art and science have pointed out this machine’s exquisite appearance 
and structure. Yet equally marvelous are Cox’s representations of elephants, machines which 
survive both in printed accounts of their initial reception and in the restored elephant clocks with 
automata. In the Descriptive Inventory, the anonymous cataloger describes in detail Cox’s ‘Piece 
the Fourth,’ which is “a very large and rich Elephant, supporting a magnificent double Gallery 
and sumptuous Temple.”121 This automaton displays Cox’s signature technical rhetoric: in 
addition to the staple element of its heavily ornate surface, the elephant is accompanied by other 
exotic animals, such as crocodiles, lizards, and serpents, among others. Additionally, the effusive 
depiction in the catalogue shows that the elephant figure supports a gallery in which a conqueror 
boasts his prowess, while yet another gallery holds a swan along with two cygnets. This 
particular item shows the extreme hybridity of Cox’s imagination: in effect, he created a 
miniature zoological garden holding a constellation of animal species, including a dragon next to 
the aforementioned animals. Within the gilt and lavishly decorated railings reside what Cox 
believed to be non-European bodies. His incorporation of a Turkish lady and a Turkish officer 
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into an automaton populated by a variety of animal species is baffling, and thus engenders a few 
possible conjectures. As Smith suggests, Cox’s machine was associated with an orientalism 
prompted by his marketing notion that including oriental figures would be an effective strategy 
for appealing to his target audiences.122 Alternatively, however, the inclusion of Turkish figures 
can also be read as a sign that Cox saw little or no difference between non-Europeans and the 
animals he populated on top of the elephant.  
Besides this elephant automaton preserved in print, the only other surviving elephant 
automata created by Cox would be the elephant clocks.123 The height of the elephant clock (250 
cm) is quite astounding. The two bronze patinated elephants, each carrying a clock and an 
automaton, make a symmetrical set which features the signature grammar of the high-end 
mechanical toy industry: a lavish use of gold and precious stones, combined with the intricate 
mechanical system, constitutes the automaton proper. Zooming in on the elephant pair, who is 
not exactly identical, we can see that they stand on a gilt brass mound which imitates the look of 
natural leaf. The contour of the elephants precisely follows a naturalistic style with the exception 
of the ears, whose surface imitates that of a leaf. Atop the elephant bodies sits a golden draped 
saddle, on which stands a large pagoda-shaped clock. Amid the signature effusive style of these 
automata, the background of the fitted clock stands out, primarily because it portrays the 
idealized landscape of a British country house that evokes a sense of balance and harmony. The 
                                                
122 Considering Smith’s observation that the amalgam of “exotic beasts and buildings” is a signpost of 
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fitted clock is located right above the vanishing point on the miniature landscape painting, which 
neatly divides the left and right sections that are lined with well-groomed trees. In front of a gate 
situated at bottom center is a woman walking to the right. A pair of swans symmetrically 
foregrounded in the lake hints at the established order of Britain. The use of perspective that 
effectively secures a broad range of country house within this painting conveys what Britishness 
ought to be. The neatly organized garden and trees—as well as the balance borne out of the 
organic body of nature, exemplified in the swans—also serve as effective visual tools to 
conceptualize Britishness. Although the two elephants carrying the clocks outsize the very small 
landscape painting as a part of the fitted clock, I view this painting paired with the intricately 
designed mechanism behind the clock as an emblem of expanding British empire.124 Presumably 
intended as a gift or a luxurious item to appease the vagaries of target consumers, the automata 
paired with clocks on top of Indian elephants suggest that Britain and its exports, however small, 
can dominate the global marketplace through their consumption by Asian subjects.  
Martinet’s musical automaton (c. 1768-1772) displays intricate design and a subtle 
rendering of nature, humans, and animals. The elephant takes center stage just like in the other 
elephant automata we have discussed. The elephant—whose trunk, ears, and pointed tusks are 
covered in gilt cloth—stands on a foundation which at first glance bears affinity to the forests of 
India. On top of the forest-like foundation stand a retinue around the elephant. As with Cox’s 
machines, this elephant also carries a lavishly decorated gallery, where an Indian emperor 
triumphantly stands. This emblematic Asiatic regalia must have been designed to appeal to a 
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local official. Moreover, the heavily ornate and gilt look of the machine—as with many 
automata—embodies the seductive and theatrical elements of the commercial engagement 
between the parties involved. Hence, the elephant automaton is an apt index of British efforts to 
negotiate the apparent incommensurability of opposed conceptual categories: the natural and the 
artificial, the Indian and the British, the commercial and the artistic. The historical evidence that 
this particular automaton was commissioned by the East India Company suggests that we might 
read the elephant automaton as “cargo” in Schaffer’s sense of the word. According to Phillipa 
Plock, Martinet’s automaton stayed in the British Isles for quite a long time, perhaps signaling 
either its inaptitude as a gift, or the failure of the EIC’s marketing strategy.125 Taking into 
consideration the common lot of cargo in British trade with Asia, this particular mechanical toy 
might have been returned, along with other failed or unsold goods which might be 
enthusiastically welcomed by British or French spectators, either as part of exhibitions held 
across Europe or as additions to private cabinets of curiosity, emporia, or museums.  
This dilemma leaves us with a number of questions. What epistemological or social 
impacts would these returned cargoes make on British audiences? What proportion of the British 
public would enjoy or be informed by exhibitions, zoos, and museums? Among those museum-, 
zoo-, exhibition-goers, how many would be cognizant of the link between these exhibitions and 
the expansion of Britain? To what degree would the general British audience be aware of the 
scope of the commercial web lying between Britain and East Asia? Ultimately, what paradigms 
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transactions, these arguments can sound largely conjectural. Indeed, Smith acknowledges the trouble 
inherent in tracking the transactions between the British East India Company and either China or India. 
The fact that the East India Company during this period drew much on the work of privateers thwarts 
historians’ attempts to trace a major single trade channel between pertinent national entities. To be sure, 
India’s case is worse in terms of the number of records that are still available.  
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of British subjectivity were formed in these domestic encounter zones? Although it is not easy to 
comprehensively track the popular reception of things putatively exotic and spectacular in the 
long eighteenth century, we do have some evidence that can help us to describe the general 
British perception of things as well as the forms of British subjectivity that emerged from the 
global context of British expansion.126  
To understand British perceptions of things, we can start with Cox’s museum, in which 
he showcased his own exemplary mechanical artworks. Despite the fact that few took his 
museum as a genuinely artistic venue, Cox’s pride and conviction led him to insist that his 
museum deserved respect equal to that offered to the Royal Academy and the Royal Society of 
Arts.127 Though contemporaries called Cox’s museum “a model of corrupt centralized 
government”—to borrow he terms of William Mason’s satirical accusation—the museum still 
attracted popular audiences.128 Beautifully crafted mechanical toys operating under the illusion 
of perpetual motion brought the public in. However, just as its creator’s enterprises were subject 
to the fluctuations of political economy, so Cox’s museum had its ups and downs. Those who 
engaged in international commerce became more wary of any signs of collapse or bankruptcy 
that might cut the streams of cash and credit. In a way, the fate of Cox’s enterprises represents 
the persistence in the later eighteenth century of the values espoused in Daniel Defoe’s works on 
the ‘complete tradesman.’  
At the other end the spectrum of British subjectivity—in contrast to manufacturers and 
purveyors of commodities like Cox—lies the identity of the public who consumed these wares. 
Because of the difficulty inherent in defining the primary characteristics of a collective body, I 
                                                
126 Richard D. Altick, The Shows of London (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), Chs. 2, 5, 
16, 23, 25-26.  
127 Pointon, “Dealer in Magic,” 439, 447. 
128 Quoted in Pointon, 426. Altick references the same accusation in The Shows of London, 71. 
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attempt to read the British public in relation to the material conditions of the mid- and late 
eighteenth century entertainments they consumed. As Altick shows us, eighteenth-century 
Britain witnessed a flood of various kinds of spectacles: waxworks, clockworks, mechanical 
engines, artworks, panoramas, and a variety of animals were on view in London to entertain 
anyone willing and able to pay for it. These shows also served to provide some degree of 
education primarily by piquing audiences’ curiosity of audiences and simultaneously displaying 
recent and advanced knowledge in a way that the public could grasp. In response to the influx of 
returned Asiatic animal automata or similarly refined mechanical toys, they were likely to be 
inured to seeing elephants and other supposedly exotic animals to such an extent that they no 
longer functioned as objects of wonder. The broadsides released in the late eighteenth century, 
however, suggest lingering public curiosity both in the bodies of animals and in mechanical 
science as a way to make sense of nature.  
Two broadsides printed in c. 1797 and 1800 demonstrate that the trope of cuorioso 
natural still effectively drew audiences’ attention in late-eighteenth-century London. The 1797 
broadside foregrounds the elephant as the centerpiece of the so-called grand menagerie, using a 
rhetoric that demonstrates the contemporary notion of nature as a mechanical engine, as is nicely 
captured in the text’s reference to “Nature having shewn the most exquisite workmanship and 
contrivance in tis wonderful structure and magnitude.”129 This text hints at historical shifts from 
understanding nature as an organic body to viewing it as a manufacturer like Cox. Near the dawn 
of the nineteenth century, the notion of nature itself is undergoing major changes in the sense 
                                                
129 A similar account of nature as an automaton is found in Robert Boyle’s A Free Enquiry into the 
Vulgarly Received Notions of Nature. The trope is derived from the overall mechanical understanding of 
nature in the eighteenth century. For discussion, see Kang’s Sublime Machines, especially Ch. 3, where he 
notes that nature, “a creative being, was replaced by a machine that operated strictly according to its 
original programming” (113). See also Harman’s The Culture of Nature, in which he discusses how 
experimental philosophy and mechanical engineering shifted the eighteenth-century understanding of 
nature.  
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that nature is no longer seen as a source of natural life, but as an artificial space in which an 
astounding array of human interventions takes place. The establishment of zoological gardens 
and the day-to-day spectacles of animals within the confines of such spaces were likely to help 
the British public to easily accept the fact that nature is a product of manmade investment and 
artificiality. The modifiers deployed to describe the elephant’s origin, physical traits, and 
intelligence bear close affinities with imaginary descriptions from the late seventeenth century: 
adjectives like “astonishing,” “amazing,” “surprising,” and “curious” are planted to intrigue this 
early generation of zoo-goers. This integration of newfound knowledge in mechanical 
engineering with the early modern rhetoric of wonder suggests that the late eighteenth century 
echoes the earlier period in terms of its language and affect toward the exotic animal. Indeed, the 
contour of the elephant body in the broadside is reminiscent of Gessner’s sixteenth-century 
depiction of the elephant in the sense that the rendition is by no means accurate. Although the 
proportion between the head and the rest of the body is close to that of an actual elephant, this 
inaccurate visualization of the elephant may have stemmed from a strategy to defamiliarize the 
elephant, which would have become quite ordinary by this time period, in order to elicit more 
enthusiasm and “admiration” from the British public.  
In a similar vein, the 1800 Exeter-Change broadside, composed of a list of animals with 
disparate origins, embodies the bare face of nature represented at the heart of the expanding 
British Empire: animals with extremely diverse backgrounds and behavioral patterns are 
transported into a single space and put into display for public entertainment. Despite the obvious 
fact that the broadside indicates the individual origin of each species, it still remains questionable 
the degree to which target audiences would be aware of the operation of imperial logistics. In 
addition, what is notable in the 1800 broadside is that the list of animals is presented without 
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indicating what brought the animals to London in the first place, helping turn Enlightened British 
subjects into consumers ignorant of the networks of commercial and imperial expansion Britain 
had successfully created. At the risk of oversimplification, I argue such encounters with animals 
signal the happy massification of British subjects; that is, most Britons tended to enjoy local 
knowledges from the corners of the expanding empire in heavily embellished material form. 
Thus, the introduction of “Tipu’s Tiger” is crucial to understanding not only the self-fashioning 
of British empire, but also British perceptions of Asian peoples and animals, along with a 
fundamental divide within the formation of British subjectivity. In his study of the operation of 
British empire in late eighteenth century, Daniel O’Quinn notes that countless representations of 
Tipu as a demonic despot predominated the theater of the period.130 The Mysorean conflict, 
according to O’Quinn, precipitated a particular need for Britain to stage the sexualized and 
racialized body of Tipu and his Indian subjects; the bloody wars consequently reduced to 
spectacles obscured British “military techniques employed in breaking down colonial 
resistance.”131 Also the 1790s saw the “consolidation” of the empire through military triumphs 
over India and other Asian countries, which propelled the myth of British supremacy.132   
“Tipu’s Tiger” entered London, where consumers of such spectacles resided in an urban 
bubble of scientific advancement, aesthetic refinement, and military triumphalism. In striking 
contrast to the automata created by Cox and other European artisans, the life-size Bengal tiger 
attempting to devour “a prostrate European body” is unsettling in many ways. First, it was 
                                                
130 See Daniel O’Quinn, Staging Governance: Theatrical Imperialism in London, 1770-1800 (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 314-15. O’Quinn demonstrates that a good number of plays 
bearing the name of ‘Tippoo’ showcased the Third and Fourth Mysore Wars in a highly spectacular 
manner.  
131 O’Quinn, Staging Governance, 314. 
132 Ibid., 313. 
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commissioned by the (in)famous Tipu, Sultan of Mysore, to decorate his palace in 1793.133 
Because Tipu is well known for his obsession with the tiger as an “instrument of God,” the 
coupling of a menacing tiger with a European male figure conveys a highly politicized 
message.134 Chatterjee discusses the notion of the tiger as a divine instrument, explaining that the 
tiger functioned as “the presiding deity of the kingdom of Mysore.”135 Tipu might be suggesting 
that it is in the hands of God to avenge not only the commercial but also the political 
encroachments of Britain in South India.136 Murphy references the 1793 Treaty of Seringapatam 
as the major backdrop against which this automaton was produced. Interestingly enough, the 
automaton is a musical one whose sound originated from the pipe-organ body of the tiger. The 
sound the tiger automaton makes is by no means aesthetically appealing. The deep bellowing of 
the tiger (made possible by the use of control handle pumps) set against the European subject 
hints at the degree of resentment and bitterness which Tipu felt toward British armies.137 
Additionally, the fact that Tipu put a wailing sound in the mouth of a prostrate British figure is 
representative of the degree of his animosity toward Britain. The dominant posture of the tiger, 
accompanied by a menacing snarl, provides the intended message against the increasing 
encroachment of Britain in the territory of Indian sultans. After Tipu was killed in 1799, this 
tiger automaton came to Britain and is still on display at the Victoria and Albert Museum in 
London. Although it is not clear whether “Tipu’s Tiger” was put on display for public audiences 
                                                
133 Susan Stronge’s Tipu’s Tigers (London: V & A, 2013/forthcoming)   
134 Partha Chatterjee shows that the “tiger motif was ubiquitous on the uniforms and weapons used by his 
soldiers, and on Tipu’s coins, flags, and throne” in The Black Hole of Empire: History of a Global 
Practice of Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 93.  
135 Chatterjee, The Black Hole of Empire, 93. 
136 Veronica Murphy, “Tipu’s Tiger,” Victoria and Albert Museum.  
<http://www.vam.ac.uk/content/articles/t/tippoos-tiger/> 
137 For more on Tipu’s demonstration of military prowess against the British, see Chatterjee, The Black 
Hole of Empire: History of a Global Practice of Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), Ch. 
3.     
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at that moment, the fact that this particular automaton—purposely created to voice resistance 
against the British empire—was eventually transported to the metropole manifests the web of 
empire, which grew substantive and visible toward the end of the eighteenth century. It also 
indicates how the British come to enjoy newfangled luxuries—mechanical toys including 
chinoiserie and newly imported animals in zoological gardens—without bothering to think about 
the imperial logic operating behind such manmade mechanical toys, clocks, zoos, and automata.   
 
Coda: Elephants in the Web of Empire  
In John Gay’s fable, “The Elephant and the Bookseller,” a bookseller encounters an 
elephant client who knows ancient Greek. The elephant criticizes philosophers’ wrongful 
descriptions of animals, alluding to early anthropocentric understandings of animals that insist 
upon a binaristic distinction between the human and the nonhuman. Fascinated by the elephant’s 
linguistic ability and the broad scope of his understanding, the bookseller asks him to write “a 
history of Siam,” ensuring him good pay. The elephant, however, curtly dismisses the offer: 
E’en keep your money, and be wise; 
Leave man on man to criticise, 
Among the senseless sons of men, 
They unprovok’d will court the fray, 
Envy’s a sharper spur than pay,  
No author ever spar’d a brother, 
Wits are game-cocks to one another.138  
Primarily, this short fable criticizes the fraught eighteenth-century literary marketplace, where 
authors attacked one another out of envy and the desire for fame and money, but there is an irony 
                                                
138 John Gay, John Gay: Poetry and Prose, ed. Vinton A. Dearing (Oxford: Clarendon, 1974), 2: 315. 
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in the fact that Gay draws on an animal character to criticize human business. In a way, my 
charting of the elephant throughout the long eighteenth century similarly adopts animals to 
examine the material conditions of British knowledge production in the context of its global 
expansion. However, instead of leaving “man on man to criticise,” I attend to what the elephant 
says about the making of British subjectivity, empire building, and the dissemination of 
commercial and scientific knowledge.   
In tracing the treatment and deployment of the elephant from the late seventeenth century 
to the late eighteenth century, I demonstrate how British subjectivity was shaped. Butler’s 
portrait of seventeenth-century amateur gentleman scientists shows how virtuosi are both the 
heirs and the emulators of experimental philosophy, prefiguring the enlightened subjectivity 
manifested in Blair’s anatomy report. In the course of forging modern subjectivity, the elephant 
is put in a range of different positions. In the case of Butler’s poem, despite the male scientists’ 
attempt at making sense of this barely imagined being, the elephant remains beyond the grasp of 
human understanding, as is evident in the sixteenth- and seventeenth renditions of the elephant. 
Blair’s Osteographia can be taken as a watershed in terms of his success in taxonomically 
describing the elephant as he initially planned: his anatomy report indicates that the arcane and 
opaque body of nature is being demystified in the early eighteenth century. The course of this 
demystification was occasioned by the influx of newfound specimens and knowledge from 
around the world, although Blair seems unaware of this himself. The Letter, using the 
conventions of it-narratives and animal satires, suggests that the elephant figure works as an apt 
critic of expanding British commercial and imperial engagements. Though Britain is never fully 
conceptualized in the Letter, this satire narrated by the elephant emissary (from nowhere or 
everywhere) indicates the advent of British ascendancy in global trade. Bolstered by unparalleled 
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advancements in science, technology, and engineering, Britain engaged other nations with the 
illusory goal of infinitely increasing its wealth. This move is tellingly captured in the logistical 
history of automata. Due to the unpredictable nature of global commerce, automata for export 
often returned to the heart of British empire, and were consumed by British subjects along with 
exotic animals in Exeter-Change. 
In short, the elephant represented in these cultural materials works as a thing located at 
the crossroads of British subjectivity and empire making. It fascinated people. It sparked popular 
and scientific imagination. It stole the heart of target audiences, from the emperor of Qing China, 
to the high-ranking and elites of Asian societies, to the British consumer of everyday spectacles. 
In addition to being a source of wonder, knowledge, and entertainment, the elephant equally 
embodies a thingness that defies designs. The vitality of the elephant encapsulates the slippage of 
human-nonhuman and center-periphery relations, complicating the fabric of eighteenth-century 
material culture. 
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Chapter 3 
WINDS, EPIDEMICS, AND BUBBLES: 
VITAL OBJECTS AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT IN DEFOE’S WRITINGS 
 
Trade, like Religion, is what every Body talks of, but few understand. 
Defoe, A Plan of the English Commerce (1728) 
 
. . .  [I]n the wilderness I find myself regarded by being other than humans—the wolves, 
bears, and so on—and in a field of languages and signs that I scarcely understand. … In 
the wilderness I am no longer a sovereign or master, but a being among other beings. 
Levi R. Bryant, “Wilderness Ontology” (2011)139 
 
Near the end of 1703, not long after his release from the much-dreaded pillory, Defoe’s 
England was struck by the ferocious storm of the century, a natural disaster whose sheer 
magnitude put in perspective the petty personal and political charges that had been filed against 
him.140 Over the course of two tumultuous days (26-27 November 1703), the tempest moved 
across the British Isles, ravaging particularly the southern and central parts of England and 
Wales. The unrelenting power of the storm fueled fear, horror, and despair. With the memory of 
his own unmediated, anxiety-ridden experience of the event still vivid, Defoe published a report 
wherein he illustrates the unprecedentedly horrifying scale of the storm as well as the 
impossibility of identifying its causes. Re-situating himself and his readers in the moment the 
gale struck, Defoe writes: 
Horror and Confusion seiz’d upon all, whether on Shore or at Sea: No Pen can describe 
it, no Tongue can express it, no Thought conceive it, unless some of those who were in 
the Extremity of it; and who, being touch’d with a due sense of the sparing Mercy of their 
                                                
139 Levi R. Bryant, “Wilderness Ontology,” Preternatural, ed. Celina Jeffrey (New York: Punctum 
Books, 2011), 21. 
140 For more on Defoe’s experience of the humiliation attendant upon the pillory, see John Richetti, The 
Life of Daniel Defoe: A Critical Biography (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), esp. 11, 22-24, 35, and 64.  
  81 
Maker, retain the deep Impressions of his Goodness upon their Minds, tho’ the Danger be 
past: and of those I doubt the Number is but few. (53)141  
Drawing on the topos of inexpressibility, Defoe modestly recognizes his limited knowledge by 
referring to the unknowable aspects of nature as “Terra Incognita” (13). His nonfiction disaster 
narrative, The Storm (1703), captures the great degree of “Concern and Consternation” (31) 
Britons must have felt that particular night, creating a kind of template for disaster writing which 
sparked many competing firsthand accounts of the earthquake and the thunder. Defoe’s writing 
not only registers the immediacy of the event, but also expresses the author’s confidence that he 
might narratively contain the unruly, unrelenting power of the natural disaster. In the face of the 
tempest’s apparent inexplicability, Defoe devises his text as a discursive mechanism for 
explaining and taming the vital force of this frightening nonhuman agent. Indeed, he suggests the 
necessity of creating a particular narrative form, one whose frame and methods might enable him 
to contain the storm’s “impetuous Course” (49), anticipating a similar desire for establishing 
narrative order evident in Defoe’s later and now better-known foray into disaster writing, A 
Journal of the Plague Year (1722).   
I argue that Defoe’s firsthand experience of two major disasters—the 1703 storm and the 
1720 South Sea Bubble—prompted him to experiment with a model subjectivity that I refer to 
here as that of an information manager, exemplified in Defoe’s editorial persona in The Storm 
and in the narrator figure H.F. in A Journal of the Plague Year. Defoe’s version of the 
information manager is engaged in empirical data collection and ordering gathered information 
in print; as importantly, he acknowledges both the corporeal dimension of allegedly objective 
                                                
141 Daniel Defoe, The Storm, ed. Richard Hamblyn (New York: Penguin, 2005). Future references to the 
Storm will be to this edition and will appear parenthetically in the text. In response to the relentless storm, 
Defoe produced two more pieces in the same year: The Lay-Man’s Sermon upon the Late Storm and An 
Essay on the Late Storm. 
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information and the human body’s entanglements with nonhuman agents. The novelty of Defoe’s 
information managers lies in the way they combine the traits required for natural philosophers 
and clerks, such as shop owners or what Defoe elsewhere calls the ‘merchant-scholars’ of the 
period.142 These idealized figures inherit the legacy of Baconian experimental science in several 
important ways: they ground their reasoning in empirical observations, they gather first-hand 
information and knowledge from a wide range of sources (and “specimens”), and they eventually 
put their findings in dialogue with others through print.143 Defoe’s disaster writings, on the one 
hand, underscore his culture’s urgent need for properly compiling, discerning, and disseminating 
information in order to contain the destructive power of nonhuman phenomena that elude human 
comprehension, from natural forces like extreme weather and infectious disease, to 
uncontrollable manmade systems like the unstable financial market and the credit economy. 
Defoe’s archetypal information managers demonstrate how credibility and factual accuracy are 
constructed in early eighteenth-century British culture, embodying Defoe’s distinctive way of 
both engaging in and questioning empirical knowledge making.144 On the other hand, read 
through the lens of posthumanist theory, Defoe’s disaster writings signify the eighteenth-century 
                                                
142 For more on Defoe’s inheritance of Baconian ideals and the new science emerging from the late 
seventeenth century, see Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the 
Sciences of Wealth and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Steven Shapin, A Social 
History of Truth, esp. chs. 1-3, 5-6; Barbara J. Shapiro, A Culture of Fact: England, 1550-1720 (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); and Ilse Vickers, Defoe and the New Science (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
143 The word “information manager” comes from Jacob Soll’s work on the unprecedented feats of Jean-
Baptiste Colbert in establishing a centralized system of information in the court of Louis XIV. See Soll, 
Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s Secret State Intelligence System (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 
2009), 3. Proper equivalents to the information manager in Defoe’s works would be what he calls a 
universal scholar, or a merchant scholar.  
144 In his construction of the information manager, Defoe borrows extensively from seventeenth-century 
Baconian (natural) philosophers, such as Samuel Hartlib, William Petty, Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke, 
and John Wilkins. It is plausible that Defoe encountered Baconian ideals—including corpuscular theory, 
the concept of exact observations, data collection and classification—through Charles Morton, his mentor 
at Newington Green Academy.  
  83 
recognition of nonhuman forces that are situated outside of the representational network, 
something fundamentally unknowable. 
Hence I approach Defoe’s construction of the information manager from two directions. 
First, Defoe’s experience of major disasters underlines the historically specific necessity of 
attaining comprehensible knowledge and objectivity amid a deluge of misinformation and/or an 
absence of information proper. Published against the historical backdrop of both the South Sea 
Bubble and the Marseilles Plague, Defoe’s Journal portrays plague-stricken late seventeenth-
century London as a site infested by “Fortune-tellers, Cunning-men, and Astrologers” who 
“made the Town swarm with a wicked Generation of Pretenders to Magick, to the Black Art” 
(44).145 For Defoe, the advent of a scientific modernity-to-come is significantly hampered by 
irrational and superstitious responses to disorienting phenomena like the plague. Similarly, with 
regard to the South Sea Bubble, he describes the nation’s mathematical failure to compute the 
risks involved in its investment practices as a “National Infection” (49), thereby suggesting that 
the viral epidemic of the plague and the unprecedented financial havoc of the market collapse are 
semiotically intertwined.146 My argument is that Defoe’s information manager emerges as a kind 
of enlightened antidote to these social and epistemological problems, but one whose limitations 
ultimately illustrate how manifold human attempts to contain unruly nonhuman forces are likely 
to fail.  
Second, taking seriously the affective dimension of anxiety and failure apparent in 
Defoe’s project, this essay argues that these intense, phenomenal incidents foreground the 
                                                
145 Daniel Defoe, A Journal of the Plague Year in John Mullan (ed.), The Novels of Daniel Defoe 
(London: Pickering and Chatto, 2009). Future references to the Journal will be to this edition and will 
appear parenthetically in the text. 
146 See Jonathan Swift, The Bubble (1721) for a similarly sharp critique of the complete failure of 
computation practices reliant on probability: “That Nation then too late will find, / Computing all their 
Cost and Trouble, / Directors Promises but Wind, / South-Sea at best a mighty Bubble.” 
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“thingliness” (Levi R. Bryant), “hyperobjectivity” (Timothy Morton), “thing-power” or 
“vibrancy” (Jane Bennett), “thingness” (Jonathan Lamb), or “vitality” (Catherine Packham) of 
modern disasters as either intractable to human attempts to comprehend, contain, and police 
them, or excessive beyond the scope of human understanding.147 By analyzing together the 
agential power of infectious disease, the credit economy, and the storm, I provide a more 
comprehensive account of Defoe’s complicated relationship to such ‘things’ than has been 
offered by studies that have treated these disasters in Defoe’s work separately, using 
methodologies specifically appropriate to each—a nonhumanist analysis buttressed by either 
object-oriented ontology or speculative realism in relation to the storm, for example, or 
epidemiology and histories of science for the plague, or economic history as a way of 
illuminating Defoe’s response to the South Sea Bubble.148 While I will borrow insights from 
these approaches (and others) during the course of my argument, my central focus will be to 
understand Defoe’s construction of the information manager as a response to what thing theorists 
                                                
147 Even though all of these terms are emblematic of different stakes and philosophical backgrounds, they 
in common acknowledge the autonomy of nonhuman entities. In this paper, I will primarily use the term 
“thingliness” as a way to indicate such agential power of nonhumans. As is well known, Bill Brown has 
offered a new definition of “things” as a complicated category opposed to “objects,” which in most cases 
serve human needs or function as a projection of human desire. For the definition and broader 
implications of ‘things,’ see Brown, “Thing Theory,” Things, 4-5; Paula Findlen, ed., Early Modern 
Things: Objects and Their Histories, 1500-1800 (New York: Routledge, 2013), which reflects the 
renewed, widespread interest in rereading objects that are both imbedded in the narrative order and 
enmeshed in the material culture of their respective historical periods; Jonathan Lamb, The Things Things 
Say (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011); Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter; Catherine 
Packham’s Eighteenth-Century Vitalism: Bodies, Cultures, Politics (New York: Palgrave, 2012).  
148 Another methodological approach developed by this renewed recognition of ‘things’ has been 
characterized as the “nonhuman turn” in interdisciplinary interpretive practice. See Levi R. Bryant, 
“Wilderness Ontology,” in which he entirely denounces the topographical distinction of civilization and 
wilderness by arguing that dethroned humans occupy the same ontological space as nonhuman species. 
To examine the gist of speculative realism or object-oriented ontology, commonly based on the premise 
that humans are nothing but objects, see Bryant, Democracy of Objects (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities 
Press, 2011); Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman, eds. The Speculative Turn: Continental 
Materialism and Realism (Melbourne: re.press, 2011); Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and 
Ecology after the End of the World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2013) and The Ecological 
Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), where he suggests re-scaling of our thoughts 
in the face of ecological crises as well resituating human subjects in relation to nonhuman subjects. 
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have described as the autonomy and resistance to human intentionality of nonhuman entities like 
Defoe’s disasters. Jonathan Lamb has argued that “the incomplete state of knowledge” in 
eighteenth-century British culture resulted in the production of “credible fictions” as the “only 
defense against vaporous fancies,” the latter of which I take as a metonym for misinformation.149 
Defoe’s information manager and the apparently coherent empiricist narratives he develops in 
his disaster writings function as precisely the kind of “credible fiction” Lamb refers to in his 
study. Even so, Defoe’s disaster writings foreground the tension between the credibility of such 
fictions and the embodied, vital dimensions of nonhuman entities, calling into question his 
narrators’ confidence in human agency through the threat that human subjects might become 
thing-like themselves.150   
Ultimately, Defoe’s texts chart how his narrators’ desires for what Lamb calls the 
“absolute cognitive possession of [the] thing” are thwarted by the autonomy of the objects they 
                                                
149 Lamb, The Things Things Say, 130. For contrasting accounts of nonhuman “vitality” in eighteenth-
century culture, see Catherine Packham’s Eighteenth-Century Vitalism. Packham questions the long-
established gulf between the Romantic ‘vitalist’ view of nature and the rather mechanical view of 
eighteenth-century materialism through her study of the prehistory of vitalist elements in earlier 
eighteenth-century natural philosophy and political economy. Packham identifies the “autonomous power 
of matter” in her reconceptualization of vitalism within the context of long eighteenth century scientific, 
literary, and philosophical discourses, but delimits the range of her discussion to forms of specifically 
organic matter in a way that would exclude from her purview ‘things’ like the credit economy or even the 
storm. See also Jayne Elizabeth Lewis, “Spectral Currencies in the Air of Reality: A Journal of the Plague 
Year and the History of Apparitions,” Representations 87 (2004): 82-101. Lewis notes the thingness 
inherent to the eighteenth-century understanding of apparitions, arguing that eighteenth-century 
apparition narratives “did not conceive of their subject as necessarily supernatural” but as potentially 
taxonomizable under “the category of the natural and its attendant laws” (86). 
150 In regard to Defoe’s knowledge-making in the face of unexplainable phenomena, previous scholarship 
has noted Defoe’s dual reliance on Providentialism and empiricism, situating him in the line of 
seventeenth-century empiricists for whom such contrasting modes of explanation were not necessarily 
incompatible or mutually exclusive. While Defoe does occasionally draw on the language of 
Providentialism in his disaster writings, my primary concern lies with his interrogation of conflicts 
internal to the methods of empiricism itself, as revealed particularly through his interest in how the 
corporeal dimension of data gathering undermines his epistemological confidence and thus gestures 
towards skepticism.  
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would command.151 But not without a great deal of effort: Defoe’s information managers in both 
The Storm and A Journal of the Plague Year are committed to a full-fledged engagement with 
the new science and its empirical vision as potential means of containing the apparently 
incomprehensible through narrative forms that borrow from the related rhetorical conventions of 
natural philosophy and early eighteenth-century accounting practices. At the same time, 
however, Defoe acknowledges the problematic corporeal dimension of the kinds of information 
and knowledge ordered in the catalogues, tables, and charts epistemologically idealized by the 
new science—a corporeality that refers both to the fallibility of the human sensorium charged 
with apprehending the natural world, and to the often inscrutable human body as one of the 
objects about which information is being gathered. In Defoe’s Journal the failure to attain 
cognitive mastery is represented in the form of failing government policy, from which the 
information manager ultimately derives a sense of humility toward human agency more 
generally. Attendant to the complex dialectic of confidence and skepticism in these works, I 
align Defoe’s The Storm with the Journal to trace the development of the information manager 
as a newly emergent subjectivity, a rational empiricist subject who enacts Defoe’s strategies for 
containing disasters in print. The last section of this chapter focuses on the mobility of three men 
in Journal, providing a coda which considers how the failure of eighteenth-century public policy 
is fundamentally related to the vibrancy of nonhuman agents. 
 
Managing Networks of Letters in The Storm 
Defoe’s initial sketch of an information manager is discernible in The Storm, which from 
the outset positions Defoe as the primary compiler, arbiter, and editor of the eyewitness accounts 
sent in by correspondents.  This editorial subject-position illustrates the nature of Defoe’s 
                                                
151 Lamb, The Things Things Say, 130. 
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engagement with empiricist processes of collecting and ordering information, processes that 
eventually enable him to produce knowledge in the face of disaster. As Richard Hamblyn notes, 
London at this historical moment was “in throe of meteorological inspection,” as were other 
parts of the nation (xi), and it is in this cultural context that Defoe’s preoccupation with 
collecting meteorological data serves as a timely model for assessing the scope and progress of 
the storm, a disaster whose excessive agential power seems to outsmart human efforts at 
comprehending it.152  
The kind of knowledge Defoe manages and produces in The Storm is multi-faceted. First, 
by conjoining his pursuit of scientific objectivity with his participation in print, Defoe grounds 
his empirical reasoning in the organization of collected materials from select local 
correspondents across the country. Defoe uses and transforms a primary convention of early 
modern knowledge-making by soliciting and containing diffuse firsthand accounts of the storm. 
Like his empiricist forerunners, Defoe is invested in establishing verifiable knowledge, 
emulating the model of Baconian natural philosophers, including systematic botanists and 
zoologists, but Defoe’s journalistic agenda ultimately expands the cultural power of natural 
philosophy through his confidence in print culture as a medium for the dissemination of truth. At 
the same time, Defoe’s empirical vision does not undermine Providentialism outright. He echoes 
his seventeenth-century predecessors by attributing the inexplicability of nature to the realm of 
the divine: “Nature plainly refers us beyond her Self, to the Mighty Hand of Infinite Power, the 
Author of Nature, and Original of all Causes” (12). Indeed, Defoe’s occasional reliance on 
Providentialism in the course of marshaling empirical observations of the storm reveals an 
                                                
152 For more on the consistently unpleasant, unpredictable weather during the early eighteenth century, 
see Robert Markley, ‘‘Casualties and Disasters’: Defoe and the Interpretation of Climatic Instability,” The 
Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies 8.2 (2008): 102-24. Markley situates Defoe’s text and the gale 
in the particular context of the Little Ice Age (c. 1300-1850) and thus in the nascent development of 
climatology in the period.  
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epistemological tension between the longstanding authority of Christianity and the increased 
significance of natural philosophy. But apart from understanding Providentialism as a contrasting 
mode of explanation, Defoe’s writing envisages two challenges to the persuasiveness of 
empirical methodology that are generated from within empiricism itself: first, Defoe’s statement 
that “all Nature has its Cause within it Self” (13) implies the primacy of nature’s thinglike 
agency, potentially independent of God’s intervention and certainly of human comprehension; 
and second, Defoe’s emphasis on the corporeal dimension of collected information—its 
dependence upon human beings’ potentially fallible sensory systems—suggests the insistent 
possibility of scientific error through lapses and inaccuracies in our unavoidably embodied, 
human observations.   
From the outset, Defoe vouches for his truthfulness in the milieu of print culture by 
saying “if a Man tells a Lye in Print, he abuses Mankind” (3). This solemn statement reveals an 
enigmatic relationship between print and the facticity of disaster writing in particular. Primarily, 
Defoe aims to promote an aura of objectivity in his methods by assuming that no one would offer 
the ‘useless Banter of an Untruth’ in print, a relatively enduring medium in which individual lies 
would be permanently recorded and would invite derision from posterity (65).153 Defoe 
insistently argues that printed materials guarantee factual accuracy, objectivity, and thus 
truthfulness, because he believes that the permanence of print will proscribe attempts at falsity or 
misrepresentation.154 However, he admits that the correspondence about the storm solicited from 
all over Britain could be subject to editorial revision from Defoe himself, as the one responsible 
                                                
153 In his examination of The Storm, Markley emphasizes that the text is committed to “empirical 
verification” (103) and religious discourses (Providentialism). See Markley, ‘‘Casualties and Disasters.’’  
154 For more on Defoe’s relationship to eighteenth-century British print culture, see Paula McDowell, 
“Defoe and the Contagion of the Oral: Modeling Media Shift in A Journal of the Plague Year,” PMLA 
121 (2006): 87-106; and also McDowell, “‘The Art of Printing was Fatal’: Print Commerce and the Idea 
of Oral Tradition in Long Eighteenth-Century Ballad Discourse” in Patricia Fulmerton and Anita Guerrini 
(eds.), Ballads and Broadsides in Britain, 1500-1800, (Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2010), 35-56. 
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for soliciting, gathering, reviewing, editing, cataloguing, and publishing the vast array of first-
hand accounts. In effect, despite Defoe’s reassurance that the collected letters are “dressed in 
their own Words” (8) and “kept close to the matter of fact” (65), he does not completely dismiss 
his own editorial intervention, explaining that ‘if I tell a Story in Print for a Truth which proves 
otherwise, unless I, at the same time, give proper Caution to the Reader, by owning the 
Uncertainty of my Knowledge in the matter of fact, “tis I impose upon the World: my Relater is 
innocent, and the Lye is my own” (4-5).  
One of the distinctive elements in Defoe’s reconstruction of the storm lies in the way he 
contrasts the function of the natural philosopher against that of the man of Christian faith. Defoe 
elucidates that his editorial position is analogous to that of a botanical anatomist, highlighting 
that “in Nature the Philosopher’s Business is … the Wood; there grows the Plant he looks for; 
and ‘tis there he must find it. Philosophy’s a-ground if it is forc’d to do any further Enquiry” 
(14). In order to define the significance of this method, Defoe constructs one of the more famous 
binary oppositions in his text: “The Christian begins just where the Philosopher ends; and when 
the Enquirer turns his Eyes up to Heaven, Farewell Philosopher; ‘tis a Sign he can make nothing 
of it here” (14). Confronting the excessiveness of nature, Defoe acknowledges that we have two 
(not necessarily incompatible) modes of explanation at our disposal: on the one hand, we can 
assume the role that Psalmists used to play by appreciating and praising the mystery of nature, 
attributing it to God’s work; or, on the other hand, we can empirically elucidate the workings of 
nature in the manner of a natural philosopher or an anatomist. Though he acknowledges both 
realms of knowledge, Defoe’s emphasis falls on the function of natural philosophers whose 
guiding principle is to attend to the material evidence available to them. In his additional 
commentary, Defoe repeatedly underscores the responsibility of the anatomist—a kind of 
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metonym in Defoe’s work for any modern objective thinker—for delving into the core of nature, 
arguing that it is “not enough for an Anatomist to know that he is fearfully and wonderfully 
made in the lowermost Part of the Earth,” because that mode of understanding is the province of 
poets or religious thinkers (15). In contrast, Defoe insists that an anatomist ‘must see those 
lowermost Parts’ and “search into the Method Nature proceeds upon in the performing the Office 
appointed, must search the Steps she takes, the Tools she works by; and in short, know all that 
the God of Nature has permitted to be capable of Demonstration” (15).  In the same manner, 
Defoe underlines the significance of objective thinking with a particular focus on the “Chain of 
Cause and Effect” imbedded in the way things manifest themselves in the natural world (15). 
Simply put, Defoe distinguishes an empiricist enquirer’s job from that of a religious person who 
can merely appreciate the sublime, or the “Arcana of the Sovereign Oeconomy” (12). Natural 
Philosophers, according to Defoe, must explore the mechanisms of nature shrouded in what he 
calls a “thin Veil of Natural Obscurity” (15).155  
Appearing in a kind of preamble to the collected first-hand accounts of the storm, 
Defoe’s manifesto for natural philosophers illustrates not only a particular technology of 
observation, but also the philosophy governing his compiling of individual observations, a set of 
principles couched in what Ilse Vickers terms the “Baconian mentality” or “Baconian ideals,” in 
that sense-oriented observations, and the use of plain, clear language are deemed pivotal rules.156 
At the same time, Defoe’s method and frequent use of the word ‘specimens’ resonates with the 
way early modern natural philosophers exchanged their new specimens found mostly in remote, 
                                                
155 In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, however, natural philosophers’ or empiricists’ 
individual efforts at attaining facticity were often understood to reveal and/or to reinforce God’s design.  
156 Vickers, 4. For more on the period’s widespread fervor regarding projects, see Maximillian Novak 
(ed.), The Age of Projects (Toronto: The Regents of the University of California, 2008), which also 
supplies contextual background explaining how the advancement of commercial knowledge went hand in 
hand with that of its scientific counterpart.  
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exotic countries and counterchecked the novelty of their discoveries through engagement with 
other scientists in a select community. As Brian Ogilvie mentions, natural philosophers and 
botanists in particular were always searching for novel specimens about which they could chart 
and establish their findings in relation to existing genealogies.157 Just as botanists were engaged 
in identifying, collecting, and arranging new specimens, Defoe is invested in locating diverse, 
but coherent specimens of the disaster in the form of letters sent in by correspondents. Defoe 
himself refers to the letters from Littleton in Worcestershire and Middleton in Oxfordshire as a 
“Specimen of what those whole countries felt” (86). Defoe uses the word ‘specimen’ 
interchangeably with ‘example’ again in A Journal of the Plague Year when he catalogues 
quacks and mountebanks as a “Specimen” of fraud and chicanery (47). From Defoe’s empiricist 
reasoning, we can see that his collection of disaster correspondence is envisioned as a way to 
understand the seemingly arcane working of nature; and, at the same time, it provides a narrative 
frame to make sense of an overwhelming large-scale event. Faced with the need to produce 
proper language to contain the recent disaster, Defoe’s weather writing visualizes the progress 
and ramifications of the recent tempest through his resort to print. By means of printed letters, 
tables, and lists, Defoe reconstructs the track of the storm in terms both of locale and of 
temporality.  
In addition, Defoe strives to standardize knowledge about the causes and consequences of 
the tempest by establishing gentlemanly consensus and by applying supposedly reliable, 
quantitative methods to his specimens. Through his deliberate selection of letters, Defoe neatly 
reduces the myriad descriptions of the event to a pattern. To be sure, Defoe passingly 
acknowledges the occurrence of wondrous, even ridiculous, events that might elude the 
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explanatory efforts of his “very serious Observation” (46)—as exemplified in cases where the 
Thames is blown up into the air, where fish and birds are respectively blown away from one 
place to another like raindrops, or where an oak which has once collapsed comes to be erect 
again.  Even so, the overall structure of Defoe’s reportage rests primarily on general patterns: the 
selected letters consist mostly of accounts of collapsed church roofs or spires, damaged 
buildings, and fatalities as proof of the storm’s impact. Defoe painstakingly fleshes out the 
means of constructing credibility throughout his collection of various testimonials by using a 
conspicuous set of rhetorical gestures toward objectivity. One such strategy involves his 
insistence that his maintaining of “very Authentick” (104), “impartial” (104) and “particular” 
(115) accounts guarantees that all the recorded events took place as related. Additionally, to 
bolster the credibility of his select authors, Defoe heavily draws on the testimonies of clergymen 
and “Gentlemen … of Piety and Reputation” (64). As Defoe’s method nicely exemplifies, in his 
cultural context the construction of objectivity and reliability in print often relied upon the 
consensus endorsement of a society of reliable men of a certain social stature. Barbara J. Shapiro 
has shown that “Membership in some of these ‘fact’-establishing circles required little more than 
honesty, sharp eyes, and an ability to describe or illustrate what had been viewed,” arguing that 
scientific credibility is determined “on the basis of a range of considerations that included social 
status but also the experience, skill, fidelity, and impartiality of the observer and the number of 
supporting observers.”158 A consensus among respectable gentlemen—what Shapiro terms the 
“gentlemanly thesis”—was a crucial component in the construction of truth.159 Steven Shapin 
also articulates the centrality of “gentility,” in such processes, as a “massively powerful 
                                                
158 Shapiro, 118. 
159 Ibid., 139. For an elaboration of these gentlemanly observational practices, see Steven Shapin and 
Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1985), Ch. 2. 
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instrument in the recognition, constitution, and protection of truth.”160 The way Defoe gleans 
local eyewitness accounts of the storm predominantly from clergymen reveals that his method is 
resonant precisely with such recourse to the “gentlemanly thesis”; his additional insistence on the 
reliability of individual accounts by framing each report with the clause “It is credibly reported” 
(45, 47) also evinces the lingering influence of the gentlemanly science in Defoe’s 
epistemological practices.  
Moreover, Defoe’s numerous references to barometers (26) and the thermometer (28) 
reinforce this ethos of objectivity and exemplify his compulsion to quantify and to standardize 
knowledge about the storm. Indeed, he displays his staunch faith in the kind of objective 
universality that Shapin contrasts against “locally credible knowledge.”161 Despite his own 
personal experience of the storm, Defoe the editor is more invested in producing standardizable 
knowledge about the extent of the event than he is in particularizing it. His insertion of the 
“Table of Degrees” signifies that Defoe’s conversance with new scientific methods and its 
standardizing language provides the fundamental groundwork for understanding and establishing 
the objective knowledge that can be derived from diffuse sets of sense-based experience (24). 
Defoe’s inclusion of the table from Reverend William Derham, in which he compares and 
contrasts the varying air pressure in Townely and Upminster (29), indicates his interest in precise 
measurement.162 Despite lingering uncertainties in his culture about the cause of the storm, 
Defoe displays his confidence in the instruments of ‘modern’ technology for measuring its 
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effects, and he works on the assumption that the advancement of science depends on the 
supposedly accurate, error-free measurement such instruments can provide. In short, Defoe 
produces an aura of objectivity through his inclusion of various tables, including the “Table of 
Degrees” of winds (24), “A Table shewing the Height of Mercury in the Barometer” (29), and 
“A List of such Her Majesty’s Ships’ lost in the storm” (146).163  
Through these empiricist procedures and rhetorical strategies, Defoe carefully builds up 
his public persona as an impartial journalist-cum-anatomist, overwhelmed momentarily by the 
sheer scale of the disaster, but undaunted by the volume of information on his desk. Defoe 
successfully captures in his narrative the latest national event, containing the overwhelming, 
transgressive ‘thinglike’ agency of nature.164 His serious attempt to generate reliable reportage 
indicates his investment in facticity and objectivity concerning sense-based observations, an 
investment which cohabitated perhaps uneasily but not impossibly with Providentialism.165 If 
Defoe’s The Storm is his first major attempt at rendering visible the invisible force of things, his 
retrospective fictional account of the plague year can be read as an analogous effort to contain 
the vibrant agency inherent in nonhuman entities. In the later text, Defoe complicates the vitality 
of the nonhuman by affiliating the 1665 epidemic with the more immediate ramifications of the 
financial crisis brought about by the South Sea Bubble in the early 1720s. In the face of unruly, 
                                                
163 For the conceptualization of objectivity in early modern Europe, see Lorraine Daston, “The Image of 
Objectivity,” Representations 40 (1992): 81-128; and see also Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity 
(New York: Zone Books, 2010).  
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transgressive, and contagious things, Defoe’s later model of the information manager requires a 
more systematic, classificatory method for establishing order. As we shall see, what is distinctive 
in Defoe’s figuration of this model subjectivity in A Journal lies with the fact that its managerial 
persona—named H. F. in Defoe’s text—in the end acknowledges the corporeal dimensions of 
empirical knowledge making, aspects of empirical method which resist containment in charts 
and tables. Paradoxically, even the faultiness of modern instruments—such as the barometers 
and thermometers upon which Defoe draws—nicely illustrates how things resist complying with 
the needs of human subjects.  
 
Managing Networks of Plague and Trade in A Journal of the Plague Year 
Though Defoe’s Journal, on a surface level, appears to have been spawned by the 
widespread epidemic that devastated London in 1665, the text has been recognized as a topical 
response to the ramifications of the South Sea Bubble. Max Novak notes of the Journal that ‘the 
chaos Defoe really had in mind was that of 1721,’ namely, the “plague of avarice” which refers 
to the financial crisis.166 Pat Rogers, drawing on journalistic pieces Defoe published between 
1720 and 1722, similarly asserts that collective anxieties emerging from the fiasco of the South 
Sea Bubble lurk in Defoe’s Journal.167 Perhaps nothing can better illustrate the exact discursive 
context in which Defoe’s Journal is situated than the opening of the 12 November 1720 issue of 
Cato’s Letters, where the narrator pinpoints the South Sea Bubble as a more serious “Contagion” 
than the plague that had recently hit Marseilles.168 Furthermore, Trenchard and Gordon highlight 
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that the vast majority of Britons were affected by the financial bubble in some degree: “That a 
Multitude of Families are ruined, and suddenly sunk from plentiful Circumstances to abject 
Poverty, is affecting and lamentable; though perhaps all owing to their own rash Confidence in 
the Management of known Knaves.”169 Such insistent juxtapositions of the epidemic with the 
financial bubble are cogent, mainly because both function as nonhuman agents that are highly 
contagious, excessive, and practically impossible to contain.  
Further, the plague as a metaphor for the financial havoc complicates the parameters of 
Defoe’s understanding of disaster by highlighting its thingness and by extending it from the kind 
of natural calamity discussed in The Storm to a rather manmade one. As the credit economy 
advanced and started working independently of the deliberate design of its architects, the 
unparalleled financial crisis resulted partly from pervasive investor ignorance as to its workings. 
In his examination of British cultural anxieties triggered by the agency of things, Lamb notes the 
invisible entity eighteenth-century Britons labeled as credit was a “mystery that left their ability 
to order the chain of events at the mercy of Fortune,” which in turn “perplexed considerably their 
ideas of identity and human agency, not to mention reality.”170 In other words, the apparently 
vital ‘thingness’ of the speculative credit economy arises in part from the widespread craze over 
the prospect of profit, which disables human subjects from grasping the implications of the their 
own inventions.  
                                                                                                                                                       
more on the Marseilles plague, see Daniel Gordon, “Confrontations with the Plague in Eighteenth-
Century France,” in Alessa Johns, ed., Dreadful Visitations: Confronting Natural Catastrophes in the Age 
of the Enlightenment (New York and London: Routledge, 1999), 3-29. Gordon’s examination of the 
Marseilles epidemic reveals meaningful parallels with its seventeenth-century London equivalent in that 
the city itself “was a site of intensive reflection on the causes of the plague and on the relationship of 
epidemic disease to commercialization” (5). Gordon persuasively argues that the devastating impacts of 
plague make it a “shorthand for everything that was excessive and irremediable” (6).  
169 John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon in Ross B. Emmett (ed.), Great Bubbles, Vol. 3 (London: 
Pickering and Chatto), 255. 
170 Lamb, The Things Things Say, xxi.  
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Towards the end of the Journal, H.F., suspicious of the ‘new Face’ of the city manifested 
by many telling signs of its apparent recovery (196), acknowledges that because he fails to 
understand the cause of the disease, he cannot speculate as to the cause of the recovery: 
“Nothing, but the immediate Finger of God, nothing, but omnipotent Power could have done it” 
(208). In a similar emphasis on the limited human capacity to understand the overwhelming 
event, H.F. comes to the conclusion that “it was evidently from the secret invisible Hand of him 
[God]” (209). This acknowledgement sounds as like the signature Defoean leap to 
Providentialism we noted earlier in The Storm, but here it contradicts H.F. extensive efforts to 
establish narrative order in the rest of the Journal leading up to these admissions.  Rather than 
reading these references to Providence at the end of the Journal as a conventional rhetoric of 
authorial modesty, I argue that such moments function as an index of Defoe’s complicated 
negotiation between the poles of his dual identity as both a Protestant observer who respects 
theological explanations for events beyond our empirical understanding and an empirical thinker 
who acknowledges the agential power of things that work in defiance of human designs, needs, 
and interpretations. 
The Journal concludes with a modest and devout acknowledgement of the impossibility 
of understanding either the workings of the credit economy or the progress of the plague, in a 
way that seems to negate the empiricist project Defoe initially takes up. Indeed, the text is 
organized around a central tension between H.F.’s initial ambition to pinpoint the possible 
origins of the plague by relying on “the Letters of Merchants” (25) as disseminators of certain 
knowledge, and his ultimate recognition that attaining comprehensive cognitive containment of 
the epidemic is almost impossible. Contrary to his nascent ambition for producing a neat balance 
sheet— in the manner of Robinson Crusoe’s spiritual ledger at the beginning of his stay on the 
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island—H.F.’s project is doomed to failure, mainly because what is facing this hardly 
dispassionate observer is a fundamentally disrupted cityscape. The streets, supposed to function 
as channels for disseminating information, are entirely emptied of people, with the occasional 
exceptions of mad men running about, or corpses and carcasses abandoned and eventually 
dumped in a nameless pit—an abyss that continually expands due to the dire necessity of 
containing the increased number of dead bodies. Witnessing such a pervasively gory reality in 
the city, H.F. questions the fine line drawn between rationality and madness in times of calamity: 
“What cou’d affect a Man in his full Power of Reflection; and what could make deeper 
Impression on the Soul, than to see a Man almost Naked and got out of his House, or perhaps out 
of his Collection Alleys, Courts, and Passages, in the Butcher-row in Whitechapel” (153)? If 
Defoe’s editorial self attempts to categorize the damages incurred by violent weather with his 
recourse to visible patterns and objective measurement in The Storm, the Journal cannot reduce 
the variegated signs of madness, delusion, misinformation to such comforting abstractions. Just 
as government-produced data and Bills of Mortality signal one strategy at organizing the 
epidemic’s statistical phenomena, H.F., besieged by the sensory signs of collapse, develops his 
own form of managing the many-headed plague: a memorandum.    
Through the notes in his ledger of memoranda, H.F. strives to establish his own archive 
of information and knowledge in the face of utter devastation. Expanding the editorial model 
developed in The Storm, H.F.’s paradigm of information management resonates with that of 
Defoe’s “complete English tradesman” who enacts the ethos of contemporary merchants.171 H.F. 
continues the project of Defoe’s editor in The Storm in that he initially shares both the earlier 
                                                
171 See Defoe’s praise of the “universal scholar” whose scholarship outsmarts that of classical scholars in 
The Review Vol. 2, no. 2 (3 January 1706). Defoe’s stress falls on the merchant scholar’s practical 
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character’s passion for compiling a comprehensive version of knowledge and his confidence in 
empirical observations. Exploring the multiple semiotic dimensions of contagion, Defoe’s 
Journal addresses both the financial crisis and the ensuing necessity of containing eddies of 
invisible information as well as plague.172 H.F. functions as the kind of information manager one 
might call interchangeable with a “merchant-scholar,” someone who attempts to establish 
narrative and economic order based on empirical reasoning and observation. H.F.’s account is 
characterized by his use of the term “memorandum” as a primary tool for framing his narrative: 
in his conclusion, he retrospectively describes the text as a series of “ordinary memorandums” 
(211), attempts to capture the material conditions of the excessive and unruly plague. More 
importantly, Defoe’s deployment of the word memorandum signals the text’s engagement with 
class-oriented, empirical methods of ordering information. As the Oxford English Dictionary 
suggests, the memorandum functions in context primarily as a kind of memento—“a record of 
events, or observations on a particular subject.”173 Indeed, Defoe’s plague tract encapsulates both 
H.F.’s particular memoryscape of London and his effort to record relatively objective data in the 
form of personal observations and government-issued orders and bills. In addition to framing the 
narrative as a means of commemorating the calamity, Defoe’s insistence upon its status as a 
‘memorandum’ stresses its comparability to a tangible record of commercial transactions. Just as 
a merchant’s memorandum supplies a comprehensive view of debits and credits on one page, the 
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aforementioned bills and orders charting the fatalities of London citizens render visible the 
surviving and the lost human subjects in the wake of the plague.   
Viewing H.F.’s narrative as a series of memorandums evokes its connections to the 
ledger and to the ethical and epistemological dimensions of bookkeeping, apparent in eighteenth-
century merchants’ methods of recording their transactions in plain English. For instance, 
Defoe’s conduct-manual on the Complete English Tradesman (1725) stresses the significance of 
adopting plain language (as a staple of the ideal merchant’s prose style) and of generating a 
precise inventory.174 Indeed, Defoe argues that the art of bookkeeping is “absolutely necessary” 
for an apprentice tradesman—so necessary, in fact, that the would-be merchant’s domestic and 
eternal destinies depend upon that single skill (45). In one instance, Defoe compares the 
tradesman who has an imperfect knowledge of bookkeeping methods to “a bride undrest … not 
fit to be married” (45), while in another passage he compares the tradesman’s books to a 
“Christian’s conscience,” arguing that any merchant who fails o keep both of these things “clean 
and clear” can “give but a sad account of himself either to God or Man” (208). Outside of this 
Christian framework, of course, bookkeeping is more generally defined as a way of “analyzing, 
classifying, and recording transactions, according to a preconceived plan, as the basis for 
reporting the financial condition and all operating results of a business enterprise”—a definition 
entirely consonant with Defoe’s methods in the Journal.175 Defoe’s methods for laying out 
statistical data and government publications, including the bills of mortality (60, 109, 112-13, 
140), and specific orders concerning the treatment of infected citizens and households (55-58), 
demonstrates his investment in bookkeeping methodology. Encapsulating the actual loss of life 
                                                
174 Defoe, The Complete English Tradesman, Vol. 1, ed. John McVeagh (London: Pickering and Chatto, 
2007). All references are to this edition and will appear parenthetically in the text. 
175 James Don Edwards, “Early Bookkeeping and Its Development into Accounting,” The Business 
History Review 34.4 (1960): 446-58, 447.  
  101 
and the spread of the infectious disease in the same kinds of numeric terms found in 
contemporary periodicals, Defoe painstakingly attempts to establish an aura of objectivity, which 
simultaneously echoes the method he had previously developed in The Storm.  
What cultural historians have noted as particularly distinctive in double-entry 
bookkeeping lies in its capability of providing information about both assets and liabilities at one 
glance.176 The overview of balance and credit on a single page came to be associated with a 
sense of the “merchant’s moral rectitude” and thus endowed middle-class men with a sense of 
what Mary Poovey refers to as “transparency and impartiality.”177 This particular way of 
recording information, according to Poovey, offers a new social identity, “mercantile honesty,” 
to those engaging in commerce, by publicizing what was once deemed private and secret.178 
Such historical shifts in managing information, in short, have far-reaching cultural and 
epistemological implications. The new bookkeeping idealizes the facticity and credibility of 
numeric data, and it expands the relevance of ‘objectivity’ as an evaluative standard into other 
social realms. Rebecca Connor uses the term “social accounting” to describe a predominant trend 
in long eighteenth-century British culture toward combining empiricism with the class-oriented 
ethic of mercantile transparency.179 Defoe’s integration of numeric data and government orders 
suggests that the Journal in its entirety can be read as just this kind of ledger.180  
                                                
176 Edwards, 456; Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in Sciences of 
Wealth and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 29-91. 
177 Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact, 11, 5. For a general overview of the epistemological 
development of accounting, see James Don Edwards, “Early Bookkeeping and Its Development into 
Accounting,” The Business History Review 34.4 (1960): 446-58. See also Jacob Soll, The Information 
Master, for more on Colbert’s compulsive drive of compiling vast volumes of information relevant to 
state centralization. Colbert’s design of a pocketbook for the crown in an effort to effectively provide 
Louis XIV with an exact account of debit and credit in one page exemplifies the perfect amalgam of 
double-entry bookkeeping and state governance. 
178 Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact, 30.  
179 Connor, Women, Accounting, and Narrative: Keeping Books in Eighteenth-Century England (London: 
Routledge, 2004), 102. Connor illustrates that Defoe deploys the sensibility of social accounting 
throughout his major prose works. She argues that accounting, as represented in Defoe’s texts, is “by no 
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 Implicated in these epistemological shifts, H.F.’s memorandums evince his particular 
aptitude as a credible information manager, a position buttressed by his profession as a saddler. 
H.F.’s networks of trade make him especially aware of the global passage of the disease, the 
domestic operation of small-scale commerce, and the circulation of money. H.F.’s profession 
supplies him with a perspective on global-scale transactions, and the intricately structured 
connections between commerce and disease. As noted earlier, H. F. relies upon networks of 
merchants as a means of collecting and sorting out information. Through his note taking, H.F. 
produces a particularly commerce-oriented knowledge—a branch of modern knowledge 
supposedly characterized by rigorous taxonomy and classificatory systems—that actually 
embraces the possibility, even the inescapability of fragmented facts. His business network is 
reportedly linked to the “Merchants trading to the English colonies in America,” where he yields 
major profits even though he has been stationed in London (31).181 This is a marker that 
identifies him as a man who has enough business acumen to grasp the impacts of the plague 
upon both domestic and global markets. H.F. reveals his responsibilities for the overseeing “not 
only of my Trade, but of my Goods, and indeed of all I had in the World” (31). Furthermore, his 
recognition of the existing network of international correspondence among merchants indicates 
that this commercial web plays a pivotal role in disseminating information, a method yet to be 
entirely replaced by printed media. Defoe underlines that his writing is governed by facts and 
buttressed by the global correspondence network among merchants, which must compensate for 
                                                                                                                                                       
means confined to money” but can be connected to the work of his predecessors in demographic statistics, 
such as John Graunt, William Petty, and Gregory King. Similarly, Nicholas Seager focuses on H.F. as a 
“compiler of evidence and the assessor of its reliability.” Seager, “Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistic: 
Epistemology and Fiction in Defoe’s ‘A Journal of the Plague Year,’’’ Modern Language Review 103 
(2008): 639-65, 640.     
180 Not coincidentally, Crusoe registers the mysterious working of God’s providence in the form of 
balance sheets as well, nicely exemplifying Defoe’s immersion in the rhetoric and ideology of 
bookkeeping. 
181 See Mullan, A Journal, 223. (footnote 21) 
  103 
the absence of newspapers (25). If Defoe’s editorial persona in The Storm attempts to build up a 
domestic correspondence network through his soliciting letters of eyewitness accounts, in the 
Journal H.F. reiterates this method by trusting the network between merchants as a crucial 
medium of information.  
H.F.’s acute interest in the commercial network is highlighted in two significant ways.  
First, when he addresses the link between international trade routes and the transmission of the 
epidemic, he speculates as to whether the “parcel of silks imported from Holland, and first 
opened in that [infected] house” might be the outbreak’s point of origin (178). In a similar vein, 
H.F. appraises the epidemic’s economic effects. Just as Defoe assesses the damage to the British 
Navy towards the end of The Storm, H.F. articulates the ruined “State of Trade” (185) after 
embargoes are imposed against British exports. Imagining a complete halt to international 
commercial transactions, H.F. fears that British “woolen Manufactures are as retentive of 
Infection as human Bodies, and if pack’d up by Persons infected would receive the Infection, and 
be as dangerous to touch, as a Man would be that was infected” (185). From that point, H.F. 
underlines how commercial trade passages overlap with those of the plague: “the Plague was 
carried into those Countries [Spain and Portugal] by some of our Ships, and particularly to the 
Port of Faro in the Kingdom of Algarve, belonging to the King of Portugal; and that sever 
Persons died of it there, but it was not confirm’d” (186). But H.F.’s preoccupation with 
economic networks is also manifested in his examination of how Londoners avoid direct contact 
with one another in day-to-day commercial transactions. Global trade increases the possibility of 
unwitting contacts with foreign bodies: disparate parts of the world become connected like a 
close-knit community by sharing a common cause of infection.182 H.F. notices that the epidemic 
                                                
182 As Carswell points out, London’s geographical proximity to such major European cities as Amsterdam 
and Paris makes it easier to create a commercial block (than with any other cities in Britain): “From the 
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is passed between random subjects through their inevitable daily interactions in the marketplace, 
commenting that “as this was a Necessity which renew’d it self daily, it brought abundance of 
unsound of People to the Markets, and great many that went thither Sound, brought Death to 
home with them” (83). He notes that servants function as go-betweens and thus become the most 
likely carriers of the disease. H.F. also draws particular attention to the circulation of money as a 
possible medium of the epidemic, since it facilitates direct contact between random individuals. 
H.F. sees in a marketplace that a butcher refuses to touch money directly, but puts it in a “Pot full 
of Vinegar” as a way to mitigate or inhibit the progress of infection (83); likewise, buyers 
attempt to minimize direct contacts with people by always carrying “small Money to make up 
any od Sum, that they might take no Change,” a little sign that “all the Means that could be us’d 
to prevent the spread of disease through commerce ‘were us’d” (83). In short, Defoe consistently 
foregrounds evidence of increased contemporary awareness of how trade networks perpetuate 
the plague. 
H.F.’s reference to memorandums thus effectively fleshes out his epistemological 
standing and his self-consciously middle-rank concern with networks of domestic, global 
commerce. The memorandum displays H.F.’s inventorying of relatively objective statistical facts 
(as in The Storm), his personal meditations on God’s providence (as in the journal entry in 
Robinson Crusoe, The Storm, and Serious Reflections), his firsthand observations, and his 
anxieties about misinformation.183 H.F.’s sets his memorandum as an antithesis to the profusion 
of inaccurate information circulating during the plague year. From his first entry it can be 
deduced that H.F. is invested in cataloguing facts to counteract the misinformation produced by 
                                                                                                                                                       
seaward side London was one unit in the ever more closely integrated commercial system disposed along 
both sides of the waters which connected Britain, the Netherlands, and France” (3). This geographical 
advantage, in turn, makes London more susceptible of the plague originated from other European parts, as 
is conjectured by H.F. from the beginning of the Journal. See Carswell, The South Sea Bubble, Ch. 1. 
183 Such eclectic aspects of the Journal indicate Defoe’s connection to Baconian notebook culture.  
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sorcerers, astrologers, psychics, fortunetellers, and quacks who are at pains to offer competing 
explanations for the unusual circumstances. At an early stage of the plague, H.F., besieged by 
such misinformants, notices the way in which they reassemble random, disparate natural events 
to propagate a “horrid Delusion” (45). Referring to the appearance of a comet before both the 
1665 plague and the 1666 Great Fire, propagators of false information attempt to make a 
connection between the brightness of the stars and the ensuing events. In response to these 
homespun, arbitrary accounts of causality, H.F. acknowledges his own uncertainty about the 
relationship between the stars and the disasters only to criticize the fact-making process of the 
group of sorcerers and fortunetellers as one deliberately “calculated” in hindsight to reinforce 
their appearance of credibility (39). H.F. is generally not shy about exhibiting his animosity 
against quacks who take advantage of the desperate, calling them “a Set of Thieves and Pick-
pockets” (48) who shamelessly display their trade cards containing false expertise in curing 
“multitudes of People, that actually had the Plague upon them” in Holland, or in “having a 
choice Secret to prevent Infection” (47). Amid the deluge of misinformation generated by such 
unreliable subjects, H.F. articulates that his registers “take notice only of the fact, and mention 
only that it was so” (49). He simultaneously makes clear that his records are based on his 
empirical observations: “I am only relating what I know, or have heard, or believe of the 
particular Cases, and what fell within the Compass of my View, and the different Nature of the 
Infection” (175). Through this combination of empiricist methods—providing a ledger-like 
statistical account of the plague’s progress, clarifying its relationship to networks of commerce, 
and stemming the proliferation of opportunistic falsehoods—Defoe’s information manager 
attempts to counteract the vital force of the ‘thinglike’ epidemic agent that threatened to destroy 
the very fabric of English society.  
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Bodies in Motion: Narrative Containment and Governmental Failure 
Defoe does not rest at merely pointing out the disruptive vitality of nonhuman forces in 
the Journal: near the end of this disaster tract, H.F.’s account of the three men from Wapping, 
which has been pointedly neglected by most scholarship on Defoe, illustrates the connection 
between the failure of human efforts to understand the workings of the plague and the ineffectual 
nature of the government’s measures to contain its effects.184 This particular episode, in which 
three working class men with different occupations and life experiences strive to escape the 
confines of London, highlights both the mobility of liminal subjects and the biopolitical failure 
of British public policies toward disease control. The journey of the three men points to a site of 
tension between governmental authority and corporeal subjects who defy the grid of power. On a 
textual level, the success of three men in fleeing and establishing a makeshift community outside 
of London embodies the corporeal residue that is not contained in print, taken here as a metonym 
for Britain’s representational network or its system of signification. Given Defoe’s efforts at 
establishing a model of rational, normative subjectivity in the narrative and his rhetorical reliance 
on empiricist techniques (charts, tables, and printed newspapers, etc.), this account is particularly 
compelling in that these men on the move are not contained either by the government’s authority 
or by its representational strategies for quantifying the manifold corporeal dimensions of its 
population.  
                                                
184 One exception to this claim can be found in the work of Carol Houlihan Flynn, who pays due attention 
to the story and argues that the key to understanding the anecdotal status of the “three men” episode, 
which has usually been read as a praise of their “stalwart and dogged virtues,” can be found in the Act of 
Settlement. See Flynn, The Body in Swift and Defoe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
146. Max Novak links the presence of these laboring-class men to Defoe’s larger concern with 
commoners. See Novak, “Defoe and The Disordered City,” PMLA 92.2 (1977): 241-52.       
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In the Journal, the “three men” episode enhances our understanding of Defoe’s thoughts 
about viral culture and the circulation/management of information in the early eighteenth 
century, and it clarifies how Defoe imagines himself as a kind of social projector. It should first 
be noted that the information about the gravity of the plague reaches these men quite late. They 
decide to leave London only after “the Plague was exceedingly advanced, and the Number 
greatly increased,” i.e. when the bill of mortality records 2,785 deaths (118). The three men 
function as a kind of anomaly in relation to similar plague-tract tropes at work in Defoe’s text. 
Unlike characters in the other anecdotes compiled in the Journal these men are given specific 
names and occupations: John the biscuit baker and former soldier, Thomas the sail maker and 
former sailor, and Richard the joiner. Admittedly, such specificity is conflated with some 
fairytale elements in their representation, particularly the use of the magic number three and their 
story’s ultimate message of restoration 
These men’s professions indicate that they belong on the lowest rung of the social ladder, 
outstripped of the means of sustenance especially in a time of crisis like the plague. As H. F. 
admits in many places, the poor in need of employment and bread do not have the luxury of 
choice in a circumstance like this.185 Somewhat belatedly, these men decide to flee London and 
find a safe haven elsewhere: 
                                                
185 See the following passages:  
…So when it was increased to such a frightful Extremity as I have related, the middling People 
who had not Friends, fled to all Parts of the Country where they cou’d get shelter, as well those 
that had Mony to relieve themselves; as those that had not. Those that had Mony always fled 
farthest, because they were able to subsist themselves; but those who were empty, suffer’d, as I 
have said, great Hardship,s and were often driven by Necessity to relieve their Wants at the 
Expense of the Country: By that means the Country was made very uneasie at them, and 
sometimes took them up, tho’ even then they scarce knew what to do with them and were always 
very backward to punish them, but often too they forced them from Place to Place, till they were 
oblig’d to come back again to London.” (137)  
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From the River they travelled towards the Forest, but when they came to Walthamstow 
the People of that Town denied to admit them, as was the Case every where: The 
Constables and their Watchmen kept them off at a Distance, and Parly’d with them; they 
gave the same Account of themselves as before, but these gave no Credit to what they 
said, giving it for a Reason that two or three Companies had already come that Way and 
made the like Precedents, but that they had given several People the Distemper in the 
Towns where they had pass’d, and had been afterwards so hardly us’d by the Country, 
tho’ with Justice too, as they had deserv’d… (125-26) 
Indeed, lodging emerges as the most critical issue for the three men because neighboring citizens 
and townspeople will not allow those from London to stay either in their houses or in 
neighboring places. In response to the fear and lack of hospitality prevalent in cities located near 
London, the three men come up with the idea that they will build a temporary shelter outside the 
town and will stay harmonious with the townspeople whose collective health they happen to 
threaten. It is worth noting that the three men are equipped with a tent, which they can build any 
time under the soldier’s guidance, and “a small Bag of Tools” (120), so that the joiner work can 
work as a handyman when necessary. In a way, these men build up a self-sufficient economic 
community immune to external forces, such as possible rejection from city officials or 
townspeople, and the contingent nature of finding proper lodging within the town.186 As such, 
the triad exemplifies what Defoe and H. F. believe to be a workable “pattern” for the poor to 
emulate. H. F. himself elucidates the purpose of the interpolated story at length, saying that it is 
meant to identify “a Pattern for all poor Men to follow, or Women either, if ever such a Time 
                                                
186 Defoe tells us that the three men flee London with “one Tent, one Horse, one Gun” (120), 
simultaneously indicating that the current biscuit baker regains his old identity as soldier. 
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comes again” (116).187 This statement can be read as a sign of Defoe’s profound and continued 
interest in the wellbeing of the socially underprivileged, which is best fleshed out in his Due 
Preparations, published in the same year. In light of McDowell’s point that Defoe’s plague tract 
is an amalgam of familiar plague tropes circulated in the early modern period, this account could 
otherwise be dismissed as just another story that dramatizes the socio-economic impacts of the 
plague.188 
On a discursive level, the men’s flight from London elucidates a collapse of the binary 
opposition between wilderness and civilization, to borrow Levi Bryant’s terminology. According 
to Bryant, the conventional spatial distinction between civilization and wilderness is predicated 
on the conviction that civilization builds on human populations and their meaning-making 
systems, while wilderness is imagined to be that which is not civilization. Yet if we recognize 
that the human being is nothing more than another object within a larger system of objects—
which is the crux of object-oriented ontology and other posthumanist critical theories—this 
binary opposition is shredded. That is, humans and nonhumans are placed on the same footing 
and civilization becomes nothing but a wilderness in which human subjects are stripped of their 
sovereignty or mastery, as is suggested in Byrant’s epigraph. In a nuanced way, Defoe’s men on 
the move epitomize the experience of an alterity that defies governmental attempts at biopolitical 
                                                
187 Before departing London, the three men establish an economic community grounded securely on 
common funding to which they all contribute and have equal access: John, the former soldier, whose 
contribution was the largest at the outset, “was content to what they had should all go into one publick 
Stock, on Condition, that whatever any one of them could gain more than another, it should, without any 
grudging, be all added to the same public Stock” (119). This unusual microeconomic unit can be 
construed as a complete antithesis to the feverish private speculative market in Britain, where every 
private or corporate investor risked his/her fate in the South Sea enterprise. 
188 Defoe’s Journal comprises eleven episodic fragments, almost a half of which are concerned with the 
condition of the poor: see the stories of the piper (94), the poor waterman isolated from his family (104), 
and the three men (68, 118-137). It is notable that the account of two brothers and their kinsmen is 
repeated twice within the narrative. These episodes focused on the poor are deployed primarily to 
dramatize the tragic effects of the plague. McDowell points out that Defoe “drew on some oral sources for 
his knowledge of the plague,” and these accounts of the London poor might exemplify such diverse oral 
sources. See McDowell, “Defoe and the Contagion of the Oral,” 95.  
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control. Despite its length and its richness in terms of detail and thematic significance, the 
account of the three men has drawn little critical attention. Indeed, such critical oversight is quite 
surprising if we consider that the story itself runs the longest among many of the plague topoi 
Defoe deploys in the Journal and that it demonstrates Defoe’s treatment of the London poor 
while criticizing the imposition of confinement upon the bodies of Londoners. More importantly, 
this account encapsulates the mobility of liminal subjects in times of crisis and thus deserves 
thorough critical attention.  
The marching, encamping, and returning of the men can be interpreted as a physical 
embodiment of the waxing and waning of the epidemic. Given that the men’s movement is 
stunted by city officials demanding their health certificate and pass, it is evident that the flow of 
human subjects has fallen under an attempt at) state control. Their mobility is persistently 
checked either by government officials or by townspeople who fear further contagion. 
Governmental efforts to circumscribe, pathologize, and criminalize vagrant subjects (and the 
epidemic itself) run parallel with state control over the flow of information. The moment when 
the Walthamstow constables check the three men’s passage indicates primarily a clash of 
conflicting self-interests in a time of crisis, but it also indicates the embodied dimension of the 
spread of the disease.  
The presence of the vagrants is associated with an impending epidemic threat, and it is 
not so uncommon for liminal figures to mobilize despite multiple authorial attempts to contain 
them.  In information management or media studies, predicting and controlling the flow of 
bodies matters. It is government administrators’ primary job to grasp, predict, and control such 
embodied flows and  movements. When they fail to keep track of such movement, the whole 
system is subject to epic failure. The account of the three men indicates both physically and 
  111 
metaphorically how unexpected and unwanted movement (seen from the top down) elides 
multiple attempts to curb the itinerary itself. Also the development of plot surrounding the three 
men shows that liminal subjectivity is associated with a thing-like state. Yet Defoe offers another 
twist, by showing that the very objects of control—pathogens, vagrant human carriers, 
information, and credit—actually take on a vitality that contradicts their usual association with 
that which is static, graspable, and thus safely contained within the grasp of anthropocentric 
epistemology and information management.  
 
Coda 
Although the threatening particulars of each disaster in The Storm and the Journal seem 
to be neatly contained by Defoe’s efforts to produce discursive or statistical order, the 
information managers’ projects get consistently undermined by the corporeal aspects of 
receiving and producing information. This subversively embodied dimension of knowledge 
making is particularly discernible in H.F.’s portrayal of the pit, his encounter with a ghost-like 
man, and his description of the disembodied sound of groans and cries throughout plague-
stricken London. H.F.’s empirical research in the city does provide some statistical anchors for 
understanding the epidemic, but it also indicates what is left unsaid in most of the ‘objective’ 
data, namely, the material and corporeal dimensions of information management.189 Initially, 
H.F. deploys the term ‘memorandum’ to describe a way of recording daily occurrences within 
the city, indicative of his process of reflection on the things he notices: H.F. is ‘employed in 
reading books and in writing down my memorandums of what occurred to me every day . . . out 
of which afterwards I took most of this work, as it relates to my observations without doors’ 
                                                
189 It is evident where Defoe’s critical interest lies when we compare his description of the pit with the 
burial register, a document that neatly records the number of buried bodies. In striking contrast to its 
neatness and error-free objectivity, H.F. is more invested in depicting what can be neglected in such data.  
  112 
(82). This fleshes out H.F.’s role as an information manager who has keen eyes for gathering 
objective empirical details and for fact-making—activities made possible by his mobility. 
Indeed, his peripatetic information gathering is foregrounded when he measures the approximate 
dimensions of the great Pit, which in many other plague tracts might function merely as a 
symbolic marker of London’s abysmal, abject condition. H.F., by contrast, not only walks 
around the pit, but provides its approximate dimensions, which are ‘about 40 Foot in length, and 
about 15 or 16 Foot broad, and … about nine Foot deep’ (68). His additional note on the need to 
deepen the pit as the severity of the plague reaches its culmination also exemplifies his interest in 
the material conditions within which information is collected. Rather than taking the gaping hole 
figuratively as a metonym for the stark abjection brought on by the plague, H.F. demonstrates his 
very practical concerns regarding the corporeal dimension of the infectious disease. As the 
number of the dead increases over time, H.F. senses that the plague might culminate in the pit 
itself devouring the land of the living.  
A few days after this first expedition, H.F.’s curiosity leads him to the pit to make a better 
observation of it. This time his memorandum is filled with more sense-based, horrifying 
encounters with actual dead bodies and with a man who is barely still alive. His conversation 
with this man, burdened with a ‘dreadful Weight of Grief’ after having the bodies of his wife and 
child carried away by the dead cart, underlines the impersonal treatment of the dead bodies as 
they are ‘shot into the Pit promiscuously’ (71). H.F.’s nighttime encounter with this utterly lost 
man renders visible the degree of human suffering that actually escapes the attention of printed 
bills and newspapers. Just as Defoe the editor is focused on the degree of public consternation 
and confusion in The Storm, here H.F. pays particular attention to the ‘mournful Scene’ in which 
no proper respect is paid to the bodies—disposed of en masse, stripped naked, erased of their 
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social ranks (71). This particular scene thus illustrates that in the face of the relentless power of 
the plague human bodies are themselves reduced to the very condition Jonathan Lamb describes 
as ‘thingliness.’ 
Some of H. F.’s most intense bodily experiences with the plague involve the audible 
agonies of the living and the muted agonies of the dead accentuated through the working of the 
dead carts. In some ways, the stark reality of misery is conveyed more effectively through sound 
than through sight: because individuals are required to confine themselves in their houses, H. F. 
is often unable to see the suffering, though he can almost always hear their cries. H. F. observes 
how the suffering of the infected is often mediated to outsiders through the ‘most dismal Shrieks 
and Outcries of the poor People terrified, and even frighted to Death, by the Sight of the 
Condition of their dearest Relations, and by the Terror of being imprisoned as they were’ (101). 
He indexes his own absorption of their agony, remarking that ‘[i]t often pierc’d my very Soul to 
hear the Groans and Crys of those who were thus tormented’ (86). The distant but distinct sound 
of human suffering amplifies the degree of pain by reminding H.F. of the fact that simple, 
everyday human interactions, even efforts to offer comfort to the afflicted, have been completely 
severed by the passage of the plague. The muffled sound of dead carts at night—and the 
silencing of the carts that ensues when even the shipping back and forth of dead bodies becomes 
risky—permeates H. F.’s observation of the completely devastated city, clarifying the extent to 
which his empirical records cannot adequately capture the force of the epidemic as a nonhuman 
agent.   
Due to the corporeal dimension of disasters that paralyzes or nullifies human efforts to 
circumscribe their progress—efforts Defoe exemplifies through his information managers in The 
Storm and the Journal—these texts illustrate the uncontainable and incomprehensible vitality of 
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what David Hume has termed ‘convulsions in nature, disorders, prodigies, miracles.’190 In effect, 
Defoe anticipates Hume’s epistemological skepticism. Hume’s ‘convulsions’ bear an affinity 
with financial and natural disasters in the eighteenth-century British imagination in that all of 
these events foreground the failure of human understanding. Extending the early modern 
conception of theatrum mundi, Hume duly expresses the profound sense of helplessness human 
subjects might feel as in ‘perpetual suspense’ when confronted with the vitality of things: ‘We 
are placed in this world, as in a great theatre, where the true springs and causes of every event 
are entirely concealed from us; nor have we either sufficient wisdom to foresee, or power to 
prevent to those ills, with which we are continually threatened.’191 Hume’s analysis of the origins 
of natural conversion here suggests that our incomplete apprehension of events stems from the 
agency of nonhuman things which cannot be subsumed within the confines of existing 
knowledge systems. Hume’s conceptualization of nature as a theater nicely encapsulates natural 
philosophy’s glaring failure to grasp what is beyond human control; indeed, it is precisely this 
failure that leads many, including Defoe’s information managers, to explain unresolved, residual 
mysteries—as to the operation of both natural systems like weather and epidemic, and manmade 
systems like the financial market—by reference to the inscrutable workings of God. 
 
  
                                                
190 David Hume, Natural History of Religion and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. A. Wayne 
Colver (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 33. 
191 Ibid. 
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Chapter 4 
GULLIVER THE MAN-MACHINE, MAN-ANIMAL: SWIFT AND THE POSTHUMAN BODY 
 
Again, it helps to notice the force, power and consequences of discoveries, which appear at 
their clearest in three things that were unknown to antiquity, and whose origins, though recent, 
are obscure and unsung: namely the art of printing, gunpowder and the nautical compass. In 
fact these three things have changed the face and condition of things all over the globe: the 
first in literature; the second in the art of war; the third in navigation; and innumerable changes 
have followed; so that no empire or sect or star seems to have exercised a greater power and 
influence on human affairs than those mechanical things. 
Francis Bacon, Novum Organum (1620)192 
 
But a Broom-stick, perhaps you will say, is an Emblem of a Tree standing on its Head; and 
pray what is Man but a topsy-turvy Creature? His animal Faculties perpetually mounted on his 
Rational; his Head where his Heels should be, groveling on the Earth. 
Jonathan Swift, “A Meditation upon a Broom-Stick” (c. 1710) 
 
The human body is a self-winding machine, a living representation of perpetual motion.  
Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Man a Machine (1748) 
 
One man’s magic is another man’s engineering.  
Robert Heinlein, Time Enough for Love (1973) 
 
During his short stint as in-house lecturer and reader at the Berkeley residence, Jonathan 
Swift inserted his reflections on a humble, domestic object within the compendium of Robert 
Boyle’s Meditations, a text deeply appreciated by Lady Berkeley. When Swift read his own 
“Meditation” out loud to her in a solemn manner as if it were a part of Boyle’s own writing, she 
reportedly enjoyed it and believed that it was actually Boyle’s.193 His argument that a human 
being is nothing but a “topsy-turvy Creature” indicates that human faculties often operate in 
ways contrary to the governing of reason, and it anticipates Swift’s more complicated treatment 
of human nature within the material world in Gulliver’s Travels, which was originally titled 
                                                
192 Francis Bacon, The New Organon, eds. Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 100.  
193 Although Lady Berkeley construed Swift’s insertion of the “Broomstick” text in the Boyle volume as 
“harmless mirth,” according to Thomas Sheridan’s later account, some, including Lord Orrery, felt 
offended by Swift’s “spirit of sarcasm” against as “good a man as Mr. Boyle.” For more comprehensive 
background on Swift’s meditation, see the “Headnote” in Parodies, Hoaxes, Mock Treatises: Polite 
Conversation, Directions to Servants and Other Works, ed. Valerie Rumbold (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 3 and 5. Barry Slepian’s account of the same episode slightly differs from 
Sheridan’s in that the target of Swift’s hoax is not Lord Berkeley’s wife, but his daughter. And this is also 
contained in Parodies. 
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Travels into Several Remote Nations of the World (1726).194 Swift’s commentary on how our 
“animal Faculties [are] perpetually mounted on [our] Rational” highlights the ridiculousness of 
our codified, supposedly rational world, which is often subject to unexpected disorder and 
disruption.195 Affiliating the withered broomstick with a mortal man, Swift creates a homology 
between an object and the human body through their apparent physiological affinity, 
foregrounding a structural similarity that elicits the idea of comparative anatomy. This episode 
reveals how Swift’s interest in materiality gets imbedded in his satiric strategies by 
foregrounding the connection between a neglected trivial object and a human body drained of 
sap, indicating the extent to which both can become lifeless. At the same time, Swift makes it 
clear that his conceit rests on a number of meaningful distinctions—upside-downside, 
rationality-irrationality, and human-animal, human-machine—which he will eventually call into 
question in the works analyzed in this chapter. In Gulliver’s Travels and many of his poems, 
Swift underlines the potential “thingness” of the human body as a sheer wooden engine, a 
possibly irrational being bordering on both animality and machinery. Although Swift cannot be 
neatly categorized as a materialist proper, his preoccupations with corporeal and material 
contingencies and the linkage between material conditions and human subjectivity are quite 
persistent.  
                                                
194 Jonathan Swift, Gulliver’s Travels, ed. Claude Rawson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
Future references to Gulliver’s Travels will be to this edition and will appear parenthetically in the text. 
195 Jonathan Swift, “A Meditation upon a Broom-Stick” (c. 1703) in Parodies, Hoaxes, Mock Treatises: 
Polite Conversation, Directions to Servants and Other Works, 13-15. Swift remarks how the senses easily 
succumb to corruption, thus interrupting the operation of reason: “the senses in men are so many avenues 
to the fort of reason, which in this operation is wholly blocked up.” He then goes on to argue that we put 
effort into clearing the channel of reason. Here what is noticeable is that he associates the senses with the 
material, reason with the metaphysical. See Swift, “Mechanical Operation of the Spirit,” Jonathan Swift: 
Major Works (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 169, 171. Claude Rawson also notes how human 
restlessness derives from the fickle operation of human rationality, arguing that the human condition 
signifies that “it is a prey to subversion and unhappiness from within, … and to false needs.” See Rawson, 
Order Sprung from Confusion: Studies in Eighteenth-Century Literature from Swift to Cowper (New 
Jersey: Humanities Press, 1985), 3. 
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This chapter argues that Swift uses Gulliver to exhibit a radical anatomy of the human 
body in ways that demonstrate his anxieties about the implications of both experimental 
philosophy and modernity more generally. The eponymous character’s body is conceptually 
deconstructed, inventoried, appraised, and reassembled in different manners throughout his 
voyages—with the exception of his third voyage, in which Gulliver enjoys a rare moment of 
observing machine-like bodies that are not his own. Focusing on Gulliver’s contingent positions 
in the cultures he encounters, we can glimpse Swift’s posthumanist imagination, particularly 
through his representation of how the intersection of his technological, cultural, and intellectual 
feats culminates in Gulliver’s identity as a kind of man-machine.196 At times, Gulliver’s body is 
negatively construed as an animal (untamable, unruly, and feral), while at others he is viewed as 
an automaton slave performing tricks for the pleasure of onlookers in Brobdignag. In the third 
voyage, Gulliver stumbles across the prosthetic extensions of Laputanian bodies in the form of 
Flappers. His fourth voyage is, as has been much discussed, punctured by Gulliver’s outright 
dismissal of humanity and by his solemn pronouncement that he has a closer affinity with 
Houyhnhnms than with Yahoos.  
Heavily charged with satirical components as Gulliver’s Travels is, Swift’s aims in 
representing numerous, disparate bodies in the text should not be thought of as merely 
satirical.197 Swift’s depictions of the body provide substantial clues for expanding our 
                                                
196 Although my use of posthumanism as a central interpretive frame and methodology can run the risk of 
anachronism, the way in which Swift plays out mechanical inventions and hybrid bodies—both 
mechanical and organic nonhumans—can be read fruitfully in the light of posthumanism. Also his 
relatively pure mechanical imagination manifests a marked difference from La Mettrie’s work.  
197 Unarguably, Swift had been critical of the contemporary practices of experimental sciences, 
particularly the making of esoteric scientific knowledge within exclusive societies. A Tale of a Tub (1704) 
and the third part of Gulliver’s voyage aim at those invested in modern science. Still, in order for Swift to 
critique early eighteenth-century modern scientists, he had to draw on the rhetoric and mechanism of the 
very scientific discourses he strove to tackle. In this paper, I pay attention to the literal level of the 
mechanical, technological discourses with which Swift engaged. 
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understanding not only of eighteenth-century perceptions of the human and nonhuman, but also 
of Swift’s anxieties in the face of technological advancement. Exploring the various 
representations of Gulliver’s body across his voyages, I contend that Swift’s engagement with 
the discourses and practices of mechanical engineering suggests his wariness that the 
longstanding man-machine distinction is not as fixed as is often imagined—an aspect of Swift’s 
work which has been largely overlooked by eighteenth-century scholarship. Gulliver’s man-
machine, man-animal body can be fruitfully examined in light of Julien Offray de La Mettrie’s 
radical, occasionally outrageous materialist manifesto, Man a Machine (1748), which came out 
two decades after the publication of Gulliver’s Travels. In this corrective to the dualistic 
Cartesian notion that an animal is an unfeeling machine based on the premise that nonhuman 
beings have no souls, La Mettrie enthusiastically contends that man is nothing but a machine and 
an animal through his valorization of the intricate mechanism and agency of human-made 
technological products. In his reformulation of the human, La Mettrie does not reduce the human 
to a pure mechanical abstraction, but rather underscores the vitality of the soul which is closely 
predicated on the material condition of the body.198  
My examination of Gulliver’s body is largely informed by posthumanist theory and by 
recent scholarship on the advancement of mechanics, engineering, and technology in eighteenth-
century Britain.199 Gulliver’s Travels exhibits a kind of eighteenth-century posthumanism by 
                                                
198 I will discuss at length La Mettrie’s vital materialism towards the end of this chapter. David Skrbina 
examines La Mettrie’s Man-Machine along with Leibniz, Diderot, and Kant within the genealogy of 
panpsychism, which is pertinent to my reading of the posthumanist underpinnings of the works of Swift 
and La Mettrie. See Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), esp. Chs. 3 
and 4.  
199 Throughout this paper, the automaton functions as a metonym for other similar types of machinery 
including cyborgs, intricately designed machines, and prosthetic devices. For critical work exploring 
eighteenth-century automata culture and the history of technology, see Otto Mayr, Authority, Liberty, and 
Automatic Machinery in Early Modern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); 
Adelheid Voskhul, Androids in the Enlightenment: Mechanics, Artisans, and Cultures of the Self 
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denaturalizing and defamilarizing human bodies, a posthumanist turn related to contemporary 
discourses of inventorying, automata, and cybernetics. This chapter is also enriched by close 
dialogue with scholars who delve into the agency of things.200 In conversation with historians 
and literary critics who explore the enlightened posthumanist, mechanical discourses of the 
period, I argue that Swift displays profound anxiety about the blurring of the fine line drawn 
between the human and nonhuman (or/and posthuman), which is neatly underlined by his 
description of the human being as a “topsy-turvy” creature.  
 
Gulliver the Man-Machine: Imagining an Eighteenth-Century Posthuman Body  
Gulliver’s four voyages are marked by somatic contingencies. Differences in size and 
species, and radical reversals of perspective become a constant theme both between and within 
the journeys.201 Susan Stewart’s argument that the body “becomes our mode of perceiving scale” 
                                                                                                                                                       
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2013); Minsoo Kang, Sublime Dreams of Living 
Machines: The Automaton in the European Imagination (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2011), Chs. 3-5; Julie Park, The Self and It: Novel Objects in Eighteenth-Century England (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010); Jessica Riskin, “The Defecating Duck, or, the Ambiguous Origins of 
Artificial Life,” Things. ed. Bill Brown (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 99-133, 
“Eighteenth-Century Wetware,” Representations 83 (2003): 97-125; Simon Schaffer, “Enlightened 
Automata,” The Sciences in Enlightened Europe. eds. William Clark, Jan Golinski, and Simon Schaffer 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 126-65; Julie Park, The Self and It, esp. Ch. ; 
Kevin LaGrandeur, Androids and Intelligent Networks in Early Modern Literature and Culture: Artificial 
Slaves (New York and London: Routledge, 2013). Susan Stewart’s work does not exactly fall into the 
category of technology studies, but her insights on the doll and the doll-house and her analysis of 
Gulliver’s position in On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1993) illuminate Gulliver’s machine-like position. See also the 
collected essays in Early Modern Things, ed. Paula Findlen (New York and London: Routledge, 2013). 
200 Jonathan Lamb, The Things Things Say (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011; Mark Blackwell, 
ed. The Secret Life of Things: Animals, Objects, and It-Narratives in Eighteenth-Century England 
(Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2007). 
201 Melinda Alliker Rabb examines “fascination and experimentation with size” in the long eighteenth 
century, focusing on the production and appreciation of miniatures. In her examination of Samuel 
Johnson’s use of Swift’s experiment with the miniature, Rabb argues that miniaturization poses 
fundamental questions about “representation, cognition, and the material world.” See Rabb, “Johnson, 
Lilliput, and Eighteenth-Century Miniature,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 46.2 (2013): 281-98, 281 and 
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is therefore central to our understanding of Gulliver’s Travels.202 Oscillation between inside and 
outside, between symmetrical balance and oblique inclination, and between normative and 
grotesque bodies is pronounced throughout this text. More importantly, since the narrative is 
filtered through Gulliver’s perspective and his embodied experiences, materiality and 
corporeality centrally shape his voyages.  
Swift vividly displays both his mechanical imagination and his satirical edge in the 
voyage to Lilliput. From the beginning, Lilliput is described as a nation grounded in its 
mechanical, scientific accomplishments, and its national military prowess hinges on the 
successful culmination of its technological advances. Indeed, Swift keenly indexes different 
societies’ technological developments and compares their varying degrees of improvement 
consistently throughout Gulliver’s four discrete journeys. According to Gulliver, Lilliputians are 
the “most excellent Mathematicians” and the land itself boasts a “great Perfection in 
Mechanicks” (22). After this cursory observation comes his unusual portrayal of the war 
machine of the Emperor of Lilliput, a man better known as a “renowned Patron of Learning” 
(22). The device custom-designed to carry Gulliver’s humongous body is described as “a Frame 
of Wood raised three Inches from the Ground, about seven Foot long and four wide, moving 
upon twenty-two Wheels” (22). Apart from providing exact accounts of the measurements and 
the amount of labor required to make this particular machine, this initial description introduces 
the device’s invention along with the other war machine the Lilliputian monarch is reportedly in 
the habit of making, evincing Lisa Roberts’s argument about the relationship between war and 
technological development: “Necessity or not, war was the mother – as well as the child – of 
                                                                                                                                                       
293. On the comparative analysis of the treatments of the body in Daniel Defoe and Swift, see Carol 
Houlihan Flynn, The Body in Swift and Defoe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), Chs. 4-5. 
202 Susan Stewart, On Longing, . 
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much invention in Renaissance and early modern Europe.”203 The Lilliputians’ use of technology 
as a key instrument of military power and aggression represents the more general purpose of 
mechanical instruments in Lilliput, as is later nicely illustrated by their use of Gulliver as a war 
machine pitted against Blefuscu. Before moving on to discuss Gulliver as a war machine, the 
Lilliputians’ inspection of his exterior and interior should be discussed, since his 
overwhelmingly gigantic body is perceived and inventoried as if it were a national property.  
In Lilliput Gulliver’s body is subjected to a wide range of material conditions: first adrift 
during the shipwreck, then maimed on the cusp of Lilliput, only to go from being a bulky 
spectacle to an inventoried one. Gulliver’s body is construed as a kind of inanimate object that 
initially conveys only surface—a kind of spectacle, a mechanical body whose inner design is to 
be precisely mapped out. With a particular focus on Gulliver’s body under rigorous scrutiny, I 
ask whether an aggregate of particularized bits of property or prostheses can count as selfhood. 
Indeed, Gulliver’s pockets—a container of his property—function at the same time as a 
mechanical and prosthetic extension of his self.204 Analyzing these elements of Swift’s text 
enables us to pose the question as to what precisely constitutes and determines human 
subjectivity in the narrative, especially in the first voyage. Held captive in Lilliput, Gulliver is 
defined by an excessiveness associated with his bulkiness and appetite. Gulliver notes that the 
Lilliputians demonstrate a “thousand Marks of Wonder and Astonishment at [his] Bulk and 
Appetite” (19). The enormous size of his body turns Gulliver into a devouring machine in the 
                                                
203 Lisa Roberts, “Introduction,” Lisa Roberts, Simon Schaffer, and Peter Dear, eds. The Mindful Hand: 
Inquiry and Invention from the Late Renaissance to Early Industrialisation (Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2007), 1. 
204 As a meaningful parallel with Gulliver’s pockets, see Ariane Fennetaux’s work on eighteenth-century 
women’s pockets and their function as a private space. Fennetaux, “Women’s Pockets and the 
Construction of Privacy in the Long Eighteenth Century,” Eighteenth Century Fiction 20.3 (2008): 307-
34.  
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Lilliputian imagination, but after their initial phase of wonder comes a moment of mutual gazing 
and surveying.  
Despite his attempts to situate himself as an active observer and describer of things, it is 
evident that Gulliver is subject to Lilliputian “survey” and thus that the power dynamics between 
the two inclines to the side of Lilliputians. Gulliver is endowed with an epithet due to his size, 
Quinbus Flestin, translated as “Man Mountain,” a term that in itself stresses his excessiveness, 
his transgression of the bounds of normalcy among the diminutive Lilliputians.205 Gulliver’s 
hugeness causes confusion, fear, and terror on the receiving end of this encounter. Gulliver’s 
body falls under the rigorous scrutiny of Lilliputian officers, his corporeality symbolically 
dissected into quantifiable and thus graspable units. Upon his receipt of the royal command, 
Gulliver is keenly aware of the fact that he cannot evade such prying and anatomical eyes. 
Though the royal command is executed based on Gulliver’s “Consent and Assistance” (28), he is 
essentially compelled to let the Lilliputian inspectors into his pocket. It is notable that Gulliver 
spares two small spaces of privacy—his fobs and his secret pocket—from the eyes of the 
Lilliputians: 
I took up the two Officers in my Hands, put them first into my Coat-Pockets, and then 
into every other Pocket about me, except my two Fobs, and another secret Pocket which I 
had no Mind should be searched, wherein I had some little Necessaries of no 
Consequence to any but my self. In one of my Fobs there was a Silver Watch, and in the 
other a small Quantity of Gold in a Purse. (28) 
The Lilliputian inspection of Gulliver, resonant with the autopsies commonly practiced since the 
early modern period, abstracts him as quantitative data. A limited section of Gulliver’s body is 
                                                
205 Given Gulliver’s tendency to transgress established boundaries, one could easily connect his body to 
the grotesque. This echoes Stewart’s association of the grotesque with huge body size. See Stewart, On 
Longing, Chs. 3-4. 
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neatly mapped out and thus rendered visible to the monarch of Lilliput.206 Gulliver’s dimensions, 
his personal possessions, and his daily excrement are all deemed significant markers of his 
selfhood. Such autoptic scrutiny is also indicative of an assumption that the assemblage of 
discrete body parts aggregates to a whole, sensible organic entity, namely Gulliver in this case. 
Hence Gulliver’s efforts to maintain private spaces can be read as an act of deflecting such an 
anatomical vision; at the same time, Gulliver’s evasiveness hints at the impossibility of attaining 
complete knowledge about the Other regardless of what empirical and objective instruments 
scientific observers apply. Gulliver’s denunciation of such an objectifying gaze through his 
attempt to maintain his private pockets can be interpreted as an effort to salvage his humanity. 
Exactly what kind of interiority is envisioned by Gulliver under the heavy surveillance of 
Lilliputians, and how is that conception of interiority linked to Gulliver’s particular personal 
identity? 
Gulliver translates their catalogue of his possessions at some length, enacting Swift’s 
deliberate rhetorical deployment of defamiliarization. In the translation, Swift represents the 
logic at work in cultural interchanges from various eighteenth-century encounter zones—
exchanges in which an object deemed mundane in one culture can sell as a curioso at a higher 
market value in another—but he also underscores the idea that the sum of Gulliver’s partitioned, 
dissected body parts leads only to epistemological nonsense. Gulliver’s size makes the 
Lilliputian inspection of his pockets a parody of contemporary ethnographies by transforming an 
otherwise ordinary activity into a daunting and fraught task involving both physical toil and 
intellectual guesswork. Furthermore, the fact that his list of possessions is comprised of mostly 
                                                
206 This logic is working on the assumption that the pockets are a natural extension of Gulliver’s body. 
Given that the surface of Gulliver’s body is already subjected to complete surveillance, it is a very natural 
corollary that Lilliputian authority comes to be interested in looking at his pockets, the only locus 
remaining invisible and mysterious to them. 
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mechanical instruments—clock, pocket watch, gunpowder—indicates a zone of cohabitation 
between the organic and the mechanical. That such mechanical devices define Gulliver’s identity 
in Lilliput suggests he is bordering on the boundary between the human and the machine in their 
imagination. The inspectors describe the process of examining Gulliver’s uncannily huge, 
intricately constructed metal objects:   
In the right Coat-Pocket of the Great Man Mountain (for so I interpret the Words 
Quinbus Flestrin) after the strict Search, we found only one great Piece of coarse Cloth, 
large enough to be a Foot-Cloth for your Majesty’s chief Room of State. In the left 
Pocket, we saw a huge Silver Chest, with a Cover of same Metal, which we, the 
Searchers, were not able to lift. We desired it should be opened; and one of us stepping 
into it, found himself up to the mid Leg in a sort of Dust, some part whereof flying up to 
our Faces, set us both a sneezing for several Times together. In his right Waist-Pocket, 
we found a prodigious Bundle of thin white Substances, folded one above another, about 
the Bigness of three Men, tied with a strong Cable, and marked with Black Figures; 
which we humbly conceive to be Writings, every Letter almost half as large as the Palm 
of our Hands. In the left there was a sort of Engine, from the Back of which were 
extended twenty long Poles, resembling the Pallisado’s before your Majesty’s Court; 
wherewith we conjecture the Man Mountain combs his Head; for we did not always 
trouble him with Questions, because we found it a great Difficulty to make him 
understand us. In the large Pocket on the right Side of his middle Cover, (so I translate 
the word Ranfu-Lo, by which they meant my Breeches) we saw a hollow Pillar of Iron, 
about the Length of a Man, fastened to a strong Piece of Timber, larger than the Pillar; 
and upon one side of the Pillar were huge Pieces of Iron sticking out, cut into strange 
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Figures; which we know not what to make of. In the left Pocket, another Engine of the 
same kind. In the smaller Pocket on the right Side, were several round flat Pieces of white 
and red Metal, of different Bulk: some of the white, which seemed to be Silver, were so 
large and heavy, that my Comrade and I could hardly lift them. In the left Pocket were 
two black Pillars irregularly shaped: we could not, without Difficulty, reach the Top of 
them as we stood at the Bottom of his Pocket: one of them was covered, and seemed all 
of a Piece; but at the upper End of the other, there appeared a white round Substance, 
about twice the bigness of our Heads. (30) 
Despite its length, the entire report deserves a full citation here: given their penchant for 
scientific, quantifiable data and descriptions, the Lilliputian officers demonstrate their acute 
interest in Gulliver’s overwhelmingly huge machinery as objects situated beyond their grasp. 
Despite their failure to deduce coherent meanings out of the particulars stored in Gulliver’s 
pockets, the items that attract the Lilliputian officers’ attention beg our attention: pocket watches, 
gunpowder, and guns. These objects are emblematic of the advance in military technology made 
possible by engineering.207 Gulliver’s possessions listed in the catalogue above work to underline 
once again the military ethos pervasive in the land. Especially important to my argument here is 
the fact that Gulliver’s private self is intimately linked to the mechanical inventions he sneaks 
inside the pocket. Read against his nickname—“Man Mountain”—which carries a connation of 
organic monstrosity, the way he is inventoried in the passage cited above suggests Gulliver is 
rather transmuted into a mechanical monstrosity, an identity that defines him throughout his stay 
in Lilliput.  
                                                
207 On the complex and multidimensional interrelationship of the Scientific Revolution, military 
technology, and imperial expansion in early modern Europe, see Brett D. Steele and Tamera Dorland, eds. 
The History of Archimedes: Science and the Art of War through the Age of Enlightenment (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2005). 
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If Gulliver is figured as a hybrid body through his possession of eighteenth-century 
weaponry and watches, his use value as an instrument of Lilliputian military prowess resonates 
with the image of both the golem and the crane. If the former epitomizes the organic realization 
of the human maker’s wildest fantasy or imagination in the way it imitates that of a creator, the 
latter represents the zenith of civil engineering. Under assignment to significantly undermine the 
military power of Blefuscu, Lilliput’s archenemy, Gulliver describes at some length how he 
provokes wonder and surprise from the Blefuscu army with the “strongest Cable and Bars of 
Iron” (45), thereby depicting himself as a terror-inducing war machine:  
I walked to the North-East Coast over against Blefuscu; where, lying down behind a 
Hillock, I took out my small Pocket Perspective Glass, and viewed the Enemy’s Fleet at 
Anchor, consisting of about fifty Men of War, and a great Number of Transports: I then 
came back to my House, and gave Order (for which I had a Warrant) for a great Quantity 
of the strongest Cable and Bars of Iron. The Cable was about as thick as Packthread, and 
the Bars of the Length and Size of a Knitting-Needle. I trebled the Cable to make it 
stronger; and for the same Reason I twisted three of the Iron Bars together, bending the 
Extremities into a Hook. Having thus fixed fifty Hooks to as many Cables, I went back to 
the North-East Coast, and putting off my Coat, Shoes, and Stockings, walked into the Sea 
in my Leathern Jerken, about half an Hour before high Water. (45) 
Much has been discussed about the passage quoted above, for it is rich with manifold symbolic 
and literal devices.208 However, in the context of Gulliver’s perennial machine-like status in 
Lilliput, it might be more illuminating to link his specific military undertakings to the operation 
                                                
208 Pat Rogers interprets Gulliver’s care of his own eyes as an emblem of the persistent emphasis on 
vision as the primary sensory experience in the eighteenth century. See Rogers, Eighteenth-Century 
Encounters: Studies in Literature and Society in the Age of Walpole (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1985), esp. 
Chs. 1-2.  
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of similar devices of early modern civil engineering. Indeed, the golem and the homunculus 
might be the singled out as close kin to Gulliver the machine in Lilliput. Yet the exact details of 
how Gulliver performs his military prowess also suggest that he is emulating a modern crane, 
another military engine that the Lilliput emperor might have dreamt of. Regardless of whether he 
is imagined as a golem, a homunculus, or a crane, the quick association of Gulliver’s body with 
these nonhuman instruments underlines his subhuman state in Lilliput, which is almost a given in 
most of his voyages, perhaps except for his trip to Laputa.209 He functions as a Lilliputian puppet 
intended to evoke a sense of wonder and terror through the sheer size of his body, his use of 
power, and his possession of the gunpowder and mechanical devices within his pocket. He is at 
times identified with his own property, then reduced to a war-machine, and generally subject to 
indiscriminate disposal, as is evidenced by Lilliput’s decision to execute him. Admittedly, the 
figuration of Gulliver’s body and the nature of Lilliput in general are intent on satirizing 
contemporary British politics, including colonial expansion and extortion, but Swift’s recourse to 
the discourses and practices of mechanical engineering indicates the author’s acknowledgment 
that the longstanding man-machine distinction is not fixed.    
During his second voyage, Gulliver figures rather as a talking, walking automaton—the 
perfect embodiment of a humanoid robot from the perspective of the Brobdignagians—due 
primarily to his miniature size.210 Although the transition from functioning as a terrifying war 
                                                
209 LaGrandeur observes the subhuman state of these early modern imaginary servants: “As with the 
homunculus, the association of the golem with automata, as well as its subhuman status, implies a servile 
status for the creature. By the sixteenth century the golem does in fact come to be represented mainly as 
an artificial servant, rather than the mere product of a devotional exercise.” LaGrandeur, Androids and 
Intelligent Networks in Early Modern Literature and Culture, 67. 
210 Concerning Gulliver’s miniature size, Douglas Lane Patey shows that the Brobdignagians’ recognition 
that Gulliver does not fit into the categories of either the “Embrio, or abortive Birth” or the “dwarf” 
facilitates the process of reducing him to a “monster.” See Patey, “Swift’s Satire on ‘Science and the 
Structure of Gulliver’s Travels,” 814. I concur with Patey’s argument that Gulliver is abstracted into a 
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machine to an intricately structured doll is striking to readers, Gulliver embraces such adverse 
circumstances without much protest; rather, he demonstrates quite docile assimilation into the 
given culture by willingly performing his prescribed role as an automaton. Gulliver’s 
performance, on one level, as a “Sight” and as a “publick Spectacle” (87)—along with such 
spectacular animals as a green eagle, a Splacknuck (88)—underlines that he is literally bordering 
on an animal state in his condition as a spectacle. On another level, however, this episode evokes 
the eighteenth-century craze for automata. Gulliver’s body—minuscule, covered in smooth skin, 
and well mannered—points to the individual components in automata that fascinated Swift’s 
contemporary audiences. Just as Jacques Vaucanson’s transparent, defecating duck provided 
audiences with a mechanical marvel by displaying an unusual combination of the organic and the 
android, Gulliver the tiny humanoid works as a source of entertainment and wonder. If the 
wetware, the life-like external material of the automata produces the effect of the real and the 
organic, Gulliver’s ability to speak, to give courtesy, and to move produces a similar effect.   
Gulliver’s travel box underlines his abstraction into the status of an automaton, for it 
embodies two representative spatial constructions of the early eighteenth century: a male 
domestic space and a dollhouse.211 The travel box is initially designed by Glumdalclitch’s father 
as a vehicle for carrying him around, after which it is settled as both his dwelling place and 
transportation during his stay in the Brobdignag court. As with the custom-designed carriage in 
Lilliput, it is usually the medium that characterizes his status within each land. In the absence of 
                                                                                                                                                       
monster – an oft-used metaphor for an aberration, but I want to highlight that Gulliver’s monstrosity is 
closely tied to mechanical inventions such as automata and wind-up toys in Swift’s age.  
211 Cynthia Wall writes that the long eighteenth century saw an increasing number of tourists and 
consequently heated interest in the “construction of interiors . . .  across class lines” (177). See Prose of 
Things, especially Ch. 7 for discussion of the material conditions that made possible this particular 
interest in furnishing interior spaces in the period: “The mass production of pottery, fabrics, carpets, and 
furniture paradoxically made interiors more individuated, at least in the quantity and, therefore, the 
possible patterns of arrangements of their things” (177). 
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detailed descriptions of Gulliver’s first box, we might guess that it bears only practical value, or 
fails to impress him. Interestingly enough, however, the box evolves into a luxuriously 
refurbished room in which Gulliver can enjoy his privacy thanks to the royal command:  
The Queen commanded her own Cabinet-maker to contrive a Box that might serve me for 
a Bed-Chamber, after the Model that Glumdalclitch and I should agree upon. This Man 
was a most ingenious Artist; and according to my Directions, in three Weeks finished for 
me a wooden Chamber of sixteen Foot square, and twelve High; with Sash Windows, a 
Door, and two Closets, like a London Bedchamber. The board that made the Ceiling was 
to be lifted up and down by two Hinges, to put in a Bed ready furnished by her Majesty’s 
Upholsterer; which Glumdalclitch took out every Day to air; made it with her own 
Hands, and letting it down at Night, locked up the Roof over me. A Nice Workman, who 
was famous for little Curiosities, undertook to make me two Chairs, with Backs and 
Frames, of a Substance not unlike Ivory; and two Tables, with a Cabinet to put my 
Things in. The Room was quilted all sides, as well as the Floor and the Ceiling, to 
prevent any Accident from the Carelessness of those who carried me; and to break the 
Force of a Jolt when I went in a Coach. (94-95)  
Gulliver’s description of the exact dimensions of the room, its overall structure, and the layout of 
its furniture and interior decorations evokes the Lilliputian inspection of Gulliver’s pockets. The 
same hyper-precise language is used to document and catalogue the bulk of the room. Swift’s 
anatomical vision, I argue, is still lurking behind this kind of detailed description of things and 
then extended to the text’s spatial understanding of things. Under this rigid scrutiny, little seems 
left to preserve the interior, private, secretive, or uncanny.  
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Moreover, we can conjecture that the particular domestic space offered to Gulliver is 
situated contiguously with other similar types of spaces—dining-room, dressing-room, or 
antechamber, to name a few—that get created, redefined, and put on full display in the 
eighteenth century. An antithesis to the pompous, huge, intricately ornate country house, 
Gulliver’s space embodies rather a diminished (in terms of size), and thus manageable space for 
gentry men. For one thing, this room particularly evokes the making of a dining-room—a room 
of luxury and leisure created exclusively for men—even though the room is initially designed as 
Gulliver’ bedroom.212 At the beginning of Gulliver’s quite exultant record of his newfound room, 
he indicates that the room has a “sash window,” which Wall argues is a class marker. In her 
analysis of the spatial relations envisioned in Richardson’s Pamela, Wall writes that the sash 
window is “a signature feature of gentry housing, pointing to high ceilings” which in turn 
signifies “a luxury of space ostentatiously unoccupied.”213 The twelve foot high ceiling definitely 
ensures a regal space. Both Richardson and Swift, it turns out, are acutely conscious of the way 
pieces of furniture are arranged within the spaces they depict in their fictions. Apparently, too, 
such domestic details are associated with male activities without much contradiction in 
contemporary gender norms. Despite its small size, however, Gulliver’s box is the ultimate 
product of a collaboration between Brobdignagian craftsmen; hence, the box represents both the 
culmination of Brobdignagian taste as well as a mimetic rendering of their architectural and 
furnishing style, which in turn is indicative of the eighteenth-century practice of dollhouse 
                                                
212 In her study of the eighteenth-century gendered division of domestic spaces, Wall shows that the 
English created “a space not simply ‘masculine’ in design or decor (a trope long known in classical 
architecture), but a space designed for men.” See “Gendered Rooms,” Eighteenth-Century Fiction 5.4 
(1993): 349-372, 352. 
213 Wall, Prose of Things, 186. See also Richard Wilson and Alan Mackley, Creating Paradise: The 
Building of the English Country House, 1660-1880 (London and New York: Hambledon and London, 
2000); Mark Girouard, Life in the English Country House (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978); and 
Amanda Vickery, Behind Closed Doors: At Home in Georgian England (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2009). 
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making. It is worth attending to the particular furniture items arranged in the very small, but 
ornate box—two closets, a bed, two chairs, tables, and a cabinet—all of which are commonplace 
objects stocked and arranged in eighteenth-century men’s domestic spaces.214 As Elizabeth 
Burton has argued, the collaboration of plural cabinetmakers and upholsterers illustrates the 
actual material conditions and social relations that dictated certain types of domestic space.215  
Gulliver’s box evokes dollhouse-making conventions, through which we can better trace 
both the division and the blurring of interiority and exteriority. Vivien Greene, in her seminal 
history of English dollhouses, argues that eighteenth-century English dollhouses originated from 
seventeenth-century Dutch counterparts, and she specifies key features of these dollhouse 
models. First, toymakers promoted some of their products as being a kind of “actual replica 
house” or at least as emulating distinctive features of the old merchant houses.216 Second, the 
dollhouses of the century were furnished mostly with elaborate and luxurious miniature items, 
which in turn provoked a craze for dollhouses. As the trade card of one eighteenth-century 
toymaker indicates, most of these dollhouses are easily foldable and portable.217 Gulliver’s travel 
box emblematizes all of these features of an eighteenth-century dollhouse, being both portable 
and stocked with elaborately designed items. Swift’s representation of the interplay between two 
                                                
214 It should be noted that such furniture was not available to everyone during the period. As Burton notes, 
houses of people without means usually displayed bare walls, devoid of even necessary items, such as 
chairs or tables. 
215 See Burton, Georgians at Home, especially Chs. 3, 4, and 8. For more on the study of eighteenth-
century furnishing style and consumer culture, see Luxury in the Eighteenth Century: Debates, Desires 
and Delectable Goods, eds. Maxine Berg and Elizabeth Eger (New York: Palgrave, 2003); and 
Furnishing the Eighteenth Century: What Furniture Can Tell Us about the European and American Past, 
eds. Dena Goodman and Kathryn Norberg (New York and London: Routledge, 2007). 
216 Vivien Greene, English Dolls’ Houses of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (London: B. T. 
Basford, 1955), 31. As for the actual collection of extant dollhouses produced between 1700 and 1900, 
see Vivien Greene with Margaret Towner, The Vivien Greene Dolls’ House Collection, photo. Nick 
Nicholson (New York: The Overlook Press, 1995). For further works on early modern dollhouses, see 
Flora Gill Jacobs, A World of Doll Houses (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965); Caroline Clifton-Mogg, The 
Dollhouse Sourcebook (New York: Abbeville Press, 1993).    
217 Ibid., 31. 
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sets of design conventions—those related to the dollhouse and those related to gentlemanly 
domestic space—underscores Gulliver’s position as a kind of automaton.    
In marked contrast to the rest of his voyages, in which Gulliver’s subject position is 
precarious enough to reduce him to either a mechanical or an organic object of observation, his 
visit to Laputa restores Gulliver’s status as a primary observer who does not need to readjust his 
sense of scale, size, or identity. This privileged position enables Gulliver to observe an unusual 
embodiment of prosthetic extension that functions as an android servant. The way Laputan 
servants aid their masters functions as the centerpiece of Swift’s mechanical imagination in the 
third voyage. In Laputa, Gulliver runs into a group of people bearing self-imposed gravity in an 
outlandish dress.218 It is notable that Laputans are described as people with mild deformation in 
the first place: their heads are tilted either to the right or the left, and one of their eyes turns 
inward while the other upward. Apparently, this physically distorted body is Swift’s means of 
parodying self-important virtuosi of the period, as the subsequent use of flappers and bladders 
serves a similar purpose as a rhetorical device. Still, Swift’s use of the deformed body as a 
manifestation of equally malformed cognitive functions deserves our attention. These particular 
people, rapt in their own books and what Gulliver believes to be “intense Speculations” (146), 
inevitably need an extra, external body either to awaken them or to alert them to any imminent 
danger.219  
                                                
218 Gulliver’s third voyage has been read as an outright satirical attack on the practices of virtuosi. See 
Douglas Lane Patey, “Swift’s Satire on ‘Science and the Structure of Gulliver’s Travels,” ELH 58 (1991): 
809-39; Marjorie Nicolson and Nora Mohler, “The Scientific Background of Swift’s Voyage to Laputa,” 
Annals of Science 2 (1937): 299-334; Dennis Todd, “The Hairy Maid at the Harpsichord: Some 
Speculations on the Meaning of Gulliver’s Travels,” Texas Studies in Literature and Language 34 (1992): 
239-283; Kristin M. Girten, “Mingling with Matter: Tactile Microscopy and the Philosophic Mind in 
Brobdignag and Beyond,” The Eighteenth Century 54 (2013): 497-520. 
219 Needless to say, this portrait of serious scholars is one of many satirized portraits of contemporary 
British scholarship (specify), but I want to pay attention to the use of bladder and flapper as a device of 
cognitive and haptic recognition. 
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Hence the Laputans employ a servant class of “Flappers” who carry “bladders” meant to 
rouse the attention of self-absorbed passers-by through the mechanical action of hitting them on 
the mouths and ears. Slapstick in nature and ridiculous in shape, the stick might function as the 
“symbol of the jester or fool,”220 just as the name of the stick associated with the pig bladder 
implies the act of flapping one’s mouth or ears—both potential meanings are insulting, and thus 
the situation is intentionally satirical. Along with Laputans’ distorted body, their everyday 
dress—“adorned with Figures of Suns, Moons, and Starts, interwoven with those of Fiddles, 
Flutes, Harps, Trumpets, Guittars, Harpsichords, and many more Instruments of Musick, 
unknown to us in Europe”—also  indicates that Swift’s satirical attack targets those invested in 
the new science (146). Despite Swift’s satirical goals, the establishment of prosthetic 
embodiment in Laputa is worth our critical attention:   
With these Bladders they now and then flapped the Mouths and Ears of those who stood 
near them, of which Practice I could not then conceive the Meaning. It seems, the Minds 
of these People are so taken up with intense Speculations, that they neither can speak, nor 
attend to the Discourses of others, without being roused by some external Taction upon 
the Organs of Speech and Hearing; for which Reason, those Persons who are able to 
afford it, always keep a Flapper, (the Original is Climenole) in their Family, as one of 
their Domesticks; nor ever walk abroad or make Visits without him. And the Business of 
this Officer is, when two or more Persons are in Company, gently to strike with his 
Bladder the Mouth of him who is to speak, and the Right Ear of him or them to whom the 
Speaker addresseth himself. This Flapper is likewise employed diligently to attend his 
Master in his Walks, and upon Occasion to give him a soft Flap on his Eyes; because he 
is always so wrapped up in Cogitation, that he is in manifest Danger of falling down 
                                                
220 David Womersley, ed. Gulliver’s Travels (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 227. 
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every Precipice, and bouncing his Head against every Post; and in the Streets, of jostling 
others, or being jostled himself into the Kennel. (146-47) 
Based on the way in which Flappers function in Laputa, they can be interpreted as human 
prostheses. Flappers are very unusual in that they exist independent of the body for which they 
provide intended assistance or service. While most prostheses work as implements or inserts, as 
if they were authentic integral body parts, these Flappers in Laputa apparently exist and function 
outside of the people whose cognitive, emotional functions they are designed to enhance. 
Compared to the series of artificial body parts that constitute Corinna—the unfortunate figure in 
Swift’s “Beautiful Young Nymph” poem, which we shall have occasion to analyze later in this 
chapter—Flappers are distinctive in their disconnection from the body they serve, despite their 
main function as an artificial limb for cognitive awakening. Given its function and external 
location, the Flapper is implicated in the discourse of the humanoid servant, which hints at a 
further development from Corinna’s relatively small prosthetic extensions. Gulliver himself 
affirms the fact that these Flappers belong in the class of servants and are therefore responsible 
for accompanying their masters while the latter are immersed in the train of their own thinking or 
daydreaming. Cyborgs exist even in the early modern period, so the idea of artificial limbs or 
prosthetic embodiment would not be so rare.221 The sixteenth-century artificial iron arm and 
hand, designed by Amborise Paré, for example, indicates that Europeans were already familiar 
with imagining such tactile contact with machines. Riskin describes how after the simulation of 
“quintessential natural human act[s],” such as speech and defecating, eighteenth-century 
                                                
221 Further historical context of early modern cyborgs will be illustrated in the section on Swift’s dressing-
room poems. 
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engineers attempted to produce human-like, or life-like prosthetic devices.222 Thus we can infer 
that Swift’s satirical commentaries are actually engagements with such contemporary 
technological, mechanical developments and discourses.  
The neat demarcation between Flappers and their masters in a strange way embodies 
Cartesian dualism—one body is held accountable for kinetic movement, while another operates 
as a cognitive function—and their apparent class distinction suggests that Swift is toying with the 
Cartesian hierarchy between the soul and the body. Flappers embody an animal-like body that 
functions, removed from where soul resides. Given that Swift’s satirical edge aims at Laputan 
scholars, it cannot be argued that he endorses Cartesian dualism, but it is telling that Flappers are 
characterized by their subservient functions. The way these Laputan scholars are entirely 
absorbed in the kinds of cognitive activities that Elizabeth Grosz calls “private, subject, invisible, 
[and] amenable only to first-person knowledge” implies that the scholars themselves are like 
machines trapped in the confines of their own bodies, as if they suffer from locked-in 
syndrome.223 Grosz also points out that within the Cartesian divide, this untranslatable firsthand 
knowledge reduces others to “complex automata, androids or even illusion, with no psychical 
interior, no affective states or consciousness.”224 Swift’s Flapper-master distinction therefore 
underscores the impasse in transmitting emotions or knowledge across the rigidly set Cartesian 
dualist world. Indeed the animal-nonhuman dualism gets more complicated in Gulliver’s next 
voyage.  
                                                
222 Jessica Riskin, "Eighteenth-Century Wetware," Representations 83 (2003): 97-125, 108. For a similar 
critical interest in the technological development, see Reed Benhamou, “The Artificial Limb in 
Preindustrial France,” Technology and Culture 35 (1994): 835-45. 
223 Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1994), 7. 
224 Ibid. 
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Gulliver’s visit to the land of the Houyhnhnms demonstrates Swift’s most prominent 
subversion of the traditional Chain of Being through Gulliver’s unusual valorization of the 
culture and civilization of Houyhnhnms. It should be noted, however, that the posthumanist 
imagination noticeable in the last voyage is not so much related to machinery as its organic, 
nonhuman counterpart.225 Because of its pronounced reversal of the longstanding boundary 
between human and animal, this particular voyage has provoked manifold attempts to read it as 
Swift’s own comments on racial difference.226 Despite the relevance and critical weight that 
these previous studies carry, I focus on species difference, primarily because Gulliver’s 
cohabitation with the horses attests to what constitutes the human more generally. More 
importantly, this particular voyage underscores the unknowability and untranslatability of animal 
experience in human terms.  
The murky divide between human and animal is first suggested by Gulliver’s observation 
that animal footprints are mingled with those of humans: “I fell into a beaten Road, where I saw 
many Tracks of human Feet, and some of Cows, but of Horses” (208). The ensuing encounter 
between Gulliver and the Yahoos is deliberately set up to confuse a reader’s perception as to 
whether Gulliver is being faced with humans or animals. Gulliver’s gaze is typical of that of an 
ethnographer, responsible for maintaining objective distance. And yet, Swift’s redeployment of 
the language of defamiliarization functions to associate what eventually turns out to be Yahoos 
with animality as well as with physical deformity: “Their Shape was very singular, and 
deformed, which a little discomposed me, so that I lay down behind a Thicket to observe them 
                                                
225 Ann Cline Kelly reads Gulliver’s position in the last voyage as both a “pet and pet keeper.” See 
“Gulliver as Pet and Pet Keeper: Talking Animals in Book 4” ELH 74 (2007): 323-349, 323. 
226 Laura Brown, “Reading Race and Gender: Jonathan Swift,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 23 (1990): 
425-43; Cristina Malcolmson, “Gulliver’s Travels and Studies of Skin Color in the Royal Society,” 
Humans and Other Animals in Eighteenth-Century British Culture: Representation, Hybridity, Ethics, ed. 
Frank Palmeri (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 49-66.  
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better” (209). Gulliver goes on to report that the body in question is “covered with a thick Hair” 
of multifarious colors (209). Even when these entities who later turn out to be Yahoos 
demonstrate nimbleness, that quality is readily associated with animality. In this dubious 
ethnographical account, Gulliver gives the impression that he has observed nonhuman, native 
animals that behave like horses. He does not hide his disgust and loathing at the sight of 
despicable horse-like humans throughout the voyage.  
Under the topsy-turvy circumstances, Gulliver willingly subjects himself to the 
established order of Houyhnhnms. Although this kind of voluntary submission has produced 
many debates on the status of Gulliver’s subject position, this act, in the light of panpsychism in 
particular, can be read as a radical denunciation of anthropocentric value, however ridiculous it 
appears.227 Rather, Gulliver’s apparently preposterous, willing assimilation into the horses’ 
culture duly underscores the ontological anxiety inherent in the task of imagining the psychic 
complexity of animal life. Steven Shaviro, in his witty and neatly organized genealogy of 
panpsychism, underscores the human tendency to deny that the nonhuman actually has 
experience independent of its human counterparts.228 At best, the animal works as a metaphor, 
mainly because nonhuman life is characterized by the absence of language. The human world 
dictated by representational, semantic rules, according to Shaviro, cannot make sense of the 
species that has no language to describe and convey its own experience and feelings. However, 
drawing primarily on Whitehead and tweaking Wittgenstein’s well known proposition, Shaviro 
                                                
227 Panpsychism is defined as an ontological and epistemological attempt to actively imagine that 
nonhuman life forms and even static ones have their own life and experience that is hardly knowable to 
human subjects. For more on the history and genealogy of panpsychism, see David Skrbina, Mind That 
Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2009) and Panpsychism in 
the West (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).  
228 Steven Shaviro, “Consequences of Panpsychism,” The Nonhuman Turn, ed. Richard Grusin 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 19-44. 
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argues that animal life/experience is “not a Something, but not a Nothing either.”229 This implies 
that making sense of animal life in human terms is always fraught, but that this difficulty cannot 
entirely renounce the existence of such life. Panpsychism provides an opportunity to see that 
there is “no evidence that there is something ontologically unique about human beings.”230 The 
panpsychic stance thus engenders a kind of humility on the side of a human subject. Gulliver’s 
deliberate attempt to be part of what the Houyhnhnms represent can be read as an act of humility, 
which in itself is rare, even though it cannot be easily overlooked that he demonstrates ready 
subservience and readjustment to the host culture throughout his voyages. Nonetheless, it can be 
argued that Gulliver’s willing acculturation to the horse culture is indicative of Swift’s derision 
toward anthropocentric values, given the extent to which his lengthy portrait of the upside-down 
world epitomizes the horse as the form of ultimate rationality. The country of the Houyhnhnms is 
a ridiculous, but simultaneously plausible form of animal world imagined in the early eighteenth 
century. Swift underscores human cruelty toward this animal world by interjecting Gulliver’s 
realistic reportage on the British treatment of horses in general within this predominantly 
speculative world. Indeed, the report that most horses are subject to forced labor for and 
mistreatment by human masters baffles the Master Houyhnhnm. As with the collapsed human-
animal categorical distinction, Swift questions human centrality here again through 
defamilarizing the act of brutality against a species deemed to have no rationality.  
The contingencies inherent to the divide between the rational and irrational are rather 
nicely illustrated by Gulliver’s own vulnerable position. His aspiration for Houyhnhnm-
becoming, or horse-becoming is in constant jeopardy when his human body draws unwanted 
attention. The constant tension between his physical affinity with Yahoos and his outright 
                                                
229 Originally from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, and quoted in Shaviro, 
“Consequences,” 26. 
230 Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West, 53. 
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denunciation of their irrational and thus brute state leads Gulliver to be obsessed with how his 
own “skin” distinguishes him from the Yahoos. His fear of undressing, which both reminds the 
master Houyhnhnm of Gulliver’s hairless state and is associated with Yahoo-ness, draws more 
attention to him. This particular moment is depicted in a manner similar to Corinna’s undressing, 
and to the body measurements performed in Lilliput and Brobdignag. A voyeur-observer wields 
authority to watch the entire process with “great Signs of Curiosity and Admiration” (221), 
which effeminizes and eroticizes Gulliver’s body. More striking is that the “Whiteness, and 
Smoothness” of Gulliver’s skin and physiology are immediately translated into the physical 
attributes of Yahoos.  
Gulliver’s attempt to maintain his dress, a visible marker for his civility and gentleness, is 
subject to voyeuristic encroachment. While Gulliver’s “performance” of undressing in front of 
the master horse seems minimal in its salaciousness, a female Yahoo’s accosting of him during 
his bath is brimming with comical and salacious intentions. During his bath in the river, Gulliver 
reports that a young female Yahoo embraces him until a sorrel horse intervenes. The harmless 
fuss is understood as a “Matter of Diversion” to Gulliver’s master and other horses (249), but the 
incident itself indicates that the boundary between what Gulliver believes to be rationality, 
humanity, and civility and what the female Yahoo stands for is easy to collapse. His following 
recognition that he is a “real Yahoo” in terms of his physiological features—based on this 
sexualized encounter with the young female—underlines the very fine line between the animal 
and the human, the rational and the irrational. Overtly ridiculous, Gulliver’s desire to be 
completely accepted in Houyhnhnmsland, his denunciation of humanity, and his complete 
withdrawal from his own family are indicative of an unusual eighteenth-century posthuman 
undercurrent, which decenters the human and its rationality.    
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Swift’s Dressing Room Poems and the Imagining of the Female Android  
 
Like the insistently mechanical constitution of Gulliver’s body, Swift’s representations of 
fragmented, half-machine/half-human female bodies in his dressing-room poems provide us with 
a revealing glimpse into the eighteenth-century posthumanist imagination.231 By intentionally 
collapsing distinctions between human bodies and their perfunctory, functional somatic 
extensions, Swift poses a fundamental question concerning the corporeal, material constitution of 
human subjectivity. This blurred distinction and the persistent theme of dismemberment bespeak 
a larger anxiety regarding the making of male subjectivity. Though I use the term ‘posthuman’ as 
a way to frame my analysis of Gulliver’s bodies, Swift obviously did not have the emancipatory 
pleasure of reading Donna Haraway’s landmark work, “A Manifesto for Cyborgs.” In it, 
Haraway posits the cyborg as an entity pulled away from the gravity of genesis, unity, gender or 
natural impositions. The cyborg, Haraway claims, is characterized as “resolutely committed to 
partiality, irony, intimacy [and] … perversity,” and as “oppositional, utopian, and completely 
without innocence.”232 Such “boundary breakdowns” inherent to the cyborg are validated 
because they emancipate human subjects from the confines of conventional cultural, social, and 
                                                
231 Swift’s persistent rhetoric of mechanical de/construction is discernible in his poems and in the second 
and third voyages of Gulliver. In “Dr. S— to Mr. P—e, while he was writing the Dunciad,” an 
autobiographical poem depicting rather self-consciously how the poet composes his own poems, Swift 
rather underlines the progress of composition drawing on mechanistic language: 
Now Backs of Letters, though design’d 
   For those who more will need’em, 
Are fill’d with Hints, and interlin’s, 
   Himself can hardly read e’m.  
 
Each Atom by some other struck, 
   All Turns and Motion tries;  
Till in a Lump together stuck, 
   Behold a Poem rise! (lines 9-16) 
232 Donna Haraway, “A Manifesto for Cyborgs.” Feminism/Postmodernism. ed. Linda J. Nicholson (New 
York: Routledge, 1990), 192. 
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political impositions.233 Admittedly, the application of Haraway’s twentieth-century frame of the 
cyborg to the reading of Swift’s works risks a certain methodological anachronism. And yet, 
Haraway’s claim that cyborgs are everywhere, from the ancient Greek period to contemporary 
science fiction to modern medicine to modern war, implies their conceptual usefulness for 
understanding eighteenth-century texts. Eighteenth-century Europe in particular saw the 
production of automata including Vaucanson’s theatrical animal automata, the chess player. 
Even less theatrical, ornamental versions of automata were employed almost on a daily basis in 
the form of the windmill and watermill.234 This kind of human cohabitation with the cyborg 
sheds light on Swift’s increased anxiety toward boundary transgressions across spaces and 
species.   
The desire for creating automated machinery dates back to the ancient period.235 Aristotle 
posits a machine-like slave to deflect his complicity with institutionalized human slavery and to 
cater to his dislike of involving in humans in general.236 LaGrandeur, in his study of how the 
early modern posthumanist imagination is implicated in the making of so-called “artificial 
slaves,” duly notes that “modern cybernetics is at least partially the product of a very old 
archetypal drive that pits human ingenuity against nature via artificial proxies,” which he traces 
back to the age of Aristotle and the ancient Jewish cabala tradition.237 Otto Mayr also writes 
about how machinery in general is the manifestation of “interaction between a society’s practical 
                                                
233 Ibid., 193. 
234 Jonathan Sawday also points to the fact that early modern life was replete not only with machinery but 
also with the noise it produced. See Jonathan Sawday, Engines of the Imagination: Renaissance Culture 
and the Rise of the Machine (London: Routledge, 2007), esp. Ch. 1. 
235 Alfred Chapuis and Edmond Droz provide a comprehensive historiography of the development of 
automata. See Automata: A Historical and Technological Study, Trans. Alec Reid (New York: Central 
Book Company, 1958). 
236 Cited in LaGrandeur, Androids and Intelligent Networks in Early Modern Literature and Culture, 9-
12. See also Aristotle, Politics, The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. 2, Trans. Jonathan Barnes 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), esp. 6 (1253b24-1254a17). 
237 LaGrandeur, 1. 
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technology and its intellectual and spiritual culture.”238 Simon Schaffer illuminates how the 
human body is perceived as a machine in the enlightenment age.239 Minsoo Kang remarks that 
the eighteenth-century craze over an automaton signifies the intersection of popular interest and 
the culmination of technological advancement. If Vaucanson’s automata—the centerpiece of 
Kang’s examination of the eighteenth-century European automata craze—“embodied some of 
the central philosophical, scientific, and medical ideas that were being hotly debated at the time,” 
Gulliver’s corporeal status, Corinna’s body, and the Flapper’s unusual functions in Laputa evince 
early eighteenth-century interest in hybrid human entities as well as the vulnerability of human 
subjects. Similarly, Adelheid Voskuhl’s work on the origin and reception of enlightenment 
machinery (circa 1730-1790) touches on how machines drew intense attention from the public as 
automated, mechanical marvels. Jessica Riskin’s case studies of Vaucanson’s unprecedented 
feats as a craftsman/engineer neatly describe the careful techniques employed to create a 
seemingly organic machine. She traces the development from the Jaquet-Droz family’s use of 
such “lifelike materials” as “leather, cork, and papier-mâché” to the work of Vaucanson, who 
successfully created a defecating duck. His success epitomizes, Riskin argues, the “simultaneous 
enactment of both the sameness and incomparability of life and machinery.”240  
As noted earlier, Swift’s own dissective vision and his long-standing interest in the 
construction of interiority are manifested in his dressing-room poems.241 The quantified, 
                                                
238 Mayr, Authority, Liberty, and Automatic Machinery in Early Modern Europe, xvii. 
239 Simon Schaffer, “Enlightened Automata,” 134. 
240 Jessica Riskin, “The Defecating Duck,” 610. The meaningful parallels between Vaucanson’s 
defecating duck automaton, defecating yahoos, and the similarly identified women in Swift’s poems will 
be discussed in the section discussing Gulliver’s last voyage. 
241 For further discussion of Swift’s treatment of the female body in his excremental poems, see Margaret 
Anne Doody’s “Swift Among the Women” in Critical Essays on Jonathan Swift, ed. Frank Palmeri (New 
York: Macmillan, 1993), 13-37; Ellen Pollak, “The Difference in Swift,” Palmeri, ed. Critical Essays, 
207-227, “Swift and Women” in Cambridge Companion to Jonathan Swift, ed. Christopher Fox 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 87-111; and Louise Barnett, Swift in the Company of 
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fragmented body in Swift’s famous “A Beautiful Young Nymph Going to Bed” (1731) has long 
been at the center of controversies surrounding his treatment of women, since it hints at Swift’s 
alleged misogyny.242 My interest here, however, lies with how the dissective viewpoints and 
partitioned bodies pervasive in Swift’s dressing-room poems point to anxieties regarding the 
progress of self-making and self-representation within the milieu of technological advancement. 
Striking in this poem is the prying male gaze that fragments Corinna’s body into divisible, 
tangible prostheses. Corinna’s body, in addition, is denaturalized to the extent that it is rendered 
as an unusual hybrid of organic body parts and small particles of machinery. In her comparative 
study of Pope and Swift, Ellen Pollak writes, contrary to Pope, who “accommodates women 
comfortably within his texts by objectifying them in such a way that they give him back the 
image of himself he wants to see,” within Swift’s works the women “represent the active 
principle of difference itself, and this principle in turn becomes the motivating structure of 
Swift’s art.”243 As such, Pollak argues that Swift’s poems display both the specific way in which 
masculine fear is displaced as well as the existence of male anxiety prompted by sexual 
difference. My concern here focuses on human anxiety in the face of species difference, which 
includes sexual difference in that Swift envisions women’s bodies using mechanistic language.244 
I read Swift’s recurrent poetic motifs of defecating, fetishistic displacement, and disfiguration as 
metaphors for his anxieties about blurred categorical divisions, particularly between the human 
and the machine.  
                                                                                                                                                       
Women (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). See also Frank Palmeri’s introduction to Critical Essays 
on Jonathan Swift. 
242 See Joseph McMinn, “Swift’s Life,” The Cambridge Companion to Jonathan Swift, ed. Christopher 
Fox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 14-30, exp. 27-28; Margaret Anne Doody, “Swift 
and Women,” The Cambridge Companion to Jonathan Swift, 87-111; J. Paul Hunter, “Gulliver’s Travels 
and Later Writings,” The Cambridge Companion to Jonathan Swift, 216-40, 235. 
243 Ellen Pollak, 207. The emphasis is mine.  
244 See Flynn, The Body in Swift and Defoe, esp. Chs. 4,5, and 8. 
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In “A Beautiful Young Nymph Going to Bed,” the onlooker’s eye begins by cataloguing 
the particulars that comprise Corinna, who  
. . . seated on a three-legg’d chair, 
Takes off her artificial hair;  
Now picking out a crystal eye, 
She wipes it clean, and lays it by.  
Her eyebrows from a mouse’s hide 
Stuck on with art on either side, 
Pulls off with care, and first displays’em, 
Then in a play-book smooth lay’em.  
Now dext’rously her plumpers draws, 
That serve to fill her hollow jaws, 
Untwists a wire, and from her gums 
A set of teeth completely comes;  
Pulls out the rags contrivd to prop 
Her flabbydugs, and down they drop.  (lines 9-22) 
The catalogue of prostheses listed above, it turns out, is indispensable to the “lovely goddess” 
maintaining and augmenting her beauty and youth, both of which have long vanished in a way 
that apparently invites male derision (line 23). What is distinctive in this unflattering portrait is 
the way Corinna is presented as a sum of haphazard body parts—aged, wrinkled, and soon to 
decay. Such mechanical constituency at times indicates her status as an automaton or 
“eighteenth-century cyborg” subjected to disembodiment.245  
                                                
245 For a further discussion of eighteenth-century disembodiment and enlightened selfhood, see Allison 
Muri, The Enlightenment Cyborg: A History of Communications and Control in the Human Machine, 
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Moreover, animal attacks in this poem tellingly signify the fragmentariness inherent to 
the making of subjectivity. “A Beautiful Young Nymph Going to Bed” registers this anxiety 
through the way Corinna’s body parts are attacked by animal assailants, such as a rat, a cat, a 
pigeon, and fleas.246 Human vulnerability gets emphasized by these moments of animals 
assuming superiority over human volition and needs. Corinna’s irreplaceable prosthetic body 
parts are under a series of attacks by animals’ natural behavior, producing what the speaker calls 
respectively a “dreadful sight” (line 57), “the ruins of the night” (line 58), and her “mangled 
plight” (line 65). The speaker elaborates:  
A wicked rat her plaster stole,  
Half eat, and dragg’d it to his hole. 
The crystal eye, alas! was miss’d; 
And puss had on her plumpers p—st, 
A pigeon pick’d her issue-peas: 
And Shock her tresses fill’d with fleas. (lines 59-64) 
Although beset by such corporeal predicaments, Corinna is required to “unite” her limbs, “re-
collect the scattr’d parts” (line 68) and “[gather] up herself again” (line 70). Due to her animal 
assailants, Corinna’s daily task of reuniting herself ultimately fails. This, I argue, represents not 
only gender- or class-oriented predicaments when it comes to securing one’s social identity. 
Rather, Corinna’s corporeal disorientation hints at a universal human vulnerability in 
establishing personal identity and maintaining interiority within an increasingly mechanized 
scientific understanding of our material condition. In Gulliver’s case, he is able to shield himself 
                                                                                                                                                       
1660-1830 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007). For more on the concept of the cyborg, see Rosi 
Braidotti, “Posthuman, All Too Human: Towards a New Process Ontology,” Theory, Culture, and Society 
23.7-8 (2006): 197-208. 
246 This also makes a parallel with the similar animal attacks Gulliver receives during his second voyage. 
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from external stimuli that might disembody him by hiding in the box offered by his benevolent, 
gigantic patrons.247 Through his disintegration of Corinna’s body, Swift continues asking 
whether Corinna is merely the sum of her artificial eyeball, her set of fake teeth, and her 
emaciated hips and breasts. If so, then where does her sense of interiority reside? Under the 
onlooker’s investigative eyes, there is no room for Corinna to possess the kind of interiority or 
privacy that Gulliver strives to preserve. She is presented as a sheer sum of shabby objects that 
materially index her disheveled life. In this bleak portrait of a prostitute, Corinna’s interiority is 
saved and disrupted by the nightmare of being sent to jail or Jamaica. Corinna embodies a central 
cultural anxiety concerning the nature of selfhood and interiority in a period which saw the 
ascendancy of empiricism’s anatomical, objective approach to things.  
Similarly, in “The Progress of Beauty” (1719), Swift employs the technique of 
disfiguring a woman’s body to the degree that a female character—the object of a male speaker’s 
voyeuristic observation—is reduced to the status of an unnatural, nonhuman entity. In effect, 
Swift reverses the order of disintegration as depicted in Corinna’s bedroom to dramatize the 
process of female masquerade. Here, the speaker carefully parallels two different models of how 
women reconstruct their beauty. The poem begins with the moment Diana rises from the bed; the 
poet, in his habitually malicious manner, portrays how her “artificiall Face” is restored from her 
shabby look (line 6).248 The earlier look is marked by wrinkles, sweats, “Cracked Lips, foul 
Teeth, and gummy Eyes” (line 15). With the aid of “Soot or Powder” (line 17) in the case of 
Diana, and of “Pencil, Paint, and Brush” (46) in the case of Celia, these two women respectively 
                                                
247 Probably the most extreme version of Lilliputian attempts to quantify and inventory Gulliver can be 
found in Gulliver being forced to go naked in front of the horse inspectors in his final voyage. During 
Gulliver’s engagement with Houyhnhnms, his bare skin without fur/hair is equated with his savageness, 
which is always associated with Yahoos. Thus his attempts to hide his “Secret of [his] Dress” (220) entail 
much trouble. 
248 Jonathan Swift, “The Progress of Beauty,” The Poems of Jonathan Swift, ed. Harold Williams, Vol. 1 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), 225-229. 
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efface the signs of aging and fatigue. The careful makeup applied to each of their faces leads to 
the construction of a new woman:  
 She [Celia] know her Early self no more, 
But fill’d with Admiration, stands, 
As Other Painters oft adore 
The Workmanship of their own Hands.  
  Thus after four important Hours  
Celia’s the Wonder of her Sex;  
Say, which among the Heav’nly Pow’rs 
Could cause such wonderfull Effects. (lines 49-56) 
In addition to the speaker’s cheeky admiration of the feminine accomplishment— “such 
wonderful Effects”—he quickly shifts his interest to a material that helps enhance female beauty: 
the white lead, a substance which “was sent to us to repair / Two brightest, brittlest earthly 
Things / A Lady’s Faces, and China ware” (lines 62-64). Presumably an eighteenth-century 
version of light powder or a porcelain color primer, white lead allegedly works effectively and is 
emblematic of the aesthetic prosthesis used in the period.249 Striking, however, is the poet’s 
juxtaposition of a woman’s face with china, which serves double purposes. On one hand, the 
china’s smooth, glossy exterior underlines the effects of the application of the white lead and 
highlights the enhanced beauty of the woman in question. Second, as has often been noted, it 
abstracts a woman’s body to the status of a fetish. “A Beautiful Young Nymph Going to Bed” 
and “The Progress of Love” reveal Swift’s anxieties about selfhood through his fixation on 
                                                
249 Julie Park, for instance, notes that the use of mechanical devices to enhance beauty was commonplace 
in the eighteenth century: “Such so-called ‘machines’ of eighteenth-century fashion, as the cork rump for 
women and artificial calves for men, indicate that the realm of the frivolous was not so far removed from 
the scientific in in its prosthetic approach to objects.” See Park, The Self and It, 42. 
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female bodies comprised of mechanical parts whose sum would not make a whole, organic body. 
These poems register Swift’s interest in the material conditions that make possible the 
appearance of unfractured human identity. He finally interjects a jocular, but pointed reflection 
on the relationship between form and matter in the latter poem, saying  
       But, Art no longer can prevail 
When the Materialls all are gone, 
The best Mechanick Hand must fayl 
Where Nothing’s left to work upon. 
  Matter, as wise Logicians say,  
Cannot without a Form subsist,  
And Form, say I, as well as They, 
Must fayl if Matter brings no Grist. (lines 77-84)  
In the context of a poem commenting on the fleeting beauty of women, the lines cited above can 
be read as a fair warning that even the diligent and deliberate application of makeup as a 
prosthetic technology is destined to fail due to the material perishability of human life.  
Swift notoriously toys with women’s bodies in an effort to blur the fine line between the 
human (natural) body and the hybrid (unnatural; machine-like) in his poems. Sexual difference 
gets conflated with species difference, as the apparently discrete female body is represented in 
the form of a machine. Despite Swift’s aversion to modern science, the language he deploys is 
heavily saturated with the discourses of prosthetic technologies and mechanical engineering.250 
The author’s own anxiety about newfound technologies in the early eighteenth century 
                                                
250 That Swift uses the word ‘engines(s)’ twenty times throughout Gulliver’s Travels imply the 
undercurrent of his interest in the modern technology despite his protests. 
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paradoxically led him to create a world populated by hybrid entities: man-machine, man-animal 
hybrids. 
 
Coda: The Age of Dissection and Technological/Medical Enlightenment 
Eighteenth-century Britain saw a continued but complicated version of what Sawday 
terms the “culture of dissection” and the so-called age of the machine (before the dawn of the 
Industrial Revolution). Given the broad range of definitions of “autopsy” listed in the OED, from 
unmediated eyewitnessing to the “actual inspection” of a dead body, it is evident that the act of 
dissecting worked fundamentally both as a faithful heir to the kinds of empirical observations 
theorized in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The rise of the new science, reinforced by 
the improvement of scientific instruments and by the institutionalization of scientific 
investigation itself (predominantly in the form of the state-sponsored laboratory), facilitated 
more general cultural dissemination of the concepts of anatomy, dissection, and disintegration.251 
In addition, anatomical theaters open to the general public, along with the production of 
anatomical figures, simultaneously fostered the culture of autopsy.252 Sawday explores the 
etiology of particularly Western interest in interiority by dint of “dissection or anatomization,” 
                                                
251 See Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986) for the interrelationship between fact-making and the 
institutionalization of the laboratory. For more on advancements in scientific instruments and their 
popular reception, see Hasok Chang, Inventing Temperature: Measurement and Scientific Progress 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Jan Golinski, “Barometers of Change: Meteorological 
Instruments as Machines of Enlightenment,” The Sciences in Enlightened Europe. Eds. William Clark, 
Jan Golinski, and Simon Schaffer (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999), 69-93. 
252 Richard D. Altick’s classic work on the various forms of public, scientific, and educational 
entertainment in early modern England describes at length the dissemination of empirical knowledge and 
enlightened forms of public entertainment. See Altick, The Shows of London (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1978), Chs. 4-5, 16, 25-28; see also Anita Guerrini, “Anatomists and 
Entrepreneurs in Early Eighteenth-Century London,” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied 
Sciences 59 (2004): 219-39; Experimenting with Humans and Animals (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2003); and The Courtiers' Anatomists: Humans and Animals in Louis XIV's Paris 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2015); and Jonathan Sawday, The Body Emblazoned. 
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and points to the fear imbedded in manifold attempts to approach and pry into interiority within 
the corpus of Renaissance literary texts.253 According to Sawday, early modern anatomy 
achieved two things: 1) it shed light on bodily interiors that had long been associated with the 
dark, and in doing so disintegrated and reassembled interiority in accordance with new standards 
of order and discipline; and 2) it recast bodily interiority in spatial terms.254 In the course of 
mapping out the body interior in three-dimensional terms, anatomists and natural philosophers 
had to acknowledge that even scientifically objective, prying eyes still met with a degree of 
resistance from the very corporeality into which they delved.  
The fact that there still remained elements of lingering mystery, the sublime, or even fear 
emanating from the body suggests the potential usefulness of thing theory to examining these 
early modern practices of placing the body and other objects under the objectifying eyes of 
scientific observers. If the strangeness, mystery, or autonomy attendant on the interior of things 
(including the human body) stems from our relative ignorance of anatomy before the early 
modern period, eighteenth-century affects surrounding the body interior originate from a more 
widely recognized sense of the autonomy of things that seem to defy human control. That is, the 
divide between the interiority and the exteriority of the body that falls under disciplined 
examination in the early modern period demonstrates that the early modern body itself becomes 
a contested site where the imposition of prying eyes reduces the object of dissection to a thing—
demystified, object-like, and at times feminized. In many ways, the pursuit of objective 
knowledge propelled by the scientific revolution entails a shifts in the definition of the human 
body from something “fearfully made” into an intricately organized machine. P. M. Harman 
likewise points to a watershed change in eighteenth-century understandings of nature caused by 
                                                
253 Sawday, The Body Emblazoned, 1. 
254 Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum offers a similar attempt to perceive the segments of human bodies as 
part of a spatial construction. See also Sawday, 86.  
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the “visualisation of the universe as a clockwork mechanism comprising cogs, wheels and 
pulleys rather than a living organism”255 In a way, the new anatomical knowledge regarding 
human interiority reinforces the Cartesian mechanical understanding of organism. At the same 
time, it amplifies the fear imbedded in the making of the self, in part because selfhood in the new 
epistemological paradigm is subjected to such mechanical disintegration, and in part because 
human subjectivity remains faced with the residual autonomy of nature despite scientific 
attempts to pin down its workings.  
If enhanced techniques of observation engendered the culture of dissection, another 
dimension of empirical culture was predicated on the use of machinery, including automata as 
well as the aforementioned scientific instruments.256 As Sawday duly notes, the eighteenth 
century was by no means a pastoral, pre-industrial age devoid of mechanical noise.257 Cohabiting 
with machinery, Britons in the eighteenth century came to accept Technē as the characteristic 
episteme that determined the fabric of their daily life. This exposure to technological devices 
affected British understandings of both nature and the self, and it conditioned the way in which 
they described and demarcated space and time: for instance, the kinds of temporal demarcation 
made possible by the increased use of more technologically advanced clocks shows that even the 
abstract unit of time came to be rendered in spatial terms.258 Descriptive technique refined by the 
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advancement of technology therefore produced a re-conceptualization of time and space, interior 
and exterior, characteristic of the Enlightenment. The classificatory impulse prevalent in both 
Linnaeus and Buffon thus goes hand in hand with concurrent practices of spatializing, and of 
fragmenting things previously conceived as whole, continuous, and abstract. Such ordering 
practices imposed on both the natural world and human interiority influenced a number of 
cultural discourses—not only in the predictable realms of anatomy and autopsy reports, but also 
in auction catalogues, and many other forms of lists which often became a structural narrative 
component of early novelistic discourse. 
The predominantly mechanical underpinnings of the human body, however, opened up 
the possibility of establishing rather radical claims about the thingness or the machine-like status 
of the human in positive terms. Dissociated from the traditional notion of God’s manifestation 
within nature, increased knowledge of human physiology aligned the human with the machine, 
by taking the material, mechanical constitution of the body seriously. Such materialist discourse 
is perhaps best represented by Julien Offray de La Mettrie. When Swift’s treatment of Corinna’s 
body (perhaps unknowingly) articulates an eighteenth-century understanding of hybridity—of an 
entity bordering uneasily on the human/machine divide—it prefigures Julien Offray de La 
Mettrie’s proposition that the “human body is a self-winding machine, a living representation of 
perpetual motion.”259 La Mettrie’s materialist monism, the outright dismissal of long-held 
Cartesian dualism, is predicated on his premise that the workings of the soul cannot be 
dissociable from its material conditions: “The soul follows the progress of the body, as it does 
education.”260 To fend off predominantly outraged contemporary responses to his argument, La 
Mettrie argues that when the container of the soul perishes, the soul faces the same fate: 
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Without food, the soul languishes, goes into a frenzy, and exhausted, dies. The soul is a 
candle whose flame is relighted the moment it is put out. But feed the body, pour 
powerful juices and strong liquors into its pipes, and then the soul arms itself with proud 
courage, and the soldier, whom water would have made run away, becomes ferocious and 
runs gaily to his death to the beat of the drum.261  
Since his primary concern centers on what is tangible, visible, and thus knowable, La Mettrie 
limits his discussion to pure material conditions. He modestly acknowledges that the 
metaphysical is located beyond the reach of human understanding. It is hardly surprising that he 
tackles the notion of a proiori, arguing that “[o]nly a posteriori, by unraveling the soul as one 
pulls out the guts of the body, can one, I do not say discover with clarity what the nature of man 
is, but rather attain the highest degree of probability possible on the subject.”262 He contests the 
long-held Cartesian boundaries distinguishing the human from the animal and the machine, 
underscoring that the soul as prime mover is “only an empty word to which no idea corresponds” 
and that the human is a “well-enlightened machine.”263 Half jocular, half serious about the way 
he applies comparative anatomical perspective to the status of human faculties, he writes that 
“man is but an animal” and comprised of a “contraption of springs.” 264 In so doing, he compares 
the human body to an “immense clock, constructed with so much artifice and skill.”265 With 
automata flooding the European popular imagination, La Mettrie, equipped with precise 
knowledge of comparative anatomy, argues that an unbiased mind could only conclude that 
“man is a machine, and that the entire universe contains only one single diversely modified 
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substance.”266 Preceding La Mettrie’s radical materialist manifesto by twenty-two years, Swift’s 
treatment of Gulliver’s body significantly anticipates the French philosopher’s contestation of 
the boundary between the human and the machine.   
  
                                                
266 Ibid.,  76. It is also notable that his equal treatment of the human and the animal in the treatise echoes 
the development of anatomy. Initially, anatomical knowledge originates from the comparative approach 
to the structure of the human body and of plants. Then it delves into the inner structure and organization 
of both the human and the animal. La Mettrie’s treatise, touching on both aspects of the human body, 
ultimately shows that humans are seldom superior to or distinct from either machines, animals, or plants.  
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Chapter 5 
“DEAR FAITHFUL OBJECT OF MY TENDER CARE”: 
ETHICS AND THE NONHUMAN IN ANNA LAETITIA BARBAULD’S NATURE POETRY 
 
 
Glory be to God for dappled things – 
– Gerard Manley Hopkins, “Pied Beauty” (1877) 
 
The subject of science is the beautiful (that is to say order, proportion, harmony) in 
so far as it is suprasensible and necessary. The subject of art is sensible and 
contingent beauty discerned through the network of chance and evil.  
 
The beautiful in nature is a union of the sensible impression and of the sense of 
necessity. Things must be like that (in the first place), and, precisely, they are like 
that.  
– Simone Weil, “Beauty”267 
 
Beauty always takes place in the particular . . .  
– Elaine Scarry, On Beauty and Being Just268 
 
In Gerard Manley Hopkins’s “Pied Beauty,” “dappled things” prompt the speaker’s sense 
of wonder. His poem depicts a range of living forms that represent quirky aspects of beauty in 
nature—described alternately as “counter, original, spare, strange, . . . fickle, [and] freckled” 
(lines 7-8)—as a visible manifestation of the divine. Hopkins shrewdly integrates the small 
details of nature into the language of the sublime. Simone Weil, in her aphoristic articulation of 
beauty as the disparate end of science and art, underlines the concept of beauty in nature as an 
unusual, seemingly incompatible amalgamation of sense perception and utility. And Elaine 
Scarry, examining how the discernment of beauty entails action and our sense of justice, remarks 
that our perception of beauty rests on the recognition of particulars: sustained attention to objects 
is a precondition for discerning beauty, argues Scarry, and such beauty by nature arrests a 
perceiver’s attention. Taken together, these epigraphs illustrate the sensorial horizon of beauty, 
                                                
267 Simone Weil, “Beauty,” Gravity and Grace, Trans. Emma Crawford and Mario von der Ruhr (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2002), 148. 
268 Elaine Scarry, On Beauty and Being Just (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 18. 
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and, more importantly, the cognitive and aesthetic dimensions of our perception of the beautiful, 
which are quite central to poets and scientists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.    
In this chapter I examine primarily the nature poems of Anna Laetitia Barbauld (1743-
1825) along with those of Charlotte Turner Smith (1749-1806), focusing on the links between 
the pervasive practice of empirical observation and the underpinnings of beauty, sympathy, and 
ethical judgment in long eighteenth-century Britain.269 Throughout my exploration of Barbauld’s 
works, I argue that her empirical sublime serves as a prelude to ethical attention and care. In 
contrast to scholars who have focused on the relationship between aesthetic pleasure and the 
observation of nature in order to account for the development of aesthetic judgment in the period, 
I examine how the accumulative knowledge of nature leads to the making of ethical 
subjecthood—a form of subjectivity characterized by its engagement with the moral, aesthetic, 
and empirical aspects of the natural world. I argue that the (primarily) organic life forms that 
draw each poet’s attention are deemed by them as objects of vibrancy and beauty. Informed by 
the work of posthumanist thinkers, I demonstrate how these objects alert human observers to 
their vitality particularly through their sensorial registers in the human mind. Barbauld and Smith 
produce what I would call “encounter poetry”: poetic texts in which a human observer stumbles 
across an unexpected life form to which she pays momentary or prolonged attention in a way 
leads to a cognitive and aesthetic event. Recognizing the multifarious objects embedded in nature 
                                                
269 My choice of Barbauld and Smith is deliberate. Both poets presage Romanticism and its 
preoccupations with nature, but have been largely overlooked until recent revivals. However, my 
treatment of Smith’s poem serves more as a point of reference to Barbauld’s work than as the kind of 
comprehensive study her poems deserve. For her literary accomplishments as a Romantic poet, see Stuart 
Curran’s “Charlotte Smith and British Romanticism,” South Central Review 11.2 (1994): 66-78; Curran 
centers on Smith’s formidable literary accomplishment “against all odds” (66) and on her distinctive, 
uncompromising political perspective: 
Charlotte Smith is not, of course, the only missing link in the chain of succession between the 
poets of the second and third generations of the eighteenth century, but because of the breadth, 
the artistry, and the impact of her achievement, hers may well be the single most important voice 
that has been until quite recently suppressed form the historical record. (71)  
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often functions as an aesthetically pleasing encounter, of course, but Barbauld and Smith do not 
stop at merely remarking novelty, beauty, or the sublime in the natural world; rather, they extend 
their speakers’ reflections to a more general consideration of our ethical responsibility to the 
particular “race” of each of the objects they encounter.270 My primary tasks in this chapter are, 
first, to analyze Barbauld’s and Smith’s articulations of the link between ethical action and the 
perception of beauty in seemingly insignificant natural life forms; and second, to consider their 
poems as engagements with contemporary discourses of ethical and aesthetic judgment, and 
particularly with the work of Joseph Addison and Francis Hutcheson. In so doing, I also point to 
the fact that poetic objects are in many cases enmeshed in the period’s colonial networks. Further 
details regarding these objects’ complicated entanglements will be illustrated in my close reading 
of Barbauld’s “The Caterpillar.”  
This chapter therefore attempts to answer to the following questions: 1) what are the 
implications of discerning beauty in an age which transitioned from understanding nature in 
mechanistic terms to engaging in analyses of chemical components and eventually of the 
foundation of life?; 2) how do these poets imagine the process of discerning beauty (and the 
sublime)?; 3) how do Barbauld and Smith view the recognition of beauty as leading to ethical 
acts or justice—usually couched in the language of care and sensibility—in terms of the human 
treatment of nonhuman species? To elucidate the cognitive dimensions of empirical and aesthetic 
experience, I build upon the work of Elaine Scarry and Gabrielle Starr.271 My argument about 
eighteenth-century concerns with animal welfare draws on the work of Christine Kenyon-Jones, 
                                                
270 It is intriguing to find both poets use the term “race” when addressing nonhuman species, a term which 
rather highlights their alterity. See Barbauld’s “The Caterpillar” and Smith’s “To a Geranium which 
Flowered during the Winter.” 
271 Elaine Scarry, On Beauty and Being Just; G. Gabrielle Starr, Feeling Beauty: The Neuroscience of 
Aesthetic Experience (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2013). 
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Moira Ferguson, David Perkins, and Marjorie Spiegel.272 Moreover, because I am interested in 
the renewed attention to eighteenth-century nonhuman species from the perspective of the very 
objects of human observation, this chapter is also in conversation with Bill Brown’s formulation 
of “thingness” or the agential power of nonhuman objects that defy human needs and/or desires. 
My methodology is also shared by Theresa M. Kelley, who foregrounds the very thingness of 
botanical specimens and their baffling power by stressing the “embededness of plants as 
matter.”273 Also, scholars like Catherine Packham, Robert Mitchell, and Sharon Ruston articulate 
how Romantic writings are intimately concerned with the acknowledgement of natural vitality.274 
To contextualize Barbauld’s poems, it is important to acknowledge that long eighteenth-
century British poetry is rife with a broad spectrum of nature poems that dealt with a variety of 
nonhuman species and nature in general, well before William Wordsworth’s landmark fin-de-
siècle turn to everyday natural objects and his emphasis on “ordinary language” in his 1802 
preface to Lyrical Ballads.275 Ann Finch (1661-1720), for instance, produced poems that testify 
not only to her interest in natural phenomena, but also to the vital agency of nature. “Spleen” 
                                                
272 Christine Kenyon-Jones, Kindred Brutes: Animals in Romantic-Period Writing (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2001); Moira Ferguson, Animal Advocacy and Englishwomen, 1780-1900: Patriots, Nation, and Empire 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998); David Perkins, Romanticism and Animal Rights; Mark 
Canuel, Justice, Dissent, and the Sublime (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012); Marjorie 
Spiegel, The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery (New York: Mirror Books, 1996).  
273 Theresa M. Kelley, Clandestine Marriage, 2.  
274 Catherine Packham, Eighteenth-Century Vitalism: Bodies, Culture, Politics (New York: Palgrave, 
2012); Robert Mitchell, Experimental Life: Vitalism in Romantic Science and Literature (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013); Peter Hanns Reill, Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment 
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275 Even though Wordsworth’s first preface was published in 1798, his more developed thoughts on poetic 
diction were included in the 1802 and 1805 editions of Lyrical Ballads. C. V. Deane suggests a possible 
continuity between eighteenth-century nature poetry and post-Wordsworthian poetry despite their marked 
differences in poetic diction. Deane demarcates the period from Thompson’s more obvious nature poems 
in order to stress the differences between neo-classical poetic diction and its Romantic counterpart as 
realized in Wordsworth’s and his contemporaries’ poems. See Aspects of Eighteenth Century Nature 
Poetry (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1935).   
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(1701) exemplifies Finch’s effort to endow the spleen with a kind of agency so that she can 
identify unexplainable symptoms of illness as willful acts of the bodily organ. “Upon the 
Hurricane” (1703) also articulates the baffling force of a storm primarily through Finch’s 
personification of the natural catastrophe:  
No more such gentle Methods you pursue,  
But marching now in terrible Array, 
 Undistingush’d was your Prey: 
 In vain the Shrubs, with lowly Bent, 
Sought their Destruction to prevent; 
The Beech in vain, with out-stretch’d Arms, 
Deprecates th’approaching Harms . . . (lines 10-16) 
It is notable that Finch, witnessing the vitality of nature, is invested in demonstrating how such 
organic forms as trees or plants respond to the succumbing power of the storm in order to 
underline the indiscriminate power of the chaos which must have confounded her to the same 
degree it affected her other contemporaries, including Daniel Defoe.276 Finch’s most acclaimed 
poem, “A Nocturnal Reverie,” registers the speaker’s meditation on the unfolding of time and the 
arrival of night in a way that altogether anticipates the Romantic treatment of nature. John Gay 
(1685-1732) also composed many poems about vital nonhuman entities—deploying a bee, a 
butterfly, and other species—particularly in his Fables. Gay’s eulogy of a pet dog, “An Elegy on 
a Lap-Dog,” echoes the pet-mourning culture of early eighteenth-century Britain, which is also 
evidenced in the end of Francis Coventry’s The History of Pompey the Little (1745). James 
Thomson (1700-1748) composed The Seasons (1746), in which he reveals that the poet’s faith 
unarguably rests on both poetic imagination and scientific knowledge, such as Newtonian optics. 
                                                
276 See Defoe, The Storm, The Lay-Man’s Sermon upon the Late Storm, and An Essay on the Late Storm.  
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John Dyer’s “Fleece” (1757) demonstrates the eighteenth-century afterlife of Virgil’s Georgics. 
Juxtaposing artifacts like sheep-dip, dye-vats, and spinning machines with a more pastoral 
landscape of rivers and waterways, Dyer illustrates his high hopes for the future of a Britain 
driven by labor and trade: 
… Ev’n nature lives by toil: 
Beast, bird, air, fire, the heav’ns, and rolling worlds, 
All live by action: nothing lies at rest, 
But death and ruin: man is born to care; 
Fashion’d, improv’d, by labor. (lines 22-26) 
Christopher Smart (1722-1771) also records his close observation of his “Cat Jeoffrey.” In his 
fragmentary, almost list-like register of feline characteristics, Smart describes how Jeoffrey’s 
natural, carefree behavior makes him “the servant of the living God” (line 2). Likewise, William 
Cowper, best known for The Task (1785), also produced a pet eulogy entitled “Epitaph on a 
Hare” (1784). 
In the context of these longstanding conventions of nature poetry, I stress the fact that 
Barbauld’s work embodies a significant transition in terms of literary taste, perceptions of 
novelty, and understandings of the beauty of nature. Furthermore, Barbauld’s poems capture the 
process whereby the accumulation of knowledge produces an ethical subject. Of course, 
Barbauld’s works can be explained as either pre- or proto-Romantic poetry, but my contention is 
that her works are simultaneously in conversation with early- and mid-eighteenth-century poetry 
in that they embody and complicate the concepts of sympathy and care. Barbauld’s nature poetry 
epitomizes a move from the pejorative representation of botany as a simple, passive, isolated, 
and gender-inflected pastime to an appreciation of it as a serious, rigorous pursuit of sensorial, 
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aesthetic, and ethical knowledge. Barbauld and Smith illustrate that botany does not occupy a 
separate sphere—one in which women can be contained while pursuing assigned, ‘proper’ forms 
of knowledge—but provides an arena in which women can exhibit their agency, ultimately 
developing a new form of subjectivity which calls for less hostile cohabitation with nonhuman 
species. Though I foreground the terms ‘care’ and ‘attention’ in an effort to articulate the main 
characteristics of the poems I discuss here, these words should not be understood as 
predominantly feminine attributes of human nature. Rather, Barbauld expands the 
conceptualizations of these terms in immediate conversation with contemporary political, 
religious, and moral debates, largely reflecting her dissenter background.  
Another aspect of Barbauld’s empirical sublime and her sustained attention to the 
particulars of nature rests on eighteenth-century scientific discourses, particularly botany and 
zoology. Recent studies of eighteenth-century natural history, knowledge production, and its 
participants can be divided roughly into several categories. First, there are scholars invested in 
the task of establishing taxonomy and nomenclature while embracing incremental knowledge of 
what appears to be just novelties.277 These scholars pay attention to the tense relationship 
between particular, local knowledge and universal knowledge. Second, scholars like Jill Casid 
and Londa Schiebinger have been committed to articulating the overlaps between British 
                                                
277 Scholars belonging in this group tend to complicate Michel Foucault’s thesis in The Order of Things. 
See Joanna Stalnaker, The Unfinished Enlightenment: Description in the Age of the Encyclopedia (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2010); Brian Ogilvie, Science of Describing: Natural History in Renaissance 
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Foucault’s analysis of modern systemic protocols veers repeatedly toward what they cannot 
control, even as they attempt to do so by identifying and then economizing difference as either 
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occupies the disputed middle kingdom of nature, neither fully mineral nor fully animal but 
disturbingly in between. (4) 
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colonial and commercial expansion, which significantly fueled the circulation of exotic 
zoological and botanical specimens all over the world.278 Within this camp, there is a general 
tendency to focus on distinctive male individuals, such as Joseph Banks (1743-1820) and 
Captain James Cook (1728-1779), whose business was clearly bound up with late eighteenth-
century British colonial expansion.279 Third, some have worked on the print circulation of 
knowledge about novel specimens and how the dissemination of such knowledge confounded the 
hierarchical distinction between scholars and the general public: scientific discourses targeting 
both the lay public and the inner circle of trained botanists (such as the Lunar Society), along 
with botanical illustrations, contributed significantly to the dissemination of knowledge during 
this period. Scholars like Desmond King-Hele, Stephen T. Jackson, and Patricia Fara focus on 
seminal male botanists of the period, such as John Ray (1627-1705), Erasmus Darwin (1731-
1802), Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832), and Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859).280 
Fourth, as both a corrective and a supplement to this kind of male-centric historiography of 
botanists, some recent scholarship has focused on ‘botanizing women’ in an effort to illustrate 
female, feminine, and feminist engagement with botany.281 Women’s participation in botany can 
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be again subcategorized into gardening (as a limited version of the kind of landscaping readily 
associated with masculinity), botanical illustrations, rigorous research in botany and vivisection, 
and literary productions that anticipated and epitomized the Romantic representation of nature. 
In each of these fields eighteenth-century women, notoriously labeled as “unsex’d females” by 
Richard Polwhele (1760-1838), produced many scholarly works.282 Fifth, informed by 
eighteenth-century debates on sensibility and imperial expansion, attempts to revisit the scene of 
botanical knowledge through the lens of eighteenth-century material culture and animal welfare 
have been made.283 Last but not least, the circulation of botanical and zoological specimens 
across the Atlantic and accounts of eighteenth-century American women’s participation in 
knowledge production are part of this scholarly turn.284 
 
“Every thing that is Great, Strange, or Beautiful”:  
From Aesthetic Enjoyment to Ethical Action 
 
When Franz Kafka came across Søren Kierkegaard’s sharp distinction between aesthetic 
enjoyment and ethical experience, he dismissed outright such a neat “Either-Or” choice by 
stressing that the “aesthetic enjoyment of life” could only result from “humble ethical 
                                                                                                                                                       
Description in Eighteenth-Century Gdansk/Danzig,” Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies 36.4 (2013): 
519-30.  
282 The famous botanical illustrations Mary Granville, aka Mrs. Delany created exemplify safer and 
sanctioned form of female engagement with knowledge making in the eighteenth century. Still, her 
aesthetical accomplishments manifested in her collages stand out even by twenty-first century standard. 
See Mrs. Delany’s Flower Collages from the British Museum (New York: Pierpont Morgan Library, 
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283 See footnotes XX.   
284 Sue Anne Prince, Stuffing Animals, Pressing Plants, Shaping Knowledge: Natural History in North 
America, 1730-1860 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 2003); Karen L. Kilcup, Fallen 
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experience.”285 Indeed, Kafka nicely spells out the entangled (and sometimes causal) relationship 
between ethical action and aesthetical response in a way that seems applicable to much literary 
work from the Romantic period. Barbauld’ nature poetry and her deliberately chosen subject 
matter—nonhuman, organic forms as well as landscapes—surely demonstrate the keen interest in 
the novel, the pleasurable, and the sublime that developed near the end of the eighteenth century. 
Late-eighteenth-century preoccupations with the interconnectedness of our perception of beauty 
and our capacity for ethical action anticipate Kafka’s own complaint that a neat division between 
them is not plausible. My goal in this section is to show how the language of Barbauld’s nature 
poetry was informed by contemporary discourses regarding sublimity, beauty, and justice. Her 
commitment to an ethics of care and attention is lodged in the language of beauty and moral 
judgment circulating in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  
In order to contextualize Barbauld’s demonstration of how the sense of beauty entails an 
ethical move on the side of the perceiver/observer, it is worth examining the influence of Francis 
Hutcheson’s Two Treatises and Joseph Addison’s formulation of the “pleasure of the 
imagination”—not only because Hutcheson’s language and logic are echoed and complicated in 
Barbauld’s own works, but also because he nicely articulates how the human understanding of 
beauty prompts an “ethical experience of life.” As has been much discussed, the discursive 
history of the sublime dates back to Longinus, who was focused on how the rhetorical sublime 
could serve the ends of eloquent speech. Many centuries later, John Locke put forth the centrality 
of the senses to our understanding of sublimity and set the tone for discourses on aesthetics for 
the rest of the eighteenth century. External stimuli and bodily receptions become predominant, 
for example, in the work of Hutcheson. Thus, what Emily Brady categorizes as the “empirical 
sublime” is an apt term to articulate relationship between sensorial registers and the actual 
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objects which evoke a sense of the sublime.286 No longer is sublime experience limited to being a 
part of or a response to speech, but it comes to have relevance to our description of objects and 
the natural world. It should be noted that Joseph Addison attempted to expand the range of 
sublimity from the confines of materiality by re-introducing the term imagination. In his oft-cited 
piece, Spectator No. 412, Addison defines the “Pleasures of the Imagination” as the end result of 
witnessing the “Great, Uncommon, or Beautiful.”287 By couching pleasurable experience 
predominantly in terms of sight-oriented experience, Addison anticipates Burke’s more 
physiological, bodily underpinnings of the sublime. This particular piece is significant for 
understanding Barbauld’s work, mainly because the author singles out three sources of the 
sublime: “everything that is Great, Strange, or Beautiful.”288 Addison, in the form of a reader’s 
letter, discusses another dimension of the sublime. In Spectator No. 489, the inserted letter from 
a reader notes that his firsthand experience with the tumultuous sea has entailed a sense of 
horror.289 The ensuing commentary of the reader is noteworthy because in it he summarizes how 
his recognition of the vitality of nature rather compelled him to reflect on the existence of God, 
who created even the “troubled Ocean” and is “neither circumscribed by Time nor Space.”290 
This issue registers a moment of transcendence to the divine when faced with the vitality of 
nature, which in itself signifies a staple early modern aesthetic, epistemological response to the 
inherent unruliness of nature. This piece also works, however, as a reference point to the way 
late eighteenth-century Britons or Romantics responded to similar natural phenomena.  
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Before we move on to late eighteenth-century understandings of nature with a focus on 
the sublime and vitality, Hutcheson’s An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and 
Virtue in Two Treatises (1726) demands a careful reading in relation to Barbauld’s formulations 
of human perceptions of beauty, novelty, and justice. In it, Hutcheson champions religious, 
humanitarian ideals of beauty and justice; Barbauld’s poetry resonates with his influence, 
particularly in her treatment of similar subject matter. Hutcheson starts from the Lockean 
premise that the mind can be a passive receptor of a broad spectrum of external stimuli: external 
objects act upon the body and the whole process is termed sensation.291 He puts forward three 
causes of pleasurable experience—beauty, regularity, and harmony—in a manner similar to 
Addison. Hutcheson goes on to list the kinds of things—both concrete and abstract—from which 
a subject can draw pleasure, ranging from nature to arts, and even to mathematical theorems (§ 
1.1.10-1.1.12, § 3.1.2, 3.1.4-3.1.5). Once he lays out the foundations of the sensorial experience 
of pleasure and the perception of beauty, Hutcheson underlines that this whole process is not 
merely aesthetic, but also cognitive: “For Beauty, like other Names of the sensible Ideas, 
properly denotes the Perception of some Mind”:292  
Hence it plainly appears, ‘that some Objects are immediately the Occasions of this Pleasure 
of Beauty, and that we have Senses fitted for perceiving it; and that it is distinct from that 
Joy which arises from Self-love upon Prospect of Advantage.’ Nay, do we not often see 
Convenience and Use neglected to obtain Beauty, without any other prospect of Advantage 
in the Beautiful Form, that the suggesting the pleasant Ideas of Beauty? Now this shews us, 
                                                
291 Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, and etc, An Inquiry into the Original of Our 
Ideas of Beauty and Virtue in Two Treatises (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004), 19. 
292 Ibid., 27. This is later contradicted by Kant’s claim that aesthetic judgment is neither cognitive nor 
logical. See Immanuel Kant’s “Analytic of the Beautiful” in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. 
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that however we may pursue beautiful Objects from Self-love, with a view to obtain the 
Pleasures of Beauty, as in Architecture, Gardening, and many other Affairs; yet there must 
be a Sense of Beauty, antecedent to Prospects even of this Advantage, without which Sense, 
these Objects would not be thus Advantageous, nor excite in us this Pleasure which 
constitutes them advantageous. Our Sense of Beauty from Objects, by which they are 
constituted good to us, is very distinct from our Desire of them when they are thus 
constituted: Our Desire of Beauty may be counter-ballanc’d by Rewards or Threatenings, 
but never our Sense of it; even as Fear of Death, or Love of Lie, may make us chuse and 
desire a bitter Potion, or neglect those Meats which the Sense of Taste would recommend as 
pleasant; and yet no prospect of Advantage, or Fear of Evil, can make their Potion 
agreeable to the Sense, or Meat disagreeable to it, which was not so antecedently to this 
Prospect.293  
In the passage cited above, Hutcheson analyzes the way in which the human mind registers a 
beautiful object: the object functions as a trigger for our perception of beauty, and the external 
stimulus leads the human subject to choose a certain form of beauty. That is evident so far. The 
process becomes complicated, however, when Hutcheson suggests the idea that we have an a 
priori perception of beauty—a preordained understanding of beauty common to all human minds, 
which is resonant with Kant’s account of aesthetic perception in his third Critique.294 After 
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nonhuman species.      
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laying out the premise of our a priori understanding of beauty, Hutcheson then suggests that the 
actual choice of beauty associated with the good in this context can be affected by either 
“Reward” (i.e. pleasantness) or “Threatenings” (unpleasantness). With regard to the decision-
making process surrounding the  good and the beautiful, Gabrielle Starr, drawing on the 
methodology of cognitive neuroscience, notes that perceiving beauty, which actually had long 
been overlooked in the Western canon, does not actually provide a neat, cohesive picture of 
human mind. Rather, she argues that “[t]here is yet more discontinuity, and even 
fragmentation.”295 Despite Hutcheson’s attempt at providing a coherent understanding as to how 
human subjects perceive beauty, the diverging results of actual human choices of beautiful 
objects hints at the very fragmented, socially inflected dimension of aesthetic judgment and 
ethical action.      
In addition, what is distinctive in Hutcheson’s first treatise is his consistent claim that the 
multiplicity of particulars ultimately conforms to the unity of the universal as divinely ordained. 
This kind of frame in which particulars serve the “unity” of the universal is also found in 
Goethe’s Metamorphosis of Plants (1790). Goethe’s botanical specimens collected in the book 
work as the tangible index of God’s creation. Since Hutcheson’s theory of beauty never goes 
beyond the trajectory of his Christian belief, the sum of particulars or the seemingly “infinite” 
number of sources of pleasure especially found in nature is understood to serve the unity of the 
world. Lastly, in the second treatise Hutcheson departs from his analysis of beauty perception to 
discuss the realm of virtue and justice. In doing so, he posits virtuous, just actions as void of self-
interest: “none of these Affections which we call virtuous, spring from Self-love, or Desire of 
private Interest.”296 He rather underlines that benevolence, the “desire of or delight in, the Good 
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of others” should be disinterested. Moral action, according to Hutcheson, is promoted by “Love 
to rational Agents” and joined by “Love of Esteem and Complacence.”297 Towards the end of the 
second treatise, this intersubjective moral imperative is extended to the discussion of rights. 
Scarry echoes this move in her examination of the link between the recognition of beauty and the 
realization of justice.298   
This understanding of the link between beauty perception and the ethical imperative 
becomes much more complicated when a human perceiver is faced with the vital forces of nature. 
Indeed, as many have pointed out, the late eighteenth century was a transitional period from a 
mechanistic, physics-oriented universe to a life-filled, biology-centered one. Catherine Packham, 
for instance, defines vitalism and the period that incubated and further developed the notion as 
the “transitional period between the rejection of earlier mechanical models and the formalization 
of the modern sciences of life, including the discipline of biology, at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century.”299 Denise Gigante likewise defines the Romantic age as the period in which 
Britons were invested in grasping the “unifying principle of organic form” when faced with the 
“unpredictable vitality of living form.”300 Admittedly, the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries can be read as the age of vitality. Robert Mitchell explores experimental vitalism in the 
Romantic period when shifts in the “[s]cientific understanding of living beings change 
significantly,” along with changes in “aesthetic norms and artistic practices.”301  
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Every thing that is Small, Strange, and Still Beautiful: 
Ethical Subjectivity and the Nature Poetry of Barbauld and Smith 
 
Late eighteenth-century Britons learned to explore a wide range of living organisms 
through the new lens of experimental philosophy, which enabled them to recognize how the 
vitality of nature can work independently of human needs or designs. Britons recognized afresh 
various facets of the natural world for many reasons: more frequent encounters with nature or 
with representations of it, increasingly precise knowledge of the body of nature owing to 
advancements in observational technologies, an increase of both zoological and botanical 
specimens brought into Britain, the popularity of anatomy theaters, and publications of botanical 
illustrations and anatomical reports.302 At the same time, attempts to illuminate more mysterious 
aspects of nature often involved a degree of violence or cruelty in the form of experimental 
animal vivisection.303 The widespread mistreatment of animals therefore went hand in hand with 
the refinement of observational technologies. This development, in turn, prompted ethical action 
for protecting, or at least improving the status quo of animal treatment protocols. Before Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818) and H. G. Wells The Island of Dr Moreau (1896), eighteenth-
century Britons were, to some degree, aware of such practices.304   
In this section I single out three poems to explore how Barbauld’s attention to nonhuman 
species develops from imagining them as objects of curiosity and beauty, to becoming objects of 
care and moral attention, and finally to being considered companion species. To examine 
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Barbauld’s moral and literary concerns with nonhuman species, I start with “The Caterpillar” (c. 
1816) as a means for understanding her ethics, to which her dissenter sentiment and her 
empirical approach to natural objects are integral. This is a poem of encounter that captures the 
moment when a cognitive event takes place. Once a caterpillar enters the horizon of the 
speaker’s perception, it brings about many changes on the side of the observer/speaker of the 
poem. “The Caterpillar” is an important piece within Barbauld’s oeuvre in that it demonstrates 
the culmination of the poet’s ethical, aesthetic concerns with a nonhuman species. It is already a 
well established fact that Barbauld engaged with the animal rights movement, as is manifested in 
her earlier poems like “The Mouse’s Petition” and “To a Dog,” which I will discuss after this 
section on “The Caterpillar.”  
Barbauld’s attention to the caterpillar is unique in that it involves appreciating a “lower” 
being within the chain of beings. Her poem starts with the speaker’s assertion that she will let the 
small insect go unharmed: “No, helpless thing, I cannot harm thee now” (line 1). This firm, albeit 
sudden ethical action, it turns out, is prompted by the particulars of the caterpillar. The speaker’s 
deliberate, studious examination of the caterpillar yields a bulk of new knowledge about the 
object to her attentive eyes. It is even quite notable to see Barbauld’s speaker deploy the word 
“scan” to indicate the degree of her curiosity as well as to illustrate her mode of observation:  
For I have scanned thy form with curious eye, 
Noted the silver line that streaks thy back, 
The azure and the orange that divide     
Thy velvet sides; thee, houseless wanderer,  
My garment has enfolded, and my arm 
Felt the light pressure of thy hairy feet; 
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Thou hast curled round my finger; from its tip, 
Precipitous descent! with stretched out neck,   
Bending thy head in airy vacancy, 
This way and that, inquiring, thou hast seemed 
To ask protection; now, I cannot kill thee. (lines 3-13) 
At first glance, the intensity of the speaker’s curiosity and her ensuing attention resonates with 
Leibniz’s notions of “prolonged scrutiny” as a “potentially more voluntary” act of attention.305 
At the same time, it evokes the longstanding underpinnings of perception and aesthetics well 
grounded in the form of an object, as exemplified in the works of John Locke, Lord Shaftesbury, 
and Francis Hutcheson. In The First Treatise of An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of 
Beauty and Virtue, Hutcheson neatly illustrates the correlation between the idea of the beautiful 
and an encounter with novelty. Hutcheson attempts to prove that “an infinite Multitude of 
particular truths” (36) should correspond to the universal, saying “Novelty is generally very 
agreeable, and heightens the Pleasure in the Contemplation of Beauty; but then the Novelty of a 
particular Truth, found out by measuring … gives no considerable Pleasure, nor Surprize” (40) 
because it should fit with the “Unity amidst such a great Variety” (40).  
In the passage quoted above, Barbauld’s speaker’s attentive gaze leads her to 
acknowledge the color variations—silver, blue, orange—and the texture of the caterpillar’s body 
surface, which is velvety. More importantly, the living body of the caterpillar exerts pressure, no 
matter how slight it might be, upon the speaker’s arm. It is not a static nonhuman, trivial life that 
simply boasts vibrant colors, but also a mobile, active life that indicates its own agency. In the 
course of registering each sensory dimension of the caterpillar, the speaker’s attention to the 
                                                
305 Quoted in Margaret Koehler, Poetry of Attention in the Eighteenth Century (New York: Palgrave, 
2012), 25.  
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colors of the caterpillar is worth noting in that it embodies the particularity and individuality of 
the insect. As in Scarry’s analysis of the correlation between particulars and the perception of 
beauty, Barbauld’s speaker perceives particular elements of an object  hand as a fundamental 
step toward recognizing its beauty. Such recognition, in turn, is a portal to further ethical action. 
In this poem, colors are key components that display the caterpillar’s beauty. In “To Mrs. 
P[riestley] with Some Drawings of Birds and Insects,” Barbauld notes an identical moment of 
recognition:  
What atom forms of insect life appear!   
And who can follow nature’s pencil here? 
Their wings with azure, green, and purple gloss’d, 
Studded with colour’d eyes, with gems emboss’d,  
Inlaid with pearl, and mark’d with various strains 
Of lively crimson thro’ their dusky veins.  
Some shoot like living stars, athwart the night, 
And scatter from their wings a vivid light,  
To guide the Indian to his tawny loves,  
As thro’ the woods with cautious step he moves.  
 See the proud giant of the bettle race; 
What shining arms his polish’d limbs enchase!  (lines 103-114) 
While the lines suggest Barbauld’s conversance with Lucretian materialism, the speaker’s 
recognition of the insect’s individual colors resonates with the degree of her admiration at the 
wondrous novelty of nature, with which a painter/poet cannot compete. Within Barbauld’s 
universe, governed as it is by Christian humanity, such vibrant colors as “azure, green, and 
  174 
purple” that adorn the insect’s body work as a tangible marker of beauty imbedded in God’s 
creation. Barbauld pays persistent attention to the colors of the insect body to stress its individual 
beauty independent of its utility.  
If particular colors function as an index of the individuality of the nonhuman specimen, 
apprehension of these particulars also works as the precondition for further sympathy and moral 
action. After witnessing the bodily details of the caterpillar, the speaker eventually reaches a 
moment of empathy when she is explicitly worried if the caterpillar might fall, imagining the 
potential harm to be caused by its “Precipitous descent” (line 10). Within ten lines or so, the 
caterpillar in question is depicted as an autonomous but still vulnerable creature. Of course, it is 
notably anthropocentric to assume such movement as a call for “protection,” but the brief 
moment of encounter and the speaker’s ensuing observations of the caterpillar definitely lead the 
speaker to take action for the “houseless wanderer.” The speaker’s identification with the 
caterpillar leaves room for political interpretation, yet my primary concern lies with the way in 
which acquisition of particular knowledge results in the speaker’s outright admission that the 
insect has its own life, vitality, and individuality:306  
A single wretch, escaped the general doom, 
Making me feel and clearly recognize   
Thine individual existence, life, 
And fellowship of sense with all that breathes,— 
Present’st thyself before me, I relent, 
And cannot hurt thy weakness. …  (lines 24-29, my emphasis) 
                                                
306 See Felicity James and Ian Inkster, eds. Religious Dissent and the Aikin-Barbauld Circle, 1740-1860 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) for more on the broad religious and political 
implications of Barbauld’s life and works as a liberal dissenter.  
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This short poem about an unusual encounter aptly illustrates how so-called “fellow-feeling” is 
evoked as a result of the observer’s gaining particular knowledge about the object of her 
attention. The act of beneficence, to borrow Adam Smith’s term, is invoked not by force, but by 
the vitality of the nonhuman being.307 Thus, what is most distinctive in the series of observations, 
expressions of care, and ethical decisions Barbauld articulates in this poem lies in how the 
caterpillar is depicted. It is rife with color, mobility, and even a certain weight, all of which calls 
for both responsibility and care from the human observer. Barbauld’s own short piece on 
sympathy argues that appropriate sympathy ought to be prompted by “a degree of complacence 
mixed with our sorrows.”308 Furthermore, the object of sympathy, Barbauld suggests, should be 
represented as a being of “grace and dignity.”309  
The train of perceptions lodged in Barbauld’s firsthand observations and empirical 
attention resonates with eighteenth-century theories of human perception and moral taste. Francis 
Hutcheson in his Inquiry writes that “enumerating … sensible Ideas [particular components or 
sensorial dimensions of an object]” is the foundation of moral and aesthetic action.310 When a 
human mind receives, ingests, and eventually abstracts the particulars from an object, that 
process can lead to further action. And the sense of beauty quite matters to incite such acts within 
Hutcheson’s Inquiry. Elaine Scarry takes a similar position: paying attention to the particulars of 
an object of beauty prompts ethical action on the part of the human observer, and it ultimately 
                                                
307 For more on the large array of circumstances that provoke sympathy, and for Adam Smith’s own 
understanding of benevolence, see The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. Knud Haakonsssen (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 12, 13, 15-16, 41-42, 47, 53, 70, 82, 85-89. See also, T. A. Roberts, 
The Concept of Benevolence (London, Basinstoke: Macmillan, 1973).  
308 Anna Laetitia Barbauld, An Enquiry into Those Kinds of Distress which Excite Agreeable Sensations 
(1773) in Anna Letitia Barbauld: Selected Poetry and Prose, ed. William McCarthy and Elizabeth Kraft 
(Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview, 2002), 200-01. 
309 Ibid. 
310 Hutcheson, An Inquiry, 20.  
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paves the way for justice.311 Surely, the overall observation of the mobility and appearance of the 
caterpillar rests on gazing and staring. Yet it is worth tracing how the mechanism of sympathy 
develops within the poem: how does the speaker/observer elevate a seemingly undeserving 
object to a status which demands our sustained attention and sympathy?  
In An Enquiry into Those Kinds of Distress which Excite Agreeable Sensations (1773), 
Barbauld provides a glimpse into how sympathy is provoked and effects a chain of further 
action. Here she notes that nothing ignoble or petty can elevate the sense of pity; only something 
“agreeable,” something that is aesthetically pleasant can evoke the feeling of pity:  
A judicious author will never attempt to raise pity by any thing mean or disgusting. As 
we have already observed, there must be a degree of complacence mixed with our 
sorrows to produce an agreeable sympathy; nothing, therefore, must be admitted which 
destroys the grace and dignity of suffering; the imagination must have an amiable figure 
to dwell upon; there are circumstances so ludicrous or disgusting, that no character can 
preserve a proper decorum under them or appear in an agreeable light.312  
Echoing Hutcheson’s ideas about the relationship between perception, beauty, and morality, 
Barbauld argues that a pleasant object tends to draw more attention and sympathy from an 
observer. Hence, the speaker’s sudden interest in the seemingly ignorable insect rather highlights 
the dilemma of attention: which objects deserve and require a longer duration of human interest? 
What is the proper object of human care? At least according to the argument made in Barbauld’s 
Enquiry, the caterpillar is a rather unusual choice. The vibrant colors and the motility of the 
                                                
311 Scarry, pp. 67, 78. I concur with Scarry’s insistent counterargument that gazing does not necessarily 
result in either objectification or reification of the said object of human observation. She rather demands a 
careful reading of the consequence of gazing, depending on the “object of perception” (72).  
312 Anna Laetitia Barbauld, An Enquiry into Those Kinds of Distress which Excite Agreeable Sensations 
in Anna Letitia Barbauld: Selected Poetry and Prose, ed. William McCarthy and Elizabeth Kraft 
(Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview, 2002), pp. 200-01. 
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caterpillar, as noted previously, can definitely serve as important markers of life, agency, and 
vitality. Still, does the caterpillar definitely pass as a novelty?  
If we take into consideration what Lord Kames discusses in his treatise, the mechanism 
of sympathy gets all the more complicated. Lord Kames illustrates that the degree of emotional 
response to a novelty depends on the significance of the object of observation. That is, a chain of 
being predetermines the degree of human sympathy:  
Novelty in the individuals of a low class is perceived with indifference, or with a very 
slight emotion: thus a pebble, however singular in its appearance, scarce moves our 
wonder. The emotion rise with the rank of object; and, other circumstances being equal, 
is strongest in the highest order of existence: a strange insect affects us more than a 
strange vegetable; and a strange quadruped more than a strange insect.313 
This helps readers better understand the position of the caterpillar, apparently undeserving of 
either attention or redemption. Yet Barbauld’s choice of the caterpillar echoes contemporary 
fascination with “‘non-organic’ living beings such as polyps and fertilized eggs, which clearly 
lived but at the same time lacked the organs that characterized all other living things.”314 As 
Londa Schiebinger duly notes, the caterpillar embodies “metamorphosis” and various “life 
cycles” which ultimately intrigue the speaker/observer of Barbauld’s poem.315 The caterpillar’s 
in-between state might have provoked the speaker’s intellectual curiosity. The small body frame 
of the caterpillar contains all kinds of potential for bodily maturity, unknown or unknowable 
development. Further, the caterpillar, like a bee—a more oft-cited insect in eighteenth-century 
literature—epitomizes utility, the potential for producing silk and threads. Although it is unclear 
                                                
313 Henry Home, Lord Kames, Elements of Criticism, Vol. 1, ed.  Peter Jones (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
2005), 191. 
314 Robert Mitchell, Experimental Life, 3.   
315 Londa Schiebinger, Plants and Empire, 34. 
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to what degree Barbauld would have been conscious of the use value of the caterpillar, its utility 
is surely an important component facilitating human attention and sympathetic reaction. 
Barbauld’s keen interest in the caterpillar therefore mirrors her shared enthusiasm for the life 
matter and vitality of a small object.   
Even more importantly, the materiality of the caterpillar suggests the possibility of 
reading it as an object entangled with existing commercial and colonial networks. Against the 
backdrop of the caterpillar hype, as suggested by Schiebinger, Barbauld’s caterpillar takes on a 
new meaning within the web of European colonial projects. Schiebinger’s account of Maria 
Sibylla Merian (1647-1717) shows how an early modern female botanist’s research was 
enmeshed in commercial ventures. Simultaneously, this portrait reveals the way in which 
scientific institutes (The Royal Society and the Academy of Sciences in Berlin) funded the 
potentially lucrative business of specimens collecting: 
Like many male naturalists Merian also joined commercial interests to her scientific 
voyage. In the same way that Sloane sought a substitute for the valuable Peruvian bark in 
Jamaica, Merian sought other varieties of caterpillars in Surinam that, like silkworms, 
might produce fine thread. Silk was, in this period, big business. In 1700, the Academy of 
Sciences in Berlin tried (unsuccessfully) to fund their scientific endeavors through a silk 
monopoly; Merian’s own stepuncle was in the silk trade in Frankfurt. Silk indeed became 
important in colonial manufactory: in the late eighteenth century, the ‘Lady Governess’ 
of the English East India Company in India, for instance, directed a plantation of 
mulberry tress at the female orphanage in Madras where at least one hundred girls were 
profitably engaged producing silk.316  
                                                
316 Ibid., 34. 
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In this early eighteenth-century context, caterpillars in Surinam drew attention due primarily to 
their utility, their practical use value. Caterpillars in Surinam are associated with the potential for 
enormous profit through their production of silk, another word for money. Even though it is not 
exactly clear to what degree Barbauld would have been knowledgeable about the early hype 
surrounding Surinam caterpillars, Merian’s own empirical observation of the caterpillar—
asserting that it created a thread of distinct color—surely supports my claim that the caterpillar 
can be interpreted as a natural object (or a commodity in Merian’s context) implicated in the web 
of European colonialism. Just as Elaine Freedgood articulates the colonial context behind the 
mahogany desk in Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre (1847), I want to foreground that this seemingly 
wondrous natural object also indicates a possible connection to the colonial context. Given her 
keen interest in political issues, such as the repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts, and the 
abolition of the slave trade, Barbauld might well have known about the itinerary of Surinam 
caterpillars. 
Charlotte Smith’s Beachy Head (1807), wherein the speaker keeps track of time and of 
shifts in the natural world throughout the course of a day, registers a moment of recognition 
about the speaker’s connection to British commercial engagement with the rest of the world:  
Afar off, 
And just emerging from the arch immense 
Where seem to pat the elements, a fleet 
Of fishing vessels stretch their lesser sails; 
While more remote, and like a dubious spot 
Just hanging in the horizon, laden deep, 
The ship of commerce richly freighted, makes 
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Her slower progress, on her distant voyage, 
Bound to the orient climates; where the sun 
Matures the spice within its odrous shell, 
And, rivaling the gray worm’s filmy toil, 
Burst from its pod the vegetable down; 
Which in long turban’d wreaths, from torrid heat 
Defends the brows of Asia’s countless casts.317  
Barbauld’s boundless curiosity about world geography and her semi-encyclopedic knowledge of 
zoological habitants are revealing in her poem “Animals, and Their Countries,” in which the 
speaker, in the tone of a nursery rhyme, matches animals with their respective origins. The lion, 
for example, belongs in Africa boasting of his pompous walk. The boar belongs in German 
forests. Lapland is described as the habitat for a peasant working with reindeer. Through this list, 
the speaker suggests a kind of world travel by pinpointing some signature, apparently exotic 
species to her British audience. Some poems conjectured to be Barbauld’s own—“India,” 
“Lapland,” and “Canada”—bespeak the poet’s keen interest in the expanding British colonies.318  
Such poems might be connected to Barbauld’s long-held interest in those who suffer the 
most in the status quo. Barbauld produced many works that demonstrate her profound 
engagement with current affairs that demand sympathetic and practical resolution: take, for 
example, poems like “The Rights of Woman” and “To the Poor,” Barbauld’s spirited political 
response entitled An address to the Opposers of the Repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts 
(1790), and even more aesthetic and ethical prose works like An Enquiry into those Kinds of 
                                                
317 Charlotte Smith, Elegiac Sonnets, Volumes I and II, The Emigrants, Beachy Head: With Other Poems, 
Uncollected Poems, The Works of Charlotte Smith, Vol. 14, ed. Jacqueline M. Labbe (London: Pickering 
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318 McCarthy included these poems at the end of his collection of Barbauld’s poems.  
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Distress which Excite agreeable Sensations (1773). Barbauld continuously attempted to identify 
who exactly was suffering from preventable, unnecessary forms of inequality and mistreatment, 
regardless of distinctions based on species, political allegation, and gender. The range of her 
objects of care can be read as quite expansive.  
Charlotte Smith’s nature poems envisage similar encounters with nonhuman life forms, 
encounters which register the speaker’s recognition of the other’s beauty as well as its novelty, 
her profound sense of care, and even her mild reprimand.319 Beachy Head holds a prominent 
position within Smith’s body of poetic work; it is undeniably Smith’s masterpiece, illustrating 
what Kelli M. Holt calls a “world of such microscopically exact beauty in which no human, even 
the observer of honoring it, can participate,” positioning Smith as “one of the first social 
ecologist poets.” As such, it deserves sustained critical attention.320 My analysis here, however, 
focuses on Smith’s shorter works because they are indicative of her acute interest in rather trivial 
objects—such as a bee, a butterfly, a moth, a violet, and so on—and because these short pieces 
so neatly register emotional, cognitive details at the moment of encounter that we can easily 
discern in them the perceptive frame of the poet. Let me begin with “The Glow-worm,” a poem 
that captures the moment of a child’s mesmerized wonder at the sight of beauty. When noticing 
the glow-worm for the first time, the supposedly innocent speaker compares it to an object 
placed on a planetary scale:  
He sees before his inexperienced eyes  
The brilliant Glow-worm, like a meteor, shine  
On the turf-bank; – amazed, and pleased, he cries,  
                                                
319 Interestingly enough, her poems are rich with a sharp imperative reflecting her concerns about the 
circumstance of the object of her observation. 
320 Stuart Curran, “Charlotte Smith and British Romanticism,” 77; Kelli M. Holt, “Charlotte Smith’s 
Beachy Head: Science and the Dual Affliction of Minute Sympathy,” ABO: Interactive Journal of Women 
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“Star of the dewy grass! – I make thee mine!” (lines 5-8) 
The lines are punctuated by the child’s excitement at the beauty of a brilliant insect, which leads 
to his desire for possession. Smith’s nature poems often extend sympathy to organic life form 
that are exposed to natural adversity (like coldness) or some other kind of delimiting, 
circumscribing condition. Unfortunate early harbingers of a coming season—butterflies, 
snowdrops, violets—fall into the ambit of Smith’s concern and sympathy. For instance, in “The 
Early Butterfly” her sympathy flows into a butterfly that comes out “in a luckless hour” (line 9) 
mainly because in its “unexperienc’d rashness” it appears too soon, which precipitates its 
premature death. On a similar note, in “Violets,” the poet pours her concern toward an 
insignificantly small flower heralding spring. In a way akin to Barbauld’s attention to the 
caterpillar, Smith’s gaze inclines to the small flower situated in its “humble beds / Among the 
moss, beneath the thorn” (lines 1-2). In this poem, Smith reveals the degree of her empathy 
through interjecting a direct imperative: her deployment of verbs like “stay” (in the case of 
“Violets”) and “go” (in case of “To a Butterfly in a Window”) indicates her sense of urgency and 
empathy at the predicaments of each species. Though Barbauld’s characteristically lingering 
attention to the physical form of each nonhuman species is not so much fleshed out in Smith’s 
poems, her particular attention to the material condition of each registers a similar account of 
sympathy.  
A more developed form of sympathy stemming from Smith’s reflection on the 
ramifications of human intervention in nature is pronounced in poems like “A Walk by the 
Water” and “The Hedge-hog Seen in a Frequent Path,” where Smith not only demonstrates her 
sympathy toward a particular animal, but also voices her critique of human cruelty. Towards the 
end of “A Walk by the Water,” the speaker asks fish not to fear her and her companion(s):  
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Do not dread us, timid fishes,  
    We have neither net nor hook; 
Wanderers we, whose only wishes  
    Are to read in nature’s book. (lines 17-20) 
The net and the hook are tools for fishing and thus pose a huge threat to the fish. While 
acknowledging the possibility of this threat to the nonhuman species, the speaker emphasizes 
that her primary task as a “wanderer” of nature is to “read” it carefully. Her suggestion of the 
careful reading of nature as an alternative to the “net” and the “hook” can be interpreted as an 
embodiment of her ethical stance toward nature. In “The Hedge-hog” Smith’s ethical stance 
takes a more active form because she happens to witness the way in which a human hunts a 
hedgehog for entertainment. From the beginning the poem is marked by a sense of urgency and 
anger: 
Wherefore should man or thoughtless boy 
Thy quiet harmless life destroy, 
Innoxious urchin?—for thy food 
Is but the beetle and the fly, 
And all thy harmless luxury 
The swarming insects of the wood. (lines 1-6)  
It is notable that the hedgehog’s life is limned as modest and harmonious with nature, as it is 
living on the “beetle and the fly.” Thus the noted human invasion is rather prominent and 
fundamentally malicious. In response to this human cruelty, Smith alerts readers that humans are 
endowed with God-given reason, underlining that it is nonsensical for man to “use his power in 
waging war / Against his brethren of the earth” (lines 11-12). Her use of “brethren” is couched in 
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the contemporary discourse of sympathy, especially evoking its relationship to the abolitionist 
and animal rights movements.321 Smith’s moral judgment here is nicely juxtaposed with 
Barbauld’s identical concerns about the life of a lab mouse.   
“The Mouse’s Petition” (1773) belongs in Barbauld’s earlier work and has been 
considered perhaps her most popular piece. From its initial publication, the poem sparked heated 
debates on Barbauld’s agenda in relation to Joseph Priestley’s engagement with animal 
experiments.322 Many associated the voice of the mouse with Barbauld’s criticism of human 
cruelty perpetrated against animal life.323 Barbauld, baffled by such a one-side reading of her 
poem, argues that she “is concerned to find, that what was intended as the petition of mercy 
against justice” has been taken as a “plea of humanity against cruelty.”324 Despite the fact that 
Barbauld’s well-intended defense of Priestley in the face of such criticism against the animal 
abuse that was quite rampant in experimental philosophy did not succeed, her letter shrewdly 
spells out the key concepts surrounding animal experiments and  the broad moral debates in the 
late eighteenth century around the conceptual definition of justice, mercy, cruelty, and humanity. 
                                                
321 For further details, see my discussion of the rhetoric of brotherhood in my following analysis of “The 
Mouse’s Petition.” 
322 Of course it is not Priestley alone who experimented with animals, but Barbauld’s friendship with him 
and his wife as discerned in her poems—such as “To Mrs. P[riestley], with some Drawings of Birds and 
Insects,” “An Inventory of the Furniture in Dr. Priestley’s Study,” and “To Dr. Priestley. Dec. 29, 
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Dissent and the Aikin-Barbauld Circle,” Religious Dissent and the Aikin-Barbauld Circle, 1-27. Here 
James argues that the engraving that captures the plausible image of the “Petition” actually belies the 
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324 Quoted in McCarthy and Elizabeth Kraft, ed. Anna Laetitia Barbauld, 69. 
  185 
Again, saturated in the language of Hutcheson and Adam Smith, Barbauld’s poetics underline 
how the language of care is implicated in both humanist and animal discourses. Hutcheson once 
notes that virtuous life—the culmination of happiness—is predicated on benevolence, which 
results from free will. Thus for him liberty is the primary condition for a happy virtuous life, to 
which Barbauld attests by extending benevolence to animal life in her poetry.  
If “The Caterpillar” registers a cognitive event wherein a small insect draws sustained 
attention from a human observer, “The Mouse’s Petition” is mainly mediated through the voice 
of the mouse. The desperate mouse from the beginning calls for readers’ attention by identifying 
its petition as a “pensive prisoner’s prayer” (line 1). Identifying itself as a prisoner, the speaker 
stresses its abject condition by insistently mentioning its confined state: “for here forlorn and sad 
I sit, / Within the wiry grate” (lines 5-6). Because of its unwanted, undue imprisonment, the 
mouse calls for “liberty” (line 2) from the “tyrant’s chain” (line 10) and from “strong oppressive 
force” (line 11). Apparently, given the diction conspicuous in this poem, “Petition” conveys a 
distinct political innuendo, as if the mouse represents the confined state of dissenters in general. 
Though this interpretation is valid and cogent,  I read the poem as an animal manifesto. The 
mouse’s petition claims that the natural state is one of the “common gifts of heaven” (line 24), a 
state the speaker in “Epitaph on a Goldfinch” (1774) describes as providing “native and 
inalienable rights” (line 20): 
The cheerful light, the vital air, 
Are blessings widely given; 
Let nature’s commoners enjoy 
The common gifts of heaven. 
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Echoing Barbauld’s own spirited inculcation in An address to the Opposers of the Repeal, here 
the reference to political liberty is more resonant with contemporary legislation concerning 
animal welfare at the dawn of the nineteenth century.325 Throughout the poem it is evident that 
the poet’s concern lies with the undeniable fact that animals can suffer. There have been 
manifold debates as to whether animals have souls or reason in order to justify or remedy the 
status quo treatment of animals, but Barbauld’s agenda as manifested in “The Petition” has more 
to do with animals’ ability to feel and thus suffer pain: her authorial attention falls squarely on 
the imprisoned state of the laboratory mouse, which can be interpreted in numerous ways, as 
Barbauld’s contemporaries did.   
To unravel the semantic layers of the poem, we should start with what constitutes the 
tyranny both inside and outside of the poem that suppresses the mouse. This term might refer to 
systematic forms of oppression: animal experimentation, slavery and the slave trade, and anti-
Dissenter bills. The oppressors themselves can easily be interpreted as a group of people or a 
collective body that denies “native and inalienable rights” to either non- or subhuman species in 
the eighteenth century. And yet, to narrow down the scope of my discussion to animal 
discourses, I will return to the grounds of moral action that the mouse calls for:  
Beware, lest in the worm you crush  
A brother’s soul you find; 
And tremble lest thy luckless hand     
Dislodge a kindred mind.  
                                                
325 The Anti-bull-baiting Bill provoked many debates in 1800 and 1802. The first society for the 
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Or, if this transient gleam of day 
Be all of life we share,  
Let pity plead within thy breast 
That little all to spare. (lines 33- 40) 
In these two stanzas, the mouse highlights a bond forged across species by arguing that the 
mouse himself is a “brother” and a “kindred sprit.” His use of brotherhood definitely echoes the 
contemporary abolitionist rhetoric widely circulated in the British Isles, “Am I Not a Man and a 
Brother?” Like the widely circulated image of an African slave pleading for his liberty and equal 
treatment, “The Petition” carries a suppliant tone, urging the voluntary extension of care and 
attention to the mouse’s seemingly undeserving species. Barbauld, keenly aware of 
contemporary abolitionist thought and rhetoric, lodges the language of the mouse within the 
critical discourse against human chattel, thereby underscoring uncomfortable truths about 
widespread practices of slavery and imprisonment in the century. What is unusual in Barbauld’s 
treatment of the mouse stems from the evidence the mouse provides in an effort to convince 
readers to release him from his current confined state. The speaker underlines the fact that his 
animal life and human lives are alike fleeting. Set against the scheme of divine temporality, their 
time is equally measured. If it is only a modicum of time that is left both to humans and to 
animals, that time should be committed to demonstrating benevolence and virtue. It is notable 
that Barbauld draws on the distinction between the natural timeline and the divine timeline to 
stress how creaturely life is dictated by the same temporality as human life, and eventually 
subject to divine judgment. It is not as explicitly stated as in Barbauld’s Hymns, but Barbauld 
situates this particular poem and her defense of humanity and justice in the working of divine 
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temporality. In an age when humans attempted to justify their dominance over animals (and 
other non- or ostensibly sub-human species) based on God’s command in Genesis, Barbauld 
reminds her readers of another important biblical passage indicating that God evenly takes care 
of both humans and animals:  
Your unfailing love, O LORD, is as vast as the heavens; 
    your faithfulness reaches beyond the clouds. 
Your righteousness is like the mighty mountains, 
    your justice like the ocean depths. 
You care for people and animals alike, O LORD. (Psalms 36:5-6, New Living Translation)  
Barbauld’s “Petition” offers a corrective to an anthropocentric understanding of nature through 
her emphasis on God caring for animals as well as humans.  
In addition to Barbauld’s recourse to biblical passages, to better contextualize this poem, 
we should explore the intersection of animal rights discourses, anti-slavery rhetoric, and the 
making of British or English subjecthood in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
Moira Ferguson has argued that in this transitional, revolutionary period certain acts of 
benevolence were understood as markers of civility readily associated with Englishness. 
According to Ferguson, women writers actively participated in propagating humanitarian 
discourses concerning slavery and animal abuse: “National character and racism were popular 
topics at the time. Animal protection, moreover, was a strategy for engaging in discussion of 
political ideas, national identity, and foreign policy. Women writers not only attacked cruelty 
against animals but complicated it to entwine the concerns of slaves and other subjugated 
communities.”326 Likewise, Christine Kenyon-Jones demarcates the turn of the nineteenth 
century and the following Romantic period as a watershed moment in which “humankind first 
                                                
326 Ferguson, Animal Advocacy and Englishwomen, 1.  
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seriously began to question its own centrality to the world in relation to animals”327 She also 
goes on to argue that the Romantic era is a fertile ground rife with “a new emphasis on nature” 
and debates about “animals’ difference from human beings and also about their similarity.”328  
Barbauld’s “To a Dog” can be taken as a minor piece compared to the two poems I have 
discussed earlier in terms of its subject matter, length, and the degree to which the speaker pays 
attention to the object. In it, the speaker catalogues canine virtues she happens to observe (or 
maybe just hears about), virtues one can readily identify in eighteenth-century animal eulogies—
both serious and satirical. Despite its excessively affectionate opening, the poem does not convey 
any intimate, personal bond between the owner and the dog itself. It may be partly because it is 
not about ‘the’ dog, but about a dog—a pet one can easily imagine. Even though the poet strives 
to flesh out the particulars of a dog, as if it were her own possession, the long list defies her 
attempts. The list rather treats very generic qualities that might characterize any dog: a canine 
penchant for sociability, a permanently domesticated state, and begging for human affection. It 
starts with an obviously affectionate opening, addressing the dog in question as the “dear faithful 
object of my tender care” (line 1). Nothing can be more exceedingly indulgent than this address. 
Yet the overall tone of the poem is condescending, suggesting that the speaker takes for granted 
the hierarchical power relations between humans and animals. What is fundamentally missing, in 
striking contrast to “The Caterpillar” in particular, is that we know nothing particular about the 
dog, but a handful of typifying canine characteristics, such as its “beseeching eyes” (line 9) that 
might seek for human affection, and a general tendency to please its master(s).  No specific 
colors, shapes, or any other physical attributes are listed even after the speaker of the poem 
suggests she might own the dog for a certain period of time.  
                                                
327 Christine Kenyon-Jones, Kindred Brutes, 1. 
328 Ibid., 2.  
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The speaker rather points to the function of the dog’s eyes, which work as a primary 
medium of communication. In so doing, the speaker underlines the fact that the dog has no 
language. In the long history of debates about animals, their alleged lack of language and soul  
almost always serves as a pretext for affirming human dominance over nonhuman species. 
Hence, it appears surprising that Barbauld would underline how the dog is unequipped with 
language proper in this poem. Seen through the overall threads of Barbauld’s personal, political, 
religious interests, this poem—predominantly condescending and indulgent, generic—appears to 
be an outlier. Where has her liberal sentiment gone? Her liberal engagement with contemporary 
political affairs as envisioned in “Corsica,” “The Rights of Woman,” and “To the Poor” does not 
stand out at all in this poem. Towards the end of the poem, the speaker reaffirms the dog’s 
inferior status by addressing it as a “safe companion, and almost a friend” (line 13, my 
emphasis). Barbauld’s emphasis on the dog’s companionship and her unusual insertion of the 
adverb “almost” might indicate not only the poet’s ambivalence toward the position of the dog, 
but also the extent of her self-censorship. As Ingrid Tague remarks in her study of eighteenth-
century pet culture and anti-slavery discourses, even if many eighteenth-century Britons pets are 
treated as friends, the “language of friendship, service, and slavery coexisted in eighteenth-
century discussion of animals.”329 Eighteenth-century pet culture in a way built on so-called 
animal slavery whose operation is justified by the longstanding, diehard belief in animal 
inferiority. However affectionate and sympathetic the human-pet relationship appears, it is 
predicated on the reactionary position that human superiority is always tenable. Also, given the 
fact that eighteenth-century British women were susceptible to derogatory criticism concerning 
their supposedly excessive, intimate bonds with pets, Barbauld might rather be opting for austere 
                                                
329 Ingrid H. Tague, “Companions, Servants, or Slaves?: Considering Animals in Eighteenth-Century 
Britain.” Studies in Eighteenth Century Culture 39 (2010): 111-30, 112. 
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poetry when it comes to unfolding her feeling towards a dog. Hence, her poem significantly 
lacks the keen interest in the particulars of the object of attention and care that is discernible in 
“The Caterpillar.”  
This discontent about the moral ambiguity of the poem arises in part from the fact that the 
exact context of the composition is not clear.330 The poem’s rhetorical development as well as 
the title itself suggests that “To a Dog” falls into the category of animal eulogies that flooded the 
eighteenth-century literary marketplace. Barbauld’s own “Epitaph on a Goldfinch,” which might 
have been written two years after the composition of “To a Dog,” definitely belongs to this 
genre, thereby suggesting that she is aware of the convention of animal eulogy which was quite 
popular in her period. John Gay, for instance, composed “An Elegy on a Lap-Dog” (1720) to 
commemorate his pet.331 Gay seizes on the pet’s death as an opportunity to reminisce about his 
time with the dog and to display his sense of the loss, just as early modern poets used the 
occasion of a friend’s death as an opportunity to boast about their poetic craftsmanship in the act 
of commemorating the loss of human life. In this way, Lycidas (1637) functioned for Milton 
analogously to the way pet eulogy functioned for some eighteenth century poets. In Gay’s 
“Elegy,” the speaker relates the degree of grief he feels at the death of his dear pet. The speaker’s 
somewhat overdramatic tone, and the churning of his various emotions would be taken as staple 
elements of this kind of poetry. The speaker clearly invites female mourners to respond to the 
death of his pet dog. Female mourners have been a common, gendered trope since ancient 
Greece, but this eighteenth-century animal eulogy indicates the heavily gendered vogue of pet-
keeping during the period:332 
                                                
330 McCarthy suggests that the date of composition would be around 1772, but does not provide any 
occasions to contextualize this poem.  
331 John Gay, Poems on Several Occasions (London: Jacob Tonson and Bernard Lintot, 1720) 
332 Greek tragedies and medieval literature are filled with women mourners. e.g. Chaucer, Knight’s Tale.  
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Shock's fate I mourn; poor Shock is now no more,   
             Ye Muses mourn, ye chamber-maids deplore. 
             Unhappy Shock! yet more unhappy fair, 
             Doom'd to survive thy joy and only care! (lines 1-4) 
As opposed to Barbauld’s list of the canine’s general qualities in “To a Dog,” Gay’s speaker 
begins to register a set of particulars about which he reminisces, including the dog’s favorite 
ribbon, and the way Shock combs his hair and the back of his ear (lines 5-8). Near the end of the 
poem, however, it becomes clear where the target of the poet’s criticism lies: it is the excessive 
care its female owner cultivated surrounding the dog. The speaker, echoing contemporary male 
detractors of female pet-owners, reminds his readers that it is only a dog, not a male lover that is 
now deceased: “ Why should such fears bid Celia's sorrow rise? / For when a lap-dog falls no 
lover dies” (lines 23-24). Thus, excessive mourning should be moderated, suggests the speaker. 
Francis Coventry also inserted an epitaph of a pet dog near the ending of The History of Pompey 
the Little in a heavily satirical manner.  
In her work on the eighteenth-century practice of commemorating the deaths of pets, 
Tague argues that pets serve to articulate “human virtues” instead of “human follies” by 
underlining our “special bond with animals.”333 In addition, Tague notes that animal eulogy also 
went through rhetorical shifts from serving as a catalogue of the animal’s universal virtues (as an 
exemplary tale) to becoming a literary form depicting human-animal friendship with an emphasis 
on the particulars of such relationships. Barbauld’s “To a Dog” can thus be read as a transitional 
poem in which the poet/speaker, on the one hand, acknowledges the symptomatic cultural trend 
toward pet-owners’ excessively cultivated care. On the other hand, the poet attempts to avoid the 
                                                
333 Ingrid Tague, “Dead Pets: Satire and Sentiment in British Elegies and Epitaphs for Animals.” 
Eighteenth-Century Studies 41.3 (2008): 289-306, 290.  
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pitfall of excessive sentimentalism usually associated with female pet-owners by maintaining 
distance from the dog. Still the pronounced lack of particulars attributed to the dog—the 
centerpiece of Barbauld’s habitual attention and care in poems of this kind—cannot be fully 
explained.  
Coda 
In an era characterized by sensibility, sympathy, and vitality, Barbauld paid particular 
attention to nonhuman or “subhuman” life forms throughout her poems. By analyzing the arc of 
her poetry in deliberately reverse order, I articulate the way Barbauld’s sustained attention to the 
corporeality of the caterpillar demonstrates that the perception of beauty leads to ethical action. 
This poem nicely captures how inter-special encounter can be a cognitive as well as an aesthetic 
event through which a human observer seizes the opportunity to appreciate and discern the 
beauty of a small insect. The speaker’s decision to release the caterpillar despite her previous 
history of killing other insects without much self-consciousness indicates that a sensorial 
recognition made possible by the encounter can actually result in an act of attention and care. 
“The Mouse’s Petition” rather works as a case study of justice and animal mistreatment. Even 
though the poem is charged with relevant political implications related to Barbauld’s dissenter 
sentiment, my argument is that it actually is preoccupied with common forms of animal abuse 
and mistreatment in the long eighteenth century. By closing the section with “To a Dog,” I 
attempt to situate Barbauld’s poetry with other contemporary animal eulogy and it-narratives 
mainly because her work has long been associated with pre-Romantic aesthetics and literary 
taste. By linking Barbauld’s works to long-eighteenth-century conventions of nature poetry and 
it-narratives, I want to underline the unique place she occupies in British cultural history, in 
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terms of her understanding of the relationship between aesthetic beauty, ethical judgment, and 
the vitality of organic beings.  
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Epilogue 
TOWARD BLENDED ONTOLOGIES:  
CONCEPTUALIZING THE POSTHUMAN, EMBODIED SUBJECTIVITY, AND AFFECTS 
IN LONG EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 
 
Touch, regard, looking back, becoming with—all these make us responsible in 
unpredictable ways for which worlds take shape.  
Donna Haraway, When Species Meet (2008)334 
 
Along with decoupling humankind’s material needs from nature, establishing an enduring 
commitment to preserve wilderness, biodiversity, and a mosaic of beautiful landscapes 
will require a deeper emotional connection to them.  
An Ecomodernist Manifesto (2015) 
 
 
An Ecomodernist Manifesto—a 31-page long, web-based document penned by a good 
number of scholars across disciplines and released in April 2015—is a collective response to the 
fast-deteriorating natural environment due to about a century of unprecedentedly rigorous human 
intervention into the natural world. Its stated purposes are deceptively simple and ring with far 
too familiar notes: the manifesto is aimed at emphasizing and promoting the “belief that both 
human prosperity and an ecologically vibrant planet are not only possible but also 
inseparable.”335 The Ecomodernist Manifesto, more importantly, chimes in a steady stream of 
recent scholarly publications that concern planetary, environmental, or ecological understandings 
of the present and the past, as evidenced in the 2016 special issue of Eighteenth-Century 
Studies.336 Although these examples deal with different subject matters, such orchestrated efforts 
that began to inundate academia for the first two decades of the twenty-first century mark a 
watershed, wherein scholars are invested in identifying and sharing responsibilities for global 
                                                
334 Haraway, When Species Meet, 36. 
335 John Asafu-Adjaye et. al., “An Ecomodernist Manifesto,” accessed 3 February 2016, 
http://www.ecomodernism.org/manifesto, 31. 
336 The special issue of Eighteenth-Century Studies 49.2 (2016) articulates various environmental 
concerns imbedded in eighteenth-century texts. Each article collected in the special issue purposefully 
puts forth the way eighteenth-century human subjects were enmeshed in the natural world, thereby 
reemphasizing the aesthetic, epistemological, and ethical significance of texts analyzed in each piece.   
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environmental crises that confront all of us.337 It is also noteworthy that the 2015 Manifesto 
registers the same sense of exigency discernible in Haraway’s landmark manifestos—“A 
Manifesto for Cyborgs” (1983) and The Companion Species Manifesto (2003)—mainly because 
manifestoes by nature are designed to present precise articulations of the most pressing concerns 
of the period to which they are addressed. If we recall, just as each of Haraway’s manifestos 
formulates a new subjectivity called for by the time of its publication, the kind of subjecthood 
conceptualized in the Ecomodernist Manifesto is a relational and ethical one. 
Prominent in this recent ecological manifesto, and directly pertinent to my dissertation is 
its proposal for “decoupling”—for promoting only the least invasive human engagement with 
nature—and its consistent emphases on the necessity of reinforcing an affective dimension in 
ecological ethics, namely a “deeper emotional connection.”338 This solution for the current global 
environmental concerns proposed in the Manifesto is firmly anchored in the assumption that 
humans are also part of natural assemblages—admittedly crucial, but hardly superior to any of 
our fellow species. Nothing can therefore better illustrate the interconnectivity between the 
human and the nonhuman than the suggested efforts at minimizing human influences upon 
nature. Since my dissertation informed by posthumanism, broadly construed, has investigated 
British culture’s affective relation to nonhuman subjectivity and agency in the context of the long 
eighteenth century, it has examined the way the multifarious subjectivities represented in the 
works by Defoe, Swift, and Barbauld in particular epitomize meaningful moments of collapse in 
                                                
337 In that sense, the recent surge of elaborating and solving issues related to the anthropocene and climate 
change—the latter is such a problematic term because it dilutes the intensity of environmental crisis we 
all are facing with, as Morton rightly criticizes—leads us back to McEwan’s fictional representation of a 
similar kind of conference Beard the protagonist visits, the one that I discuss at some length in Chapter 1. 
Timothy Morton criticizes the alternate employment of the term “climate change” that came to replace 
“global warming” as it diluted the urgency of the current climate crisis. Morton rather justifies his 
insistent use of the latter because “[w]hat we desperately need is an appropriate level of shock and anxiety 
concerning a specific ecological trauma.” See Morton, Hyperobjects, 8-9.  
338 Asafu-Adjaye, et. al, “An Ecomodernist Manifesto,” 27. 
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which the ontological and epistemological distinctions drawn between human subjects and 
nonhuman agents become blurred. In doing so, my dissertation has presented a new avenue 
toward two distinctive areas within eighteenth-century British literary and cultural studies: 
ecocriticism (concerning environmental enmeshment) and postcolonial studies (addressing 
historically specific British imbrications with commercial, scientific, and colonial networks of 
the century).  
I have found my methodological focus on posthumanist methodology, one of the major 
critical turns of our era that significantly coincides with new materialisms and the nonhuman 
turn, to be tremendously useful when discussing both the affective and the epistemological 
aspects of human-nonhuman interchanges as represented in the wide-ranging literary and non-
literary texts produced from 1670 to 1812 that are the focal point of this dissertation.339 Each of 
the four chapters engages with recent turns toward posthumanism and environmental ethics in 
literary studies by highlighting both the autonomy of marginalized objects and animals and the 
interconnectedness of the human and nonhuman. Throughout these four chapters, I have charted 
a broad arc of British subjects from an anxiety-ridden observer, one that can be read as the 
opposite side of a supposedly rational enlightened figure, to a caring subject who exhibits 
sympathy, benevolence, and ethical actions towards nonhuman species. But I want to highlight 
the fact that such shifting subjectivities—identities I have called “porous,” “anxious,” or fluid 
throughout this dissertation due primarily to their respective encounters with nonhuman agents—
detected in each chapter do not suggest either historically coherent development or some kind of 
organic evolution of so-called eighteenth-century subjecthood: I am not proposing a model for 
                                                
339 This dissertation is bookended by the publication of Butler’s The Elephant in the Moon (c. 1670s) and 
by Barbauld’s “The Caterpillar” (1812). 
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the historically congruous development of British subjectivities throughout the eighteenth 
century.  
Rather, the ever-present undercurrent of the four chapters that respectively covered 
disparate historical periods and different literary genres is the focused examination of embodied 
relationships between humans and nonhumans: visual, tactile, olfactory, and aural registers 
abound in and define these various contact zones. These sensorial registers, in turn, contribute to 
dismantling anthropocentric underpinnings of subjecthood, for “embodiment,” observes Alex 
Wetmore, “resists full incorporation into language.”340 Admittedly, scholarly efforts to dethrone 
human centrality, a privileged subject position firmly grounded in linguistic and representational 
systems, have long been criticized mainly because such efforts are inevitably implicated in 
representational systems. And yet, I believe any attempt to identify slippages and fissures within 
human subjects is a fundamentally ethical interpretive move. Not only do such readings reveal 
the extent to which nonhuman subjects actually shape human identity, they attest to the 
possibility of dissociating nonhuman bodies from the existing representational web—the main 
target posthumanist thinkers like Barad vehemently and successfully attacked—and they enable 
us to think about “who and what can count as the subject of ethical address.”341 Frost’s recent 
article similarly registers a degree of well-reasoned uncertainty about the actual outcome of 
decentering the established practices of endowing certain groups of people with privileges—as is 
found in anthropocentrism, Eurocentrism, and racism—even when she astutely acknowledges the 
                                                
340 Alex Wetmore, Men of Feeling in Eighteenth-Century Literature: Touching Fiction (New York: 
Palgrave, 2013), 167. Wetmore’s remarks here are prompted by his consideration of the achievements of 
affect studies scholarship by figures like Hayles, Mark Hansen, and Brian Massumi. Wetmore’s own 
focus on what he calls “embodied sensation” in his study of the affective dimension of eighteenth-century 
formulations of sensibility and attendant sensibility discourses beautifully articulates the way affective 
studies meets posthuman studies. 
341 Cary Wolfe, What is the Posthumanism?, 49. 
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ethical and aesthetic dimensions of our renewed interest in human-nonhuman, human-
environment relationships:  
But exactly how these ethically or aesthetically transformed relations might vivify or 
energize environmental politics is unclear. The reason is that in elaborating the 
interconnectedness of humans, non-human creatures, and their habitats, and in 
elucidating the forms of agency or effectiveness that non-human creatures and habitats 
have irrespective of human intention, these approaches diminish the human as an agent—
just as (human) collective political action is urgently needed.342 
This ethical, methodological dilemma noted above is quite pervasive in the writings of 
posthumanists, for any attempts to displace human subjectivity from its privileged, central 
position involves human intention, and the immediate outcome would not be entirely free of 
human-centeredness. However, my manifold efforts to tease out literary evidence of displaced, 
decentered human subject positions from the texts analyzed here has enabled me to identify 
blended ontologies as well as blended epistemologies in eighteenth-century culture. For example, 
in Chapter 3, on Defoe’s nonfictional and fictional accounts of the 1703 storm and the 1665 
plague, I investigated the way corporeal experience with natural calamities undermines the 
enlightened methods deployed to understand the disasters’ origin and scope because of the 
excessiveness inherent to nonhuman agents. Defoe’s eighteenth-century disaster writings thus 
reveal precisely where the fundamentally anthropocentric, enlightened project of understanding 
the natural world fails.   
In the last two chapters, I investigated the way a vast array of human affects—wonder, 
anxiety, terror, sympathy, and benevolence—are occasioned by nonhuman agents. Chapter 4 
analyzed Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels to examine how the normative configurations of humanity 
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and rationality border on animality and machinery. Gulliver’s own troubled interaction with 
yahoos and his family members exemplify the prominent aspect of his affects: anxiety and fear. 
My juxtaposition of Gulliver’s Travels with La Mettrie’s Man a Machine enables us to see how 
seminal eighteenth-century literary texts anticipate current posthumanist intervention in 
cybernetics and hybridity. Chapter 5 focused on Barbauld’s animal poems in order to investigate 
late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century formulations of ethical subjecthood in conjunction 
with contemporary scientific, aesthetic, and ethical discourses. It is notable that this chapter was 
more focused on emotions that carry a positive connotation, such as the perception of beauty, 
sympathy, and fellow-feeling, in sharp contrast to the first three chapters exploring anxiety and 
terror. My ultimate task in the chapter was to argue that Barbauld’s disciplined attention to the 
autonomy and beauty of nonhuman animals provides a glimpse of an expanding intersubjective 
community as well as the interconnectivity between humans and environs, humans and animals 
across the globe. Ultimately, this last chapter laid out foundations for elaborating further the 
ecological, colonial network of the eighteenth century.   
As this dissertation has examined the agential power of nonhuman colonial subjects, it 
points the way toward a broader investigation into what might be called the “colonial nonhuman” 
in eighteenth-century culture, a new form of postcolonial critique focused on the overlooked 
agency of marginalized subjects. Chapter 2, a lengthy case study of interrelations between the 
circulation of elephant representations and the formation of British subjectivity, traced natural 
philosophers’ disparate responses to the elephant, as illustrated in Samuel Butler’s satirical 
portrait of the Royal Society virtuosi and Patrick Blair’s hands-on experience with the elephant. 
It also analyzed an elephant speaker who offers social commentary on mid-eighteenth-century 
English colonial policies, and late eighteenth-century elephant automata. The chapter thereby 
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presented a wide-ranging picture of British identity, from an amateur natural philosopher unable 
to use modern scientific devices to an enlightened subjectivity, and then on to mundane British 
consumers oblivious to the network of commerce, trade, and colonial projects in play in the 
historic period.  
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Figure 2. An excerpt from Patrick Blair, Osteographia Elephantina 
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Figure 3. Pidcock's Exhibition of Wild Beasts, 1797 (?) 
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Figure 4. Exeter-Change. London, 1800 (?) 
 
